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[T]he legal mind has always preferred multiplication to division.
- Grant Gilmore'
I. Introduction
In the ordinary run of situations, testators leave their property to other
persons. Most estates flow from hand to hand, typically enriching members
* © 1999 by Adam J. Hirsch. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, Florida State
University. M.A. 1979, J.D. 1982, Ph.D. 1987 Yale University. A substantial portion of this
Article was composed underthe auspices oftheRogerTraynor Summer Research Professorship,
endowed at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I wish to express my
heartfelt gratitude to the Traynor family, whose gift for a purpose allowed me precious free time
to contemplate the problem of bequests for purposes. I am also grateful to Rob Atldnson, Steve
Bank, Jesse Dukeminier, William McGovern, Jr., and auditors at a faculty colloquium at the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, for helpful comments.
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of a decedent's immediate family. Every so often, however, a testator seeks
to follow a different course: She may assign funds within her will for the
accomplishment ofpurposes or causes, as opposed to the financial betterment
of individuals. When she chooses to do so, how does - and how should - the
law respond?
Historically, lawmakers have differentiated the rules applicable to
bequests for purposes depending upon the sort of purpose the testator had in
mind. Bequests for "charitable" purposes - being objects deemed to subserve
the public interest - have occupied one sub-category. These are "favored
creatures of the law,"2 and courts see to it that they are given effect. At the
opposite extreme lie bequests for objects found to disserve the public interest,
originally known as "superstitious" purposes; courts take a dim view of these,
refusing to allow them to be carried out. And these two sets of purposes are
not complementary: A third set is sandwiched in between. Found here are
bequests for an amalgam of purposes perceived neither to help nor to harm the
public - a variety of transaction sufficiently rare at first that it was not blessed
with a name, but which one early English advocate felicitously dubbed an
"indifferent" purpose.' Courts in Great Britain have generally rejected be-
quests falling into this sub-category. In the United States, as we shall see,
bequests for indifferent purposes have met with greater tolerance, if not open
arms; courts have ratified them but have dictated a number of provisos that
fail to apply to charitable bequests.
This trio of doctrinal sub-categories we have lived with for a long time -
so long that we have come pretty much to take them for granted. Commenta-
tors invariably address purpose bequest doctrine, when they address it at all,
from the confines of a given one of its legal compartments - usually the
charitable one, which has long garnered the lion's share of attention. The time
has come to take a fresh look at the law of purpose bequests from a broader
perspective - to step back from its isolated segments in order to reflect upon
the subject as a theoretical whole and, more broadly still, to juxtapose the
structural features of purpose bequests with those of their more common
counterpart, the bequest for a person. This exercise may help us to reevaluate
not only the substance of purpose bequest doctrine, but also, and no less
importantly, its taxonomy. My overall thesis is that the law of purpose
bequests has become unnecessarily and unhelpfully balkanized; and that
2. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 63 S.E.2d 786,790 (Va. 1951). For earlier
similar statements, see EDITH L. FisCH, THE CY PRES DoCTRNE IN THE UNITED STATES 118 &
n.10 (1950). These were formerly, in medieval times, known as "pious" bequests, a synonym
that lingered in the legal vocabulary. See, e.g., Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 566,583 (1829)
(Story, J.).
3. Attorney-General v. Whorwood, 27 Eng. Rep. 1188, 1189 (Ch. 1750) (reporter's
summary of counsel's argument).
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virtually all of these bequests ought instead to be subsumed within a single
doctrinal entity, preferably the one now regulating charitable bequests.
We shall develop this thesis, along with a few corollaries, in three stages.
In Part II we begin by exploring the history of purpose bequest doctrine as it
assumed its present configuration. In Part m we leap to the plane of public
policy. Here we assay the core question of whether bequests for purposes
should be allowed at all and, if so, what subsidiary doctrines ought to govern
them. Finally, in Part IV, we soar briefly on into more rarefied air, to grasp
(or gasp) at the larger implications of it all.
II Doctrine: Categorical Proliferation
A. The History
The beginnings of the purpose bequest in Great Britain lay in the Chris-
tian pursuit of piety. Throughout the middle ages, clergymen entreated their
parishioners to bequeath portions of their worldly goods for the greater good
of their fellow sinners. Prior to the Reformation, most responded by leaving
property to the Church itself, as social entrep~t for the dissemination of
charity. With the arrival of Anglicanism, the Church lost this role, and by the
sixteenth century it was common for Englishmen to formulate bequests
directly for the relief of the poor, for public education, and for other merciful
endeavors of their own devising.'
Bequests of this sort, though welcome, nonetheless posed a practical
difficulty: How could the law go about carrying them out? When a testator
left property to a person - or, as earlier, to a religious corporation - the bene-
ficiary (or Bishop) could hold out his palm and accept the funds directly. But
when "the only beneficiaries are purposes,"' who did a testator leave the funds
to? Perforce, a human intermediary had to be recruited to secure the resources
provided by the testator and then to spend them for the desired end. As it
happened, the trust (or use) had by the fifteenth century developed into an
institution that could perform this function.6
4. See MIcHAEL CHESTERmAN, CHARIIs, TRUSTS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 11-19 (1979);
3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 545-46 (5th ed. 1942); 7 id at 370-71;
GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARIrY, 1532-1827, at 3-4 (1969); W.K. JORDAN,
PHILANTHROPY IN ENGLAND, 1480-1660, at 147, 155-215, 245-322 (1959); 4A AUSTIN W.
ScoT,THELAw oFTRUSTS § 348.2, at 27-30 (William F. Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987 & Supp.,
Mark L. Ascher ed., 1998). An act of 1532 restricting bequests to chantries also contributed to
this secularizing trend. See JONES, supra, at 11; JORDAN, supra, at 115.
5. In re Astor's Settlement Trusts, [1952] 1 All E. R. 1067, 1071 (Ch.).
6. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 4, at 20-22; 4 HOLDSWORTHt, supra note 4, at 438-39;
5 iad at 304-05; JONES, supra note 4, at 6-7; 1 SCOTT, supra note 4, §§ 1.2-1.6; 4A id. § 348.2,
at 28. Professor Maitland asserted that the earliest documented example of a trust in Great
Britain served to endow a charity. See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 25 (John Brunyate ed., rev. ed.
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There still remained the difficulty of verifying that trustees faithfully
discharged the responsibilities they assumed. When a settlor created a trust
for an individual beneficiary, that same beneficiary could watch over the
trustee's activities, bringing suit as necessary to ensure fidelity. In the case
of a purpose trust, no equivalent monitor emerged naturally from the structure
of the process. Exercising jurisdiction over all trusts, the fledgling Court of
Chancery surmounted this difficulty as best it could, entertaining suits by
private parties to enforce charitable trusts. Even though they prayed for relief
on behalf of a broader constituency of parishioners or society, these petition-
ers received standing so long as they could claim somre indirect interest in the
trust's enforcement.7 This ad hoc procedure was anything but efficient,
however, and in the face of complaints that charitable trusts "have bene and
are still like to be most unlawfully... converted to the lucre and gayne of
some fewe greedy and covetous persons," the Statutes of Charitable Uses
introduced the first formal supervisory process for British charities at the
dawn of the seventeenth century.8 Under these statutes, charity commissions
met to investigate breaches of charitable trust, issuing decrees with appeal to
the Chancellor, a process superseded in turn by the Attorney General's asser-
tion of power to proceed by information against charitable trustees later in the
seventeenth century.9
1936) (1909); cf Shael Herman, Utilitas Ecclesiae: The Canonical Conception ofthe Trust, 70
TUL.L. REv. 2239,2254-55 (1996). The Statute of Uses of 1535, which temporarily functioned
to abolish trusts, did not apply to trusts for charitable purposes. See J.H. BAKER, ANINTRODUC-
TION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 242 (2d ed. 1979). For some examples of charitable uses
dating to the fifteenth century, see Stephen W. DeVine, EcclesiasticalAntecedents to Secular
Jurisdiction Over the Feoffment to the Uses to Be Declared in Testamentary Instructions, 30
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295, 308-13 (1986); R.H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1505 & n.14 (1979). This Article will not explore contract mechanisms
for the accomplishment of purposes postmortem. For a discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts
for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly in the Uniform Laws (forthcoming).
7. Petitions came, for example, from chaplains and churchwardens, and from the
inhabitants oftownsforwhosepooratrustprovided. See JONES, supra note 4, at 7-9; 4A SqoTr,
supra note 4, § 348.2, at 30. Prior to the development of Chancery jurisdiction over uses, Which
arose gradually during the fourteenth century, ecclesiastical courts had often undertaken to
enforce them, under threat of the anathema. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 332 (S.F.C. Milsom ed., 2d ed. 1968) (1895);
Helmholz, supra note 6, at 1504-05, 1508-11. On the jurisdictional transition, see
CHESTERMAN, supra note 4, at 20; DeVine, supra note 6; Helmholz, supra note 6, at 1511-13.
On the advent of Chancery as ajudicial court, a phenomenon substantially tied to the rise of the
use, see Stephen W. DeVine, The Concept ofEpieikeia in the Chancellor ofEngland's Enforce-
ment of the Feoffment to Uses Before 1535,21 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 323 (1987); Timothy
S. Haskett, The Medieval English Court of Chancery, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 245 (1996).
8. See 39 Eliz. I c. 6 (1597) (Eng.) (quoting preamble), reenacted with amendments in
43 Eliz. I c. 4 (1601) (Eng.).
9. See JONES, supra note 4, at 22-56.
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Purpose bequest doctrine was marked by its early focus on charity. The
Attorney General based his claim to intervene on the "publique interest which
concerned his Highness to take care [that charitable uses] might be preserved
and performed."'' 0 So long as all, or virtually all, purpose trusts were found
to manifest such a public interest, the Attorney General's exclusive standing
to enforce them effectively covered the field. If, however, a case should arise
where a purpose trust lay beyond the perceived parameters of charity, the
foundation for the Attorney General's mandate would crumble and courts
would again have to grapple with the question of how - and whether - to go
about carrying the trust into execution.
That a case of this sort might present itself was easy enough to imagine.
The Christian mind had long been accustomed to thinking in terms of dual-
isms - of good and evil, for example" - and so it comes as no surprise that
lawmakers (albeit with ulterior motives) should have conceived of an antithe-
sis to the charitable trust - to wit, a trust for the promotion of heresy. In the
course of the Henricean campaign to suppress and loot the English chantries
in the mid-sixteenth century, acts of Parliament introduced the concept of
superstitious uses - those promoting false religious practices - which were
void and forfeit to the Crown. 2 In such an event, the public interest lay in
thwarting the bequest, and the Attorney General could intervene by informa-
tion to seek its suppression. 3 Case law subsequently expanded on this notion
to hold void (but not forfeit) all trusts for purposes against public policy. 4
But did any space lie in between these antipodes? Such a notion may
have come less naturally to legal thinkers, and in fact the possibility that a
trust for a purpose might be neither charitable nor superstitious did not dawn
early on the English courts. Testators tended to follow familiar channels,
rendering exploration of the issue unnecessary; and on top of that, commenta-
tors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had assumed the definition of
charitability to be an expansive one, encompassing all uses serving to enrich
10. /d at 36 n.6 (quoting unpublished court record of 1656). See Attorney-General v.
Whorwood, 27 Eng. Rep. 1188, 1190 (Ch. 1750); Attorney-General v. Hewer, 23 Eng. Rep.
848, 849 (Ch. 1700).
11. Though a central feature of Christian thought, dualistic philosophy traces back to the
Greeks. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 134, 302-03 (1945).
12. See 1 Edw. VI c. 14 (1547) (Eng.) (preamble); see also, 37 Hen. VIII c. 4 (1545)
(Eng.) (predecessor statute).
13. See Attorney-General v. Baxter, 23 Eng. Rep. 446 (Ch. 1684).
14. See, e.g., West v. Shuttleworth, 39 Eng. Rep. 1106, 1111 (M.R. 1835); Whorwood,
27 Eng. Rep. at 1190; Brown v. Burdett, 21 Ch. D. 667, 673 (V.C. 1882); Egerton v. Earl
Brownlow, 4 H.L.C. 1, 144 (1853); M'Caig v. University of Glasgow, 1907 Sess. Cas. 231
(Scot.); M'Caig's Trustees v. Kirk-Session of United Free Church, 1915 Sess. Cas. 426 (Scot.);
Lindsay's Ex'rv. Forsyth, 1940 Sess. Cas. 568,572,575-77 (Scot.); Thruppv. Collett, 53 Eng.
Rep. 844, 845 (M.R. 1858).
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the public.' In such circumstances, courts could and did conceive of supersti-
tion as lying adjacent to charity's outer edge. 6
Only in the nineteenth century, beginning in 1804 with the seminal case
of Morice v. Bishop ofDurham,7 did English courts begin to envision a third
tier of purpose trust, fracturing the original categorical dichotomy. In Morice,
the trust at issue sought to advance "such objects of benevolence and liberal-
ity" as the Bishop of Durham should in his discretion select.' Surely there
was nothing superstitious in that, and no suggestion that this bequest contra-
vened public policy was ever made. The court nonetheless ruled that the
Statutes of Charitable Uses applied only to gifts for purposes affirmatively
subservient to society, and that the testator in this case intended to counte-
nance expenditures beyond the Statutes' scope.' "It is clear liberality and
benevolence can find numberless objects, not included in that statute in the
largest construction of it," declared Sir William Grant, Master of the Rolls."0
In effect, Grant had fenced off from the range of purpose bequests that might
theretofore have been deemed charitable a middle field, though without
proceeding to survey its boundaries. What then was to be done with it?
In the instant case, the court (apparently) held the stated purpose void for
vagueness: Only a charitable trust that was vague could be cured under the
Crown's prerogative.' But Grant added a dictum pertinent to all nonchar-
15. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 4, at 25-28; JONES, supra note 4, at 120-23.
16. In what appears the first published case to raise the issue, a testator in 1750 left the
residue of his estate, including his house, to supply a residence for the senior fellow at Univer-
sity College, Oxford, and to provide funds for entertaining the other fellows there and for
distributing cordials, drugs, and moral pamphlets to the poor. See Attorney-General v.
Whorwood, 27 Eng. Rep. 1188, 1188-89 (Ch. 1750). Counsel for the testator's heirs character-
ized the bequest as "whimsical... not a superstitious or illegal, but an indifferent use; as to feed
sparrows," which counsel asserted, on doubtful authority, prior courts had disallowed. Id. at
1189. Counsel cited to one case only, the unreported Attorney-General v. Oakaver (1736), in
which a stipend to provide choristers was held void "as the choristers were never allowed in
parochial churches"- hence a purpose impossible to perform. IL at 1189-90. At any rate, the
court took no interest in this conceptual novelty and proceeded simply to distinguish charitable
from superstitious purposes: "If this is no charitable or public, but a superstitious use, it results
[i.e., goes by resulting trust] to the heir at law .... " Id at 1190. On rehearing, the terms of the
bequest were found to violate the constitution of University College and hence failed for
impossibility. See Attorney-General v. Whorwood, 28 Eng. Rep. 511,513 (Ch. 1750). Cases
involving bequests for purposes that did not enrich the public at all apparently failed to arise
before the nineteenth century. See infra note 24.
17. 32 Eng. Rep. 656 (M.R. 1804).
18. See Moricev. Bishop ofDurham, 32Eng. Rep. 656,656 (M.R. 1804), aff'd, 32 Eng.
Rep. 947 (Ch. 1805).
19. Id at 659,
20. Id
21. Id at 658-59 (Grant, M.R.). "[U]nless the subject and the objects [of a trust] can be
ascertained, upon principles, familiar in other cases, it must be decided, that the Court can
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itable purpose bequests, be their terms ever so precise. For a valid trust to
exist, "[t]here must be somebody, in whose favour the Court can decree
performance," Grant announced, "for an uncontrollable power of disposition
would be ownership, and not trust."'  With the Attorney General consigned
to the sidelines, and with no beneficiary or other supplemental mechanism in
reserve to see to the trust's enforcement, its trustee would be free to act
without restraint. Though a testator might intend to bind the trustee to fulfil
a purpose, that desire could not be carried into execution. As a consequence,
like a superstitious use (though for a different reason), the trust failed.
Subsequent British cases in the main have cleaved to this "beneficiary
principle," as it has come to be known. It continues to serve in Great Britain
as the modem basis for denying the effectiveness of trusts for noncharitable
purposes, often referred to there, appropriately under the conceptual circum-
stances, as trusts of"imperfect obligation."'  Still, a number of British courts
over the years have taken a contrary view, at least with regard to certain types
of purposes,2 4 though without exploring the mechanism (if any) whereby the
neither reform meal-administration, nor direct a due administration.... [and] where the objects
are too uncertain to make recommendation.., the trust is... ineffectual." Morice, 32 Eng.
Rep. at 954-55 (Eldon, L.C., on appeal); see also id at 952-53; JONES, supra note 4, at 88-91
(discussing Crown's power to cure uncertain charitable trusts). But commentators have dis-
agreed about the meaning and precise ratio decidendi of the opinions in the case, which them-
selves suffered from a measure of vagueness. See, e.g., George E. Palmer, The Effect ofindef-
initeness on the Validity of Trusts and Powers of.Appointment, 10 UCLA L. REV. 241, 245-46
(1963); L.A. Sheridan, Trustsfor Non-Charitable Purposes, 17 CoNV. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 46,
48-49 (1953).
22. Morice, 32 Eng. Rep. at 658.
23. This phrase appears in many British secondary sources, see, e.g., J.G. RIDDALL, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS 175 (4th ed. 1992); ARTHUR UNDERHILL & DAVID J. HAYTON, LAW RELATING
TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 76 (14th ed. 1987), though it may have originated in an American
case, see infra note 59. For cases, see In re Bushnell, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1596, 1602 (Ch.)
(bequest for advancement ofsocialized medicine); In re Shaw, [1957] 1 All E.R. 745, 758 (Ch.)
(bequest for linguistic research), appeal dismissedper compromise, [1958] 1 All E.R. 245
(C.A.); In re Wood, [1949] 1 All E.R 1100, 1101 (Ch.) (bequest to make distributions to
B.B.C.'s "The Week's Good Cause"); In re Hummeltenberg, [1923] 1 Ch. 237,241-42 (bequest
for training of mediums); In re Astor's Settlement Trusts, [1952] 1 All. E.R 1067, 1071 (Ch.)
(discretionary bequest for "useful" purpose); In re Endacott, [1959] 3 All E.R. 562 (C.A.)
(discretionary bequest for "benevolent" purpose); Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson, 1944
App. Cas. 341 (H.L.) (same); In re Harpur's Will Trusts [1962] 1 Ch. 78 (App.) (discretionary
bequest for specified purposes); R. v. District Auditor, exparte West Yorkshire Metro. County
Council, 1986 R. & V.R. 24 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.) (same); see also In re Hopkinson, [1949] 1 All
E.Rt 346 (Ch.) (ground of decision unclear); cf. infra note 262 and accompanying text. British
cases have explicitly rejected the American rule giving effect to bequests for noncharitable
purposes. See infra note 52.
24. Most of these cases have involved bequests for the care of animals and tombs. See
In re Catherall (unreported, 1959), quoted in UNDERHILL & HAYTON, supra note 23, at 75;
Adnam v. Cole, 49 Eng. Rep. 862 (M.R 1843); In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889); In re
40 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 33 (1999)
trusts in question are to be enforced.' At the same time, courts willing to give
effect to noncharitable purpose trusts have insisted that the testator confine
them to the period set by the Rule Against Perpetuities, a limitation which has
never applied to charitable trusts.26 But given the apparent conflict between
the cases, British law remains today in a state of conspicuous uncertainty.
Hooper, 1931 All E.R. 129 (Ch.); Masters v. Masters, 24 Eng. Rep. 454 (M.R. 1717) (validity
conceded); Mellick v. President and Guardians of the Asylum, 37 Eng. Rep. 818 (M.R. 1821)
(dicta); Mitford v. Reynolds, 60 Eng. Rep. 812 (V.C. 1848); Mussett v. Bingle, 1876 W.N. 170
(V.C.); Pettingall v. Pettingall, 11 L.J.R. (n.s.) 176 (V.C. 1842) (validity conceded); Pirbright
v. Salwey, 1896 W.N. 86 (court of decision not noted); Trimmer v. Danby 25 L.J.R. (n.s.) 424
(V.C. 1856); see also In re Thompson, 1934 Ch. 342 (holding valid bequest for promotion of
fox hunting). But see Dawson v. Small, 18 L.R.-Eq. 114, 118 (V.C. 1874) (deeming bequest
for upkeep of grave to be ineffective); Hunter v. Bullock, 14 L.R.-Eq. 45, 48 (V.C. 1872)
(same). Other courts have characterized cases giving effect to trusts for noncharitable purposes
in Great Britain as "anomalous and exceptional." See In re Astor's Settlement Trusts, [1952]
1 All E.R. 1067, 1074 (Ch.); In re Endacott, [1959] 3 All E.R. 562, 567-68, 570-71(C.A.)
(adding that the range of purposes given effect by prior rulings "ought not to be extended"); cf.
D.C. Potter, Trusts for Non-Charitable Purposes, 13 CONv. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 418, 423
(1949) (prematurely predicting that exceptions were about to "[sweep] away the rule").
25. In one early case, the court gave effectto abequest to build amonument but observed
that "I do not suppose that there would be any one who could compel the executors to carry out
this bequest... but if the residuary legatees or the trustees insist upon [it,] ... this Court is
bound to see it carried out." Tfimmer v. Danby, 25 L.J.R. (n.s.) 424, 427 (V.C. 1856). Simi-
larly, in two other cases, the court granted standing to residuary legatees to "apply to the Court,"
in the event that purpose bequests were not properly carried out, in order to terminate the
bequests. Pettingall v. Pettingall, 11 L.J.R. (n.s.) 176, 177 (V.C. 1842); In re Thompson, 1934
Ch. 342,344. Another puzzledjudge found it "difficult to say" who the beneficiary ofa purpose
bequest was, and hence "I do not see who could ask the Court to enforce it." In re Dean, 41 Ch.
D. 556, 557 (1889). By contrast, whether a special power of appointment for a noncharitable
purpose, which cannot be enforced, is valid under British law is an issue no court has ever faced.
A dictum in one opinion asserts that such apower would be effective. See In re Wooton, [1968]
1 W.L.R. 681,688 (Ch.); see also JILLE. MARTIN,HANBURY&MARTINMODERNEQUITY 377-
78 (14th ed. 1993); J.H.C. MORRIS & W. BARTON LEACH, TrE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrIES
320-21 (2d ed. 1962 & Supp. 1964); L.A. Sheridan, Power to Appoint for a Non-Charitable
Purpose: A Duologue orEndacott's Ghost, 13 DEPAULL. REV. 210,227-30 (1964). Neverthe-
less, two of the recent opinions denying effect to trusts for purposes use language that suggests
a broader principle of invalidity here. One judge fears the prospect of "large funds devoted to
non-charitable purposes which no court... can control, or... reform," a fear that presumably
would extend to powers as well as to trusts. In re Astor's Settlement Trusts, [1952] 1 All E.R.
1067,1071 (Ch.). Endorsing this view, anotherjudge refers generally to the invalidity ofa"gift"
for anoncharitable purpose. Inre Endacott, [1959] 3 All E.R. 562,570 (C.A.). Compare R.M.
Eggleston, Purpose Trusts, 2 RES JUDICATAE 118, 123-24 (1939) (arguing that powers for
purposes fall within purview of beneficiary principle) with O.R. Marshall, The Failure of the
Astor Trust, 6 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 151, 164-65 (1953) (in rebuttal).
26. See MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 25, at 185-86, 321-27. For a more detailed
doctrinal and historical discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 6.
27. "The whole of the cases relating to this question require to be reviewed by the House
of Lords before any intelligible principle can be extracted from them." UNDERHILL &HAYTON,
supra note 23, at 80. For recent doctrinal analyses of the British cases, see id. at 75-80; J.B.
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In America, as well, a tripartite scheme of purpose trusts gradually took
shape, although it came to assume a somewhat different (and clearer) form
from its British counterpart. Trusts for charitable purposes were already
familiar to Englishmen when they began to settle the New World toward the
end of the sixteenth century. Living as they did in an atmosphere thick with
religion, the colonists acknowledged charitable trusts from the outset.2" As in
Great Britain, the concept of a trust for a purpose that was noncharitable
emerged only later - in the first instance, oddly enough, as an accidental
byproduct of independence from the mother country.
Following the American Revolution, many states acted to reaffirm the
validity of charitable trusts by statute, or even by constitutional mandate, and
these were permitted to endure indefinitely.29 In Virginia, however, no such
steps had initially been taken. Virginia's reception statute meanwhile had
repealed all acts of Parliament previously in force, which included the Statutes
of Charitable Uses. When a Virginian subsequently left a bequest for the
purpose of educating youths into the Baptist ministry, Chief Justice Marshall
ruled that charitable trusts did not exist apart from statutory law - hence,
barring passage of an equivalent statute, testators could not create them within
the state.30
And so, apparently for the first time, an American court had to contem-
plate the implications of a purpose trust "were it not a charity."'" This case
came down in 1819, just fifteen years after the holding in Morice. That Mar-
shall viewed the English decision as controlling is clear enough: Elsewhere in
his opinion, he cited to Morice for its first proposition, namely that the defini-
tion of charitability was circumscribed by the Statutes of Charitable Uses, in
order to establish the Statutes' exclusivity as a source of validating author-
CLARK & J.G. Ross MARTYN, THEOBALD ON WILLS 152-54 (15th ed. 1993); MARTIN, supra
note 25, at 353-79; L.A. SHERIDAN, KEETONAND SHERIDAN'S THELAW OF TRUSTS 43, 152-58
(12th ed. 1993).
28. EDITH L. FisCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 152, at 151
(1974); HOWARD S. MILLER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY, 1776-
1844, at 3-8 (1961); Note, The Enforcement of Charitable Trusts in America: A History of
Evolving Social Attitudes, 54 VA. L. REV. 436, 440-41 (1968).
29. Note, supra note 28, at 441-42. For early American cases allowing charitable trusts
to continue in perpetuity, see Shotwell v. Mott, 2 Sand. Ch. 46, 54-55 (N.Y. 1844); Williams
v. Williams, 8 N.Y. 525,534-35 (1853); Griffin v. Graham, 8 N.C. 96, 131-32 (1820), together
with the cases cited in LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 1392, at 242 n.6 (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1998).
30. See Trustees of the Phila. Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1, 29-51
(1819). The Supreme Court reversed this decision in 1844, recognizing charitable trusts on the
basis of newly uncovered historical evidence of their judicial enforcement prior to, and hence
independent of, the Acts of Parliament that some American reception statutes had nullified. See
Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 193-97 (1844).
31. Hart's Executors, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 29.
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ity. 2 In so many words, he then proceeded to apply the beneficiary principle
encapsulated in Grant's dictum; absent the enforcement remedies provided by
legislation, there were "[no] persons designatedwho mighttake beneficially."33
As a consequence, the purpose trust failed."' Trusts for purposes affirmatively
contrary to public policy also eventually came before American courts and
were held void on that alternative basis, rounding out the trio?5
But, whatever Marshall's stature, his early embrace of the beneficiary
principle did not lay the issue of noncharitable purpose trusts to rest. On the
matter of their effectiveness, American courts in the nineteenth century aired
all manner of opinions. The dominant theme of the period was confusion.36
Many courts proceeded to strike down trusts for purposes deemed nonchar-
itable for want of beneficiaries, sometimes quoting Morice directly.37 Other
32. See id. at 45-46. The respect due in theNew Republic to post-1776 English common
law and equity decisions was a matter of some controversy. In a string of opinions, however,
Justice Marshall had already indicated his willingness to look to contemporary English cases
for authority. See JOSEPH H. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 495-98 (1965).
33. Hart's Executors, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 29. Marshall failed to cite to Morice, or to
any other authority, at this precise juncture. Id
34. See id at 29, 51.
35. Trusts against public policy were already accounted for in common law doctrine, and
the earliest reported cases in America never remarked that the trusts at issues raised any novel
legal questions. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford's Ex'r, 16 S.W. 451,452-53 (Ky. 1891) (dicta); In re
Scott's Will, 93 N.W. 109, 109 (Minn. 1903); In re Killen's Will, 209 N.Y.S. 206, 208 (Sur.
Ct. 1925); In re Hill's Estate, 204 P. 1055, 1056 (Wash.), aff'd en banc, 207 P. 689 (Wash.
1922).
36. For an admission of uncertainty about the proper doctrine to apply in such a case, see
Sherman v. Baker, 40 A. 11, 12 (R.I. 1898) ("But however this may be .... "); see also Moran
v. Moran, 73 N.W. 617,622 (Iowa 1897) (observing thatnoncharitable purpose bequests lacked
"a name or a legal classification," but arguing that they should not fail on that account). For a
survey of early case law in one state, see David C. Wolfe, Honorary Trust in Pennsylvania, 42
DICK. L. REV. 161 (1938).
37. See, e.g., Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church, 18 So. 394,396 (Ala. 1894); In
re Koppikus' Estate, 81 P. 732,733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1905); Spaulding v. Lackey, 173 N.E. 110,
112 (ill. 1930) (citing to Morice); Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5 H. & J. 392, 399-400 (Md.
1822) (citing to Morice); Gilman v. McArdle, 2 N.E. 464, 468 (N.Y. 1885) (dicta); Levy v.
Levy, 33 N.Y. 97, 101-05 (1865) (citing to Morice); Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead, 26 N.E.
801, 803 (N.Y. 1891); Tilden v. Green, 28 N.E. 880, 881-82, 888 (N.Y. 1891); Holland v.
Alcock, 16 N.E. 305, 306 (N.Y. 1888); Gallego's Ex'rs v. Attorney General, 31 Va. (3 Leigh)
450, 462 (1832); McHugh v. McCole, 72 N.W. 631, 633-36 (Wis. 1897). This was almost
invariably the outcome of cases involving bequests for indefinite noncharitable purposes -
usually limited to "worthy" or "benevolent" purposes chosen by a delegate named in the will.
These cases more precisely fit the facts of Morice, and courts referred to either or both of the
rationales articulated in that case. See In re Ralston's Estate, 37 P.2d 76, 78 (Cal. 1934) (void
for uncertainty); In re Sutro's Estate, 102 P. 920,922-23 (Cal. 1909) (same); Bristol v. Bristol,
5 A. 687,691 (Conn. 1885) (void because "vague and indefinite"); Adyev. Smith, 44 Conn. 60,
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courts ruled that where a testator did not intend to create a binding trust, but
only an optional power on the part of the donee of the power to perform the
specified purpose or not, with a gift over in default of its exercise, the bequest
was good. If the purpose was not meant to be enforceable, then the absence
of an enforcement mechanism became inconsequential; all that was needed
was a means to enforce the gift over in default, and under the traditional
doctrine of powers a petition by the alternative taker - being, at last, a
person - could perform that function.38 And in still otherjurisdictions, courts
gave effect to trusts for noncharitable purposes and simply ignored the rule of
Morice.39 As to the process of enforcement, courts offered vague assurances
67-68,70-71 (1876) (void because "indefinite" and lackofbeneficiary, citing to Morice); Taylor
v. Keep, 2 111. App. 368,384 (1878) (void for "uncertainty," citing toMorice); Nichols v. Allen,
130 Mass. 211,212,221(1881) (void because "too indefinite," citingtoMorice); Chamberlain
v. Steams, 111 Mass. 267, 269 (1873) (void for "uncertainty," citing to Morice); Hegeman's
Ex'rs v. Roome, 62 A. 392,393 (N.J. Ch. 1905) (void because "vague and indefinite"); Hyde's
Ex'rs v. Hyde, 53 A. 593, 594 (N.J. Ch. 1902) (void without discussion); Livesey v. Jones, 35
A. 1064, 1064 (N.J. Ch. 1896) (void because "too general and indefinite"), affld sub nom.
Chadwick v. Livesey, 41 A. 1115 (N.J. 1897) (per curiam); Norris v. Thomson's Ex'rs, 19 N.J.
Eq. 307, 313-14(Ch. 1868) (void because "too indefinite," citing to Morice), affd, 20N.J. Eq.
489 (1869). But see infra note 39.
38. This suggestion first appeared as a dictum in Tilden:
But it is said that the Tilden Trust [devoted to a purpose] ... is discretionary
wholly, and depends for its execution upon the will of the trustees ... and the
power to endow the Tilden Trust is likened to a power of appointment. Powers of
appointment are so common in testamentary dispositions of property that no
citation of authority is necessary to show their validity .... But there is no similar-
ity between the suggested bequest and the will before us .... [I]n the will before
us there is no alternative purpose. There is a single scheme ....
Tilden v. Green, 28 N.E. 880, 886 (N.Y. 1891). But in another early case, where the testator
referred to sums that "may be employed" for the construction of a monument, the provision was
construed as creating a power that apparently would have been valid, but for its violation of the
Rule Against Perpetuities. See Hartson v. Elden, 26 A. 561, 562 (N.J. Ch. 1893); see also
Whiting v. Bertram, 199 N.E. 367, 367-68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1935) (finding that direction to
executors to hold sum "in trust" for care and decoration of graves would have been deemed void
had trust been intended, but construing provision as intended to create power, though no further
disposition could be made for want of appellate jurisdiction over powers); cf supra note 25.
39. See Angus v. Noble, 46 A. 278, 282 (Conn. 1900) (trust for upkeep of graves);
Wilmes v. Tiemay, 174 N.W. 271,272-73 (Iowa 1919) (trust for masses); Moran v. Moran, 73
N.W. 617, 622 (Iowa 1897) (same); Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739, 740 (Ky. 1923) (citing
state statute giving effect to all bequests for "charitable or humane purpose[s]"); Lounsbury v.
Trustees of Square Lake Burial Ass'n, 129 N.W. 36, 38 (Mich. 1910) (trust for construction of
cemetery vault and fence), affd, 137 N.W. 513 (Mich. 1912); In re Gorey's Will, 170 N.Y.S.
635, 636 (Sur. Ct. 1918) (bequest for masses and construction oftombstone held valid as trust);
Wrenshall's Estate, 72 Pa. Super. 258, 259-62 (1919) (trust for maintaining cemetery lot and
providing for horse); see also Bainbridge's Appeal, 97 Pa. 482, 486 (1881) (assuming valid
without analysis bequest for construction of monument to deceased); Stoffel's Estate, 145 A.
70, 71 (Pa. 1929) (same), discussed in 2 SCOTT, supra note 4, § 124, at 244-45; Sherman v.
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33 (1999)
that they themselves would undertake this responsibility." But, as in Great
Britain, courts continued in any event to strike down trusts for noncharitable
purpose if their intended duration exceeded the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 1
B. The (Re)statement
There matters stood, however unsettled, when in 1935 the Restatement
of Trusts appeared. This resource, largely the brainchild of Professor Austin
Scott,42 accepted - though not without modification - Britain's tripartite
Baker, 40 A. 11, 12 (R.I. 1898) (dicta). In some early cases, bequests for monuments and
masses were held valid as an aspect or equivalent of funeral expenses. See In re Koppikus'
Estate, 81 P. 732,733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1905); Ford v. Ford's Ex'r, 16 S.W. 451,452 (Ky. 1891);
InreBackes' Will, 30N.Y.S. 394,395 (Sur. Ct. 1894); In re Boardman, 20 N.Y.S. 60,61 (Sur.
Ct. 1891); Holland v. Smyth, 47 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 372, 373 (1886); Emans v. Hickman, 19 N.Y
Sup. Ct. 425, 427 (1877); McIlvain v. Hockaday, 81 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, writ
ref'd); see also cases cited infra notes 182, 274. In at least one early case, a court gave effect
to an indefinite noncharitable bequest. See In re Dulles' Estate, 67 A. 49, 50 (Pa. 1907) (trust
for "charitable and benevolent purpose" in trustee's discretion); see also Smith v. Pond, 111 A.
154, 155 (N.J. 1920) (trust for "benevolent purposes"; held valid under 1905 statute expressly
authorizing such trusts); Allred v. Beggs, 84 S.W.2d 223,229 (Tex. 1935) (bequest for "worthy
objects"; denying attorney general's motion to intervene and holding valid executor's distribu-
tive decisions as falling within specified category of "worthy" purposes; heirs, however, were
notjoined as parties and had not challenged bequest). Both Scott's treatise and the Reporter's
Notes to the Restatement misread Allred as denying effect to the bequest at issue. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, app. § 123, at 191 (1959) (Reporter's Notes); 4A SCOTT, supra
note 4, § 398.1, at 457 n.20.
40. See Wilmesv. Tiemay, 174N.W. 271,272-73 (Iowa 1919); Moran v.Moran, 73 N.W.
617, 621 (Iowa 1897); In re Dulles' Estate, 67 A. 49, 50 (Pa. 1907). For a later opinion to the
same effect, see Devereux's Estate, 48 Pa. D. & C. 491,498-500 (Orphans' Ct. 1943), appeal
quashed, 46 A.2d 168 (Pa. 1946). See also Sherman v. Baker, 40 A. 11, 12 (R.I. 1898) (suggest-
ing in dicta that "an heir at law.., has a sufficient interest to see that the will is carried out").
41. For cases prior to 1935, when the Restatement of Trusts was published, see Union
Trust Co. v. Rossi, 22 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Ark. 1929); Hampton v. Dill, 188 N.E. 419,422 (ll.
1933); McCartney v. Jacobs, 123 N.E. 557,588-59 (Ill. 1919); Mason v. Bloomington Library
Ass'n, 86 N.E. 1044, 1046 (l1. 1908); Thorp v. Lund, 116 N.E. 946, 949-50 (Mass. 1917);
Leonard v. Haworth, 51 N.E. 7, 8 (Mass. 1898); Lounsbury v. Trustees of Square Lake Burial
Ass'n, 129 N.W. 36,37 (Mich. 1910), affd, 137 N.W. 513 (Mich. 1912); Tichenor v. Mechan-
ics & Metals Nat'l Bank, 125 A. 323, 324 (N.J. Ch. 1924); Morristown Trust Co. v. Mayor &
Bd. of Aldermen, 91 A. 736, 737 (N.J. Ch. 1913); Hilliard v. Parker, 74 A. 447, 448 (N.J. Ch.
1909); Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq. 347, 353-54 (Ch. 1883); Driscoll v. Hewlett, 91 N.E.
784,784 (N.Y. 1910) (dicta); In re Waldron, 109 N.Y.S. 681, 684 (Sur. Ct. 1907); Meehan v.
Hurley, 150 A. 819, 820 (R.I. 1930); Shippee v. Industrial Trust Co., 110 A. 410, 411 (R.I.
1920); Kelly v. Nichols, 21 A. 906, 907-08 (R.I. 1891); Smith v. Heyward, 105 S.E. 275,279-
80 (S.C. 1920); Mcllvain v. Hockaday, 81 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, writ ref'd).
42. Scott served as Reporter for the Restatement of Trusts, and his famous treatise on
trusts was born out of his desire to justify the rules promulgated therein. The two projects were
so closely tied that the section numbers he assigned to the treatise corresponded with those of
the Restatement. See 1 SCOTr, supra note 4, xxvii-xxx.
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scheme of purpose trusts. Trusts for charitable purposes were valid under the
Restatement, enforceable by the Attorney General, and effective in perpetu-
ity.4 They were defined, restrictively if imprecisely, as trusts for those
"purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community."'4
Conversely, bequests for purposes that a court finds conducive to "illegal" or
"immoral" acts, or that a court otherwise deems "detrimental to the commu-
nity" or "capricious," were to fail and pass by resulting trust to alternative
beneficiaries."
In these aspects, the Restatement's treatment of purpose trusts was
perfectly orthodox. Its treatment of trusts falling into the middle tier of non-
charitability was another story. "Where property is transferred to a person
upon an intended trust for a specific non-charitable purpose... the transferee
is not under a duty.., to apply the property to the designated purpose, since
there is no beneficiary to enforce the intended trust,"46 the Restators began;
with "no beneficiary to enforce it, it is not a trust."'47 Thus far, their language
might have flowed from the pen of Sir William Grant. Then came the depar-
ture: "but the transferee has power to apply the property to the designated
purpose,"4 the Restators continued; atthe transferee's option, "[h]e can either
apply the property to the designated purpose or surrender itto the... estate."49
Such an "intended trust is sometimes called an 'honorary trust'," although the
Restators added "it is more accurate to state that the trustee has power than...
that he holds upon trust, whether honorary or otherwise."5 Finally, as in
43. SeeRESTATEMENTOFTRUSTS§§ 124cmt. e,348,364-65,391 (1935);RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 124 cmt. e, 348, 364-65, 391 (1959).
44. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 368(f) (1935). The section adds a nonexclusive list of
illustrations: trusts for the relief of poverty, for the advancement of education, for the advance-
ment of religion, for the promotion of health, and for governmental purposes. See id. § 3 68(a)-
(e). The definition found in the Restatement is modelled after the British Statutes of Charitable
Uses. See id § 368 cmt. a. The Restatement (Second) repeats the definition without amend-
ment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959).
45. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §§ 62 & cmts. a, n, & o, 124 cmt. g, 374 cmt. l, 377 &
cmts. a-c, 418(c) & cmt. b (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 62 & cmts. a, v, &
w, 124 cmt. g, 374 cmt. m, 377 & cmts. a-c, 418(c) & cmt b (1959).
46. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. a(1935).
47. Id. § 124 cmt. c.
48. Id § 124.
49. Id § 124 cmt. b.
50. RESTATEMENTOFTRUSTS § 124 cmt. c (1935); see also id. §§ 374 cmt. h (discussion
limited to trusts for upkeep of tombs), 418 & cmts. (duplicating section 124 in connection with
resulting trust principles). These provisions were carried forward without significant revision
into RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 124, 374 cmt. h, 418 (1959). The Restatement
(Second) differs from the original in one substantive respect only: Under the first Restatement,
the honorary trust principle applied only to bequests for definite noncharitable purposes.
Bequests for indefinite noncharitable purposes, to be selected by the trustee, were void. See
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states that had previously acknowledged trusts for noncharitable purposes, the
Restators cabined in the duration of this construct, restricting honorary trusts
to the period allowed by the Rule Against Perpetuities."
Whence was born the modem American - but not British52 - orthodoxy:
When a testator seeks to create a trust for a purpose, one that neither advances
nor offends the community interest, the intended trust is instead treated as a
power, which the intended trustee may carry out if she so chooses; otherwise,
the residuary legatee or heirs can sue for a resulting trust to recover the corpus
of the bequest.53 From what source or sources had this rule sprung? In 1935,
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §§ 123 & cmts. b & c, 417 & cmts. (1935). Why these bequests
should not also have been treated like powers, the Restatement failed to explain. It was left to
the Restatement (Second) to clear away this anomaly, declaring as valid, but honorary, bequests
for noncharitable purposes of both the definite and indefinite variety. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OFTRUSTS §§ 123 & cmts., 417 & cmts. (1959). Professor Scott had harbored doubts
about the distinction between bequests for definite and indefinite noncharitable purposes as
early as 1917. See Austin W. Scott, Control ofProperty by the Dead (pts. 1 & 2), 65 U. PA. L.
REv. 527,540-41 (1917) [hereinafter Scott, Control; AUSTINW. SCOTT, EXPLANATORYNOTES
ONTRUSTS 30 (American Law Instituteprepared in connection with RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1930)). In 1945, Scott published a law review article advocating the
rule subsequently adopted by the Restatement (Second), for which he again served as Reporter.
Rather than embark on an exercise in self-criticism, however, Scott chose as the target of his
1945 article the line of British cases he had followed, however reluctantly, in the first Restate-
ment. Nowhere did Scott acknowledge or even cite to the Restatement into which he had
himself imported the very rule he was now condemning! See Austin W. Scott, Trusts for
Charitable andBenevolent Purposes, 58 HARV. L. REV. 548, 571-72 &passim (1945) [herein-
after Scott, Trusts].
51. See RESTATEMENTOFTRUSTS §§ 124 cmt. f, 418(2) (1935); RESTATEmENT(SECOND)
OF TRUSTS §§ 123 & cmt. f, 124 & cmt. f, 417(b) & cmt. a, 418(b) & cmt. b (1959).
52. British courts have explicitly rejected the American rule. See In re Endacott, [1959]
3 All E.R. 562,568 (C.A.); In re Shaw, [1957] 1 All E.R. 745,759 (Ch.), appeal dismissedper
compromise, [1958] 1 All E.R. 245 (C.A.).
53. Though the majority of states lack modem case law on point, commentators assume
this to be the rule of today. See WILLIAM M. McGOvERN, JR. Er AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES § 8.6, at 328 (1988); 5 WILLiAM H. PAGE, ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 40.3, at 108
(William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker eds., rev. ed. 1960 & Supp. 1999); 7 RICHARD R.
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 588, at 46-5 (Don R. Castleman rev., rev. ed. 1998);
2 SCOTT, supra note 4, § 124, at 242, 244. But cf GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 166, at 167-68, § 218, at 313-14 (rev. 2d ed. 1979 &
Supp., George G. Bogertetal. eds., 1995) (alleging general rule to be invalidity, despite absence
of any American cases since 1935 so holding, apart from those implicating indefinite purposes
or perpetuities violations). For modem cases, see infra note 62. For doctrinal discussions of
some specific sorts ofpurpose bequests, see generally James T. Brennan, Bequestsfor the Care
ofSpecificAnimals, 6 DUQ.L. REv. 15 (1967-68); James T. Brennan, Bequestsfor the Erection,
Care, and Maintenance of Graves, Monuments, and Mausoleums, 9 WASHBURNL.J. 23 (1969);
James T. Brennan, Bequests for Religious Services, 17 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 388 (1968);
RP. Davis, Annotation, Law as to Cats, 73 A.L.R. 2d 1032, 1043-44 (1960); M.C. Dransfield,
Annotation, Gift for Maintenance or Care ofPrivate Cemetery or Burial Lot, or of Tomb or of
Monument, Including the Erection Thereof as Valid Trust, 47 A.L.R. 2d 596 (1956); Kenneth
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it could scarcely have been called a restatement of the law, for not a single
American court was then taking this approach.' It was, however, a rather
precise restatement of a law review article, published by Professor James Barr
Ames in 1892." Taking umbrage at a line of New York decisions that, under
a quirk in the state's early statutory law, had restricted the privileges of
charitable status to charitable corporations (as opposed to trusts),56 and hence
that invalidated trusts for even salutary purposes under the beneficiary princi-
ple, Ames insisted in language unusually fiery for his time that Morice had
been wrongly decided:
It may be said that there can be no trust without a definite cestui que trust
[i.e., beneficiary]. This must be admitted.... But it does not follow from
this admission that such a gift is void.... The only objection that has ever
been urged against such a gift is that the court cannot compel [the trustee]
to act if he is unwilling. Is it not a monstrous non sequitur to say that
therefore the court will not permit him to act when he is willing?...
Suppose a testator to give [the trustee] a purely optional power of appoint-
ment.... [T]he validity of this power would be unquestioned.... Does
it not seem a mockery of legal reasoning to say that the court will sanction
the exercise of the power where the donee was under no moral obligation
to act at all, but will not sanction the appointment when the donee was in
honor bound to make it?57
R. O'Brien & Daniel E. O'Brien, Seventy Years of Bequests for Masses in New York Courts,
1883-1953, 23 FORDHAM L. REV. 147 (1954).
54. Seesupranotes37-40 and accompanyingtext; infranote57; cf Inre Gibbons, [1917]
1 Ir. R. 448, 453 (Ch.) (allowing noncharitable purpose trust to take effect where trustees were
willing to carry it out without ruling on whether they could be compelled to do so). The
relevant provisions all appeared in the earliest draft oftheRestatement, submitted for discussion
in 1930. See RESTATEmENT OF TRUSTS §§ 118-20 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1930). Scott's
innovative treatment of honorary trusts in the Restatement was hardly his only effort therein to
remake, rather than restate, the law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 55 (1935) (address-
ing secret and semisecret trusts); IA SCOTT, supra note 4, § 55.8.
55. J.B. Ames, The Failure of the "Tilden Trust," 5 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1892).
56. On New York's odd and complex early law of charity, see Stanley N. Katz et al.,
Legal Change and Legal Autonomy: Charitable Trusts in New York 1777-1893, 3 LAW &
HIST. REv. 51, 59-89 (1985); see also 4A SCOTT, supra note 4, § 348.3, at 33 n.2, 37-38.
57. Ames, supra note 55, at 395-96. Significantly, Ames had to dip back to antebellum
slavery cases in order to discover American "precedents" for his position: In those few states
where slaves lacked standing to sue for freedom, some courts had nonetheless held valid trusts
for the purpose of manumitting slaves. Ames quoted several opinions in which the court
suggested that the trustee in such a case was free to carry out the trust but could not be com-
pelledto do so. See id at 400-01. John Chipman Gray subsequently reviewedAmes's evidence
and found it wanting: In each of the cases Ames cited, courts on appeal had deemed the trusts
enforceable, either by the slave himself or by the court of equity. See John C. Gray, Gifts for
a Non-Charitable Purpose, 15 HARV.L. REV. 509,522-24 (1902); see also 2 SCOTT, supra note
4, § 124.6, at 276.
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This argument was not, in fact, original to Ames. In more tempered
tones, it had been sounded four years earlier in counsel's submission in one
of the cases Ames was criticizing, Holland v. Alcock,58 where it was rejected
by New York's Court of Appeals. 9 Ames now took the idea and ran with it,'
convincing Scott of its rightness long before Scott turned his hand to the
Restatement.61 That project proved to be an effective pulpit. Soon enough,
those American courts facing the issue had adopted (or simply took for
granted) the Ames-Scott line.62 And so the honorary trust entered America's
58. 16 N.E. 305 (N.Y. 1888).
59. "[Tihe absence of a beneficiary entitled to enforce the trust is notfatal to its existence
where the trustee is... willing to execute it, and the purpose is lawful and definite." Holland
v. Alcock, 16 N.E. 305, 309 (N.Y. 1888). The Court nonetheless ruled that the trustee's
absence of"accountability to any one... contrary to the intention of the donor," constituted "a
fatal objection" to the trust:
[E]quitable title cannot on any sound principle be made to depend upon the exer-
cise by the trustee of an election whether he will or will not execute the alleged
trust. In such a case there is no trust, in the sense in which the term is used in
jurisprudence. There is simply an honorary and imperfect obligation to carry out
the wishes of the donor, which the alleged trustee cannot be compelled to perform,
and which he has no right to perform.
Id. at 307, 309-10.
60. Ames referred to counsel's argument in his article. See Ames, supra note 55, at 401.
61. See Scott, Control, supra note 50, at 537-42.
62. See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157-58 (D.D.C. 1971) (dicta); In re
Rogers, 412P. 2d 710,713 (Ariz. 1966) (failing to explicate holding); Feinberg v. Feinberg, 131
A.2d 658, 660-61 (Del. Ch. 1957) (dicta); John Robinson Hospital v. Cross, 272N.W. 724,727
(Mich. 1937) (dicta in dissenting opinion); In re Byrne's Estate, 100 A.2d 157, 159-60 (N.H.
1953) (dicta); Rengav. Spadone, 159 A.2d 142, 145 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960) (dicta); In
reVoorhis' Estate, 27N.Y.S.2d 818, 821-22 (Sur. Ct. 1941) (dicta); Goldv. Price, 211 S.E.2d
803, 804 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 214 S.E.2d 430 (N.C. 1975) (dicta); In re
Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 781-82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950); cf Fidelity Title & Trust Co.
v. Clyde, 121 A.2d 625, 630 (Conn. 1956) (declining to rule on validity of honorary trusts);
Kingsley v. Montrose Cemetery Co., 26N.E.2d 613,616-21 (111. App. Ct. 1940) (holding "trust"
to build monument invalid for lack of beneficiaries, but not addressing whether bequest could
have been given effect as power because "trustee" had already refused to accept appointment);
In re Swayze's Estate, 191 P.2d 322,324 (Mont. 1948) (holding void for "uncertainty" bequest
to build memorial hotel because bequest failed to specify terms with sufficient clarity, but citing
to section 124 of Restatement for authority); Richberg v. Robbins, 228 S.W.2d 1019, 1021
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (dicta that "private trust" for care of animal is valid). In Pennsylvania,
one post-Restatement case upheld the state's pre-Restatement tradition, see supra note 39, of
deeming bequests for noncharitable purposes valid as full-fledged trusts. See Devereux'sEstate,
48 Pa. D. & C. 491,498-500 (Orphans' Ct. 1943), appeal quashed, 46 A.2d 168 (Pa. 1946).
Nevertheless, subsequent opinions have given effect to intended trusts as honorary trusts. See,
e.g., Stewart Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 488, 489-90 (Orphans' Ct. 1979); Lyon Estate, 67 Pa. D.
& C.2d 474, 478-79 (Orphans' Ct. 1974); see also In re Renner's Estate, 57 A.2d 836, 838-39
(Pa. 1948) (construing bequest"intrust" to provide for pets -involving a substantial sum, where
trustee was also named owner of pets and residuary legatee- as outright bequest to that person
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legal lexicon - a telling irony, given that in prior appearances, the phrase had
conveyed judicial disapproval of the bequests at issue. 3
IIL Policy: Categorical Reassessment
The history of purpose trusts is indeed interesting and not without its
small ironies. But all of this is just by way of introduction. We have, in the
foregoing pages, beheld purpose trust doctrine as it proliferated into its
modem trio of sub-categories. The question to be pondered in the balance of
the Article is whether this state of affairs should gain our blessing as policy
analysts. More specifically, how many regimes of law do we need to deal
with the problem of purpose bequests, how should they be structured, and
where should we nowadays draw the lines?
Before we partake of these questions, I want to remove from the table one
potential ingredient in the discussion. The focus of this Article is substantive
rules, not principles of taxation. The prevailing scheme of purpose trust
categories evolved before the modem estate tax system came into being and
hence was not tied to the considerations of policy underlying that system."
What is more, these two bodies of law were, and remain, formally independ-
ent of each other: Though the Internal Revenue Code grants an unlimited
estate tax deduction for "charitable" transfers,65 seemingly dovetailing one of
with precatory instructions). On the other hand, cases concerning bequests for indefinite
noncharitable purposes - over which the Restatement had flip-flopped - have continued to go
both ways. Compare Cochran v. McLaughlin, 24 A.2d 836, 838 (Conn. 1942) (valid), Feinberg
v. Feinberg, 131 A.2d 658, 660-61 (Del. Ch. 1957) (same), and Goetz v. Old Nat'l Bank, 84
S.E.2d 759, 772 (W. Va. 1954) (same, dicta), with Read v. McLean, 200 So. 109, 110 (Ala.
1941) (void), Hoenig v. Newmark, 306 S.W.2d 838,840 (Ky. 1957) (same), Wilson v. Flowers,
277 A.2d 199, 201 (N.J. 1971) (same, dicta), Thomas v. Harrison, 191 N.E.2d 862, 869 (Ohio
Prob. Ct. 1962) (same), andln re Estate of Kradwell, 170 N.W.2d 773,775 (Wis. 1969) (same).
Cf RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS app. § 123 (1959) (Reporter's Notes) (misreading
several of these cases); 4A Scorr, supra note 4, § 398.1, at 457 n.20 (same). For additional
cases not directly raising the issue of substantive validity, see In re Hayward's Estate, 178 P.2d
547 (Ariz. 1947); In re Estate of Jones, 318 So.2d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). For modem
perpetuities cases, see SIMES & SMITH, supra note 29, §§ 1392, 1394.
63. See Holland, 16 N.E. at 306 ("There is simply an honorary and imperfect obliga-
tion...."). Ames had repeated the phrase in his article and was first to speak of an "honorary
trust," so-called. See Ames, supra note 55, at 396-98, 400. For antecedents of the phrase in
Great Britain, see Mussettv. Bingle, 1876 W.N. 170, 170 (V.C.); Dawson v. Small, 18 L.R.-Eq.
114, 118 (V.C. 1874); Hunter v. Bullock, 14 L.R.-Eq. 45, 48 (V.C. 1872); Pettingall v.
Pettingall, I1 L.J.R. (n.s.) 176, 177 (V.C. 1842).
64. The first federal estate tax was enacted in 1916. The Restatement of Trusts nowhere
addresses the taxation of purpose trusts or the exemption from taxation of charitable trusts.
65. See I.R.C. § 2055 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998). Recently, the category ofcharitability
has also colonized the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 (b)(2), 548 (a)(2), (d)(3) &
(d)(4), 707(b), & 1325(b)(2) (West Supp. III 1998).
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the key categorical distinctions found in the common law, deductibility
actually depends on meeting a federally-defined standard that does not corre-
spond in all respects with the one elaborated in the Restatement and concern-
ing which state law determinations of the dividing line between categories
have no bearing whatsoever.' Whether, when, and how government should
tax bequests for purposes are interesting and controversial matters.67 They are
also matters quite distinct from legal substance, our focus herein.
Viewed substantively, purpose bequests raise an assortment of policy
issues that we must explore in turn. But let us begin at the beginning: Under




This is the fundamental question. To address it, we must place the issue
into fundamental context. Freedom of testation is today recognized to be a
legal right, circumscribed by legal limits; lawmakers grant owners of property
leeway to plan their own estates for affirmative reasons of public policy, but
only to the extent that they do not overstep the bounds ofjustifying argument.
Certainly, lawmakers can and have acted to curtail testamentary liberty when
it strays into licentiousness; restrictions on the right to create far-future inter-
ests present an obvious example." To assess, then, the inclusion vel non of
purpose bequests within the parameters of acceptable exercise of the power of
the will, we must start by rehearsing the ends we aim to accomplish thereby.
Needless to say, that is a subject fit for a volume; we cannot dwell on it here.
But, for present purposes, an adumbration of traditional analyses will suffice.69
66. See 4A Scor, supra note 4, § 348.4; Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on
Charitable Organizations, 3 VA. TAX REV. 291,297-99 (1984); cf Rob Atkinson, Altruism in
Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 636 n.377 (1990).
67. Forrecent discussions ofthis question, citing in turn to earlier ones, see Rob Atkinson,
Theories ofthe Federal Income Tax Exemptionfor Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses,
27 STET. L. REv. 395 (1997); Atkinson, supra note 66, at 599-638; Evelyn Brody, Of Sover-
eignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998);
Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393
(1988); MarkA. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory ofthe Charitable Tax Exemp-
tion, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 1379 (1991). For recent economic analyses, see Ralph Chami & Connel
Fullenkamp, Should Gift Giving Be Subsidized? (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469 (1995); Louis
Kaplow, Tax Policy and Gifts, 88 AM. ECON. REv., PAPERS & PROC., May 1998, at 283.
68. See generally MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 25.
69. A collaborator and I offer a somewhat fuller elaboration of the points set out in the
following paragraph, along with scholarly references, in Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang,
A Qualitative Theory of the DeadHand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6-14 (1992). I shall here take as a given
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At the level of economic policy, commentators justify freedom of testa-
tion in four ways: (1) it supports a market for social services; owners can
implicitly trade future bequests for the present attentions of beneficiaries that
cannot explicitly be bargained for and contractually bound, given prevail-
ing cultural taboos; (2) owners gain personal satisfaction from bequeathing
property - testamentary freedom adds to the utility owners derive from what
they acquire and hence enhances their incentive both to produce and to save
wealth; (3) freedom of testation can also benefit survivors; by virtue of an
owner's in-depth knowledge of her relatives' individual needs, she can craft
ajudicious estate plan, calculated to maximize the family's collective welfare,
without incurring information costs; and (4) in any event, denying freedom of
testation in the statute books would not curtail it in action (absent very costly
policing), for testators could avail themselves of roundabout, or if need be
surreptitious, expedients to reach the same result.
The question then becomes whether freedom to bequeath for purposes,
as opposed to persons, finds support among the policies we have just outlined.
At this point, we need to examine the nature of the beast: What exactly is a
testator doing when she disposes of property in pursuit of a purpose? Viewed
in the context of economic and social criteria, our answer could indeed depend
upon the qualitative attributes of the purpose at issue - but, of course, differ-
ences and similarities are relative and contingent upon the frame from which
they are viewed. Focusing at one level, lawmakers and commentators have
discerned a structural dichotomy between purposes that affirmatively promote
community interests and those that do not. In Great Britain, the validity of a
purpose bequest can turn on this distinction; 0 plainly, it is one we must
examine. But ifwe continue to widen our focus, a second, broader dichotomy
enters our field of vision - one that lawmakers and commentators have not
heretofore seized on as significant, yet, when perused in the light of traditional
inheritance policies, one that manifests differences sufficiently pronounced
as also to require extended analysis.
On the one hand, a testator may dictate some purpose which she prefers
her property to be put by the living. In other words, she may seek to benefit
those who come after her -just as when she bequeaths directly to persons -
but still may wish to stipulate the uses to which her estate is devoted. Be-
quests for purposes that the law deems charitable fall into this category, but
so do others not so acknowledged. When a testator bequeaths a sum for "the
the right of inheritance-that is, the right of property owners to leave their wealth to successors
at death. The distinct question raised in the text above is why, assuming that right exists, the
law further allows property owners the power of testation, i.e., the right to pen their own wills,
making whatever provisions they choose for the distribution oftheir estates. On this distinction,
see id at 6 n.16.
70. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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promotion and furthering of fox hunting," for example, she decrees that her
resources go to survivors, but only to subsidize a fixed variety of consump-
tion - one that lawmakers fail to accept as generating public benefits." A
testator might also tack such a use-restriction onto a bequest to a person or a
class: a bequest in trust to pay for the fox-hunting expenses of a named
beneficiary or the present and afterborn children of a named beneficiary, by
analogy. Nonetheless, where the testator bequeaths for a purpose without
specifying or defining the persons who are to enjoy the bequest, someone or
other is still going to benefit; the recipients simply comprise an undefined
group. Let us call this type of transfer a bequest for a social purpose.
On the other hand, a testator may direct that her estate be disbursed to
accomplish her own, private purposes. Just as she consumes resources for her
own comfort during life, so may a testator wish to spend money on herself
postmortem. A bequest to build a tomb or to care for a pet are obvious
examples. In such a case, the recipients of the bequest do not comprise an
undefined group of living persons; the deceased herself is the only recipient.
Let us call this type of transfer a bequest for a personal purpose.
2. Purposes and Testation
Obviously, bequests for purposes, whether social or personal, cannot
form the currency of a market for services; only bequests to persons can
sustain such an economy. It is the very absence of a named beneficiary - the
potential provider of a current quid for the testator's quo - that marks this
variety of testamentary transfer. Hence, a right to bequeath for purposes can
find no basis in this particular rationale for freedom of testation.
At the same time, the opportunity to make bequests for purposes may be
of no small interest and concern to testators.72 When a testator bequeaths to
persons, the satisfaction she derives from the transfer- being a second justifi-
cation for the right to make it - stems from what the economists, in their
71. See In re Thompson, 1934 Ch. 342, 343. For other social purpose bequests found to
be noncharitable, see, for example, Barton v. Parrott, 495 N.E.2d 973, 974-76 (Ohio Prob. Ct.
1984) (bequest to fund annual harness horse stake race); In re Nottage, [1895] 2 Ch. 649, 653-
54 (App.) (bequest to encourage yacht racing).
72. The point, oddly, has often been diminished by scholars. Professor Bogert referred
to the arguments in favor of recognizing honorary trusts, including the fact that they reflect "the
intent of the donor," as "relatively unimportant." BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 53, § 166, at
164-65. In a similar vein, Professor Atkinson has argued in favor of permitting the trustees of
charitable trusts to vary from the restrictions that a testator places on their use, immediately and
without confinement to the traditional bounds of cy pres. Such a power to ignore designated
purposes, Atkinson prophesies, would not discourage charitable giving, let alone overall pro-
ductivity and saving, given the "more popular" outlets of private bequests to individuals and
unrestricted charitable gifts. See Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HAST. L.J.
1111, 1123 &passim (1993).
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inimitable fashion, dub an interdependent utility function: Making her loved
ones happy also makes the testator happy.' Similarly, when a testator makes
a bequest for a social purpose, her utility may derive from a more diffuse
association with the undefined group that benefits; thus, a testator may be
personally gratified by the knowledge that her bequest will aid fellow fox-
hunting enthusiasts. These ties of identification (and sometimes of empathy)
can bind one to a group, as to the members of a family.74 Hence, the gratifica-
tion flowing from the testator's knowledge that a bequest benefiting a group
will be honored is, at the very least, comparable.
And that is not all: Tangled up with ties of affiliation could be other con-
cerns of an egoistic nature. By hypothesis, bequests for social purposes can
function as a mode of self-expression. Their inspiration could come not (mere-
ly) from the testator's feelings about the world, but also (in part) from how she
wishes theworld to feel about her. Social-psychological research suggests that
individuals throughout their lives employ various and sundry strategies to
highlight, and even to edit, aspects of their identities, signaling how they wish
others to perceive them.75 An estate plan can serve as the final move in this
73, 'Tis spring, and a young man's fancy turns to... interdependent utiliy functions?
Alas, it loses something in the translation. For an economic discussion of interdependentutilities
within families, see GARY S. BECKER, ATREATISE ONTHE FAMILY 277-306 (rev. ed. 1991).
74. The point is uncontroversial among social psychologists. See, e.g., MARKH. DAVIS,
EMPATHY: ASOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 102, 126-52 (1996); MICHAEL A. HOGG &
DOMINICABRAMS, SOCIALIDENTNICATIONS 92-115 (1988); GROUP COHESION (Henry Kellerman
ed., 1981). Identification and empathy often reinforce each other. See DAVIS, supra, at 145-46.
In their own vernacular, economists have voiced agreement, postulating interdependent utility
functions between individuals and social groups, which economists have taken to calling the
"warm glow" phenomenon. See GARY S. BECKERA Theory ofSociallnteractions, in ACCOUNT-
ING FOR TASTES 162, 184-89 (1997) (essay first published in 1974); James Andreoni, Impure
Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464
(1990); Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rogers, Pareto OptimalRedistributions, 59 AM. ECON.
REV. 542, 542-47 (1969). For an early discussion, see ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS 219-27 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfle eds., 4th prtg. 1997) (1759).
75. The classic study is ERVINGGOFFMANTHEPRESENTATIONOF SELFINEVERYDAYLIFE
(1959). For morerecent discussions, see JEROLDHEIss, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGYOF INTERAC-
TION 70-84 (1981); TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES (1995) (highlighting
phenomenon of false presentations to win social acceptance and esteem); GEORGE J. MCCALL
& J.L. SIMMONS, IDENTITIES AND INTERACTIONS 133-64 (rev. ed. 1978); GRANT MCCRACKEN,
CULTUREAND CONSUMPTION (1988); Ottman L. Braun & Robert A. Wicklund, Psychological
Antecedents of Conspicuous Consumption, 10 J. ECON. PSYCH. 161 (1989) (suggesting,
perceptively, that persons employ identity strategies to compensate for insecurity or incomplete-
ness within their identities - a psychological insight which may help to explain why "old-
money" and "new-money" behave so very differently). Sometimes the process is none too
subtle: Individuals may display upon their automobiles or clothing, or even on their flesh,
written messages proclaiming things about themselves. On the other hand, cultural taboos
dictate that certain sorts of messages ("I am rich!") ought not be stated, though via strategies
only a trifle less transparent they can still be implied. Hence, persons may parade around in
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social game, communicating to survivors how individuals prefer to be remem-
bered. 6 Bequests to persons could also sometimes function in this egoistic
capacity;' a testator might hope to win posthumous recognition as a devoted
parent, a benevolent employer, a loyal friend. But bequests for social purposes
can do so far more flexibly,78 allowing a testator to define her character with
precision.79 Thus can she present herself to the world as a humanitarian80 or,
Polo shirts, flaunt Rolex watches, etc., but not before first removing the price-tags. See MC-
CRACKEN, supra, at 68-69; Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bermheim, Veblen Effects in
a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 367 (1996).
76. This point is developed in David R. Unruh, Death and Personal History: Strategies
ofldentity Preservation, 30 SOC. PROBS. 340 (1983). Individuals sometimes adopt a similar
tactic earlier in the life-cycle, giving lifetime (as opposed to death-time) gifts chosen to under-
score their own identities, rather than gifts tailored to their donees' identities. See HELGA
DHrMAR, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MATERIL POSSESSIONS 97-98 (1992).
77. Bequests to persons may also serve other egoistic purposes, such as the testator's own
dynastic ambitions. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 69, at 15 n.52, 33, 53-54. For an early
recognition, see Andrew Camegie,.Wealth, in DEMOCRACY AND THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 1, 4
(Gail Kennedy ed., 1949) (1889) (essay published in Great Britain as The Gospel of Wealth).
78. Likewise, bequests to named individuals restricted to specific uses could conceivably
be (in part) so motivated. For a possible example, see Mitchell v. Whittier College, 272 P. 748
(Cal. 1928), involving a bequest for the education ofa beneficiary, where the testator specified
as the preferred educational institution a college for which the testator had served as a trustee.
79. This is not invariably the case: The impetus for some purpose-gifts may be wholly
empathetic, for plainly not everyone wishes personally to associate himself with the purpose or
need he chooses to subsidize. See, e.g., Ian Fisher, $1 Million Gift for New Charity Case: The
Viagra Needy, N.Y. TIMEs, June 10, 1998, at B3.
80. That many donors to charitable causes are actuated at some level by social posturing
has long been a commonplace. Such posturing may be either direct, i.e., the donor wishes to
win renown as a philanthropist, or stereotypic, i.e., the donor wishes to highlight her economic
status, philanthropy being a social preserve of the well-to-do. For legal recognition of this
social verity, see FiSCHETAL., supra note 28, § 260 (remarking the rule that trusts for charitable
purposes retain that status irrespective of testators' motives for creating them); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. d (1959) (same). For analyses by sociologists, see TERESA
ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS ATHOME39-42 (1990);FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHYTHE WEALTHY
GrvE 124-28 (1995). Foran early discussion, see SIRARTHURHOBHOUSETHEDEADHAND 15-
20 (London 1880) ("[W]hatever fine words [the donor] may have used, we may be sure he was
really thinking more of himself than of his fellow-creatures.... I attribute but a minor place
to the influence of Patriotism or Public Spirit."). For economic discussions of this insight, see
BECKER, supra note 74, at 184 & n.34; Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konmad, A Signaling Explana-
tion for Charity, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1019 (1996); William T. Harbaugh, The Prestige Motive
for Making Charitable Transfers, 88 AM. ECON. REV., PAPERS & PROC., May 1998, at 277;
William T. Harbaugh, What Do Donations Buy? A Model ofPhilanthropy Based on Prestige
and Warm Glow, 67 J. PUB. ECON. 269 (1998); cf Robert Sugden, On the Economics of
Philanthropy, 92 EcON. J. 341, 349 (1982). One interesting social repercussion is that some
donors prefer to give to, and thereby to associate themselves with, more richly endowed
charities, because these can offer greater prestige. Professor Brody calls this phenomenon the
"Harvard Syndrome." See Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of
Dynasty, 39 ARIZ, L. REV. 873, 938-39 (1997).
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more particularly, as a hospitable host,8" a man of letters,82 a Marxist, 3 a
midget," a tobacco aficionado" - or as a fancier of equestrian blood sport.
In addition, bequests for social purposes display one other, related char-
acteristic that could also appeal egoistically to a testator: They remain sym-
bolically associated with her, rather than with posterity. When persons come
to inherit property, it is absorbed into their own, individual estates. But when
property is bequeathed for a social purpose, the corpus has no manifest owner
and so can continue, for however long the bequest persists, to be connected
with the testator's memory. Social psychologists have observed that the
desire somehow to transcend mortality and sustain one's identity beyond the
grave is both common and strong.86 Testation aside, it often motivates the
elderly to compose memoirs or to gather together artifacts of their lives.8 7 A
bequest for a social purpose - existing in nubibus, laid hold of by no one -
could fulfill this same function. Thus could atestator endeavor to ensure not
only how she will be remembered, but that she will be remembered at all.88
81. See Kelly v. Nichols, 21 A. 906, 907 (RI. 1891) (describing estate plan of testator
who left his house for the purpose of lodging itinerant clergymen, "inasmuch as my house has
been open during my life-time... for the reception and entertainment of ministers and others
traveling in the service of truth").
82. Was it pure benevolence that led George Bernard Shaw to bequeath funds within his
will for an "alphabet trust"? See infra note 113.
83. See Alexander v. House, 54 A. 2d 510, 511 (Conn. 1947).
84. See Helen O'Neill, Scholarships SeekSpecial Students, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, July
14, 1996, at A10 (describing estate plan of deceased actor, Billy Barty).
85. See FRANKTHOMAS, LASTWILLANDTESTAMENT: WILLS,ANCIENTAND MODERN 73
(1972).
86. See Robert N. Butler, Looking Forward to What?, 14 AM. BEHAv. Sci. 121, 123
(1970) (labelling this phenomenon "historicity").
87. See Unruh, supra note 76, at 341-45. No such efforts need be taken by screen actors,
who sometimes delight in leaving a mark upon the world in the form of celluloid. Ray Bolger,
who played the Scarecrow in the classic feature film The WizardofOz (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
1939), once remarked that he had gained by it "a kind of immortality" that he rated "better than
residuals," which the studio had denied him. Television Interview with Ray Bolger (n.d.,
rebroadcast May 8, 1998).
88. Some courts have intuitively grasped this psychology, analogizing a perpetual trust
to a "monument" or "memorial" to the deceased. See Williams v. Herrick, 32 A. 913, 913-14
(R.I. 1895) (adding that "[t]he provisions of the will ... seem to go beyond a legal perpetuity,
and reach into eternity"); Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E.
173, 175-76 (N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo, J.); Medical Soc'y of S.C. v. South CarolinaNat'l Bank,
14 S.E.2d 577,581-82 (S.C. 1941). Some testators have drawn such analogies themselves. See,
e.g., In re Swayze's Estate, 191 P.2d 322,323 (Mont. 1948); In re Endacott, [1959] 3 All E.R.
562, 563 (C.A.) (discretionary bequest for "some useful memorial to myself"); see also
LawrenceM. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALEL.J. 547,548,589 (1964) (observing that
charitable trusts allow testators "to found a bloodless dynasty"). Needless to add, professional
fund-raisers for philanthropies both understand and exploit this desire. See ODENDAHL, supra
note 80, at 26.
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That some testators do harbor such motives is suggested by the care they take
to label funds for social purposes with their own names, lest anyone forget
whose money it was. 9
A testator may also value the opportunity to make bequests for personal
purposes; just as she has personal expenses throughout her life, so may a
testator conceive these to continue following her death. Of course, most
expenditures stem from the demands of our corporal existence, but others can
ensue from the very act of dying: the funeral and burial, for example, possibly
hallowed by masses or prayers for the departed. More ineffably, the prospect
of death could occasion in the testator a wish to preserve her memory, as we
have seen. Bequests for the purpose of constructing a memorial or publishing
an intellectual product of the deceased can once again play this role. The
testator thereby purchases for herself a visible," intelligible,9' or even
audible 2 reminder that she was here. Bequests of funds to maintain items of
the testator's tangible property - the souvenirs of her passage through life -
could be similarly motivated. 3
89. See, e.g.,Inre Swayze's Estate, 191 P.2d 322,324 (Mont. 1948); Allegheny College
v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1927); Williams v. Herrick, 32
A. 913, 913 (R.I. 1895); Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 63 S.E.2d 786, 788 (Va.
1951). Indeed, anonymous gifts for social purposes are so unusual that (ironically) they tend
to attract notice. See Judith Miller, He Gave Away $600 Million, and No One Knew, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1997, at Al.
90. Inscriptions and the scale of a monument can speak to the identity and personality of
the testator -though perhaps not always in the way that she intended. See M'Caig's Trustees
v. Kirk-Session of United Free Church, 1915 Sess. Cas. 426, 438 (Scot.) (suggesting that
testator's bequest for grandiose statues of family members would "turn a respectable and
creditable family into a laughing stock to succeeding generations"); see also Morristown Trust
Co. v. Mayor & Bd. ofAldermen, 91 A. 736,737 (N.J. Ch. 1913) (bequest to fund construction
of flagstaff as memorial). That an edifice can function to perpetuate the memory of a testator
has been recognized since the Pharaohs - and some have not stopped there. Along with
bequests to build monuments, testators sometimes leave substantial funds to care for them, or
even, in a few cases, to employ persons to draw attention to them. See, e.g., Shepp Estate, 29
Pa. D. & C.2d 385, 388 (Orphans' Ct. 1962) (bequest forvarious specified floral arrangements
to decorate graves on specified days); Palethorp's Estate, 24 Pa. D. & C. 215, 216 (Orphans'
Ct. 1914) (including bequest for grave-guide), affd, 94 A. 1060, appeal dismissed, 94 A. 1066
(Pa. 1915); Travis v. Randolph, 112 S.W.2d 835, 835 (Tenn. 1938) (bequest of vast bulk of
estate for upkeep of graves).
91. See Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Clyde, 121 A.2d 625, 627, 629 (Conn. 1956)
(bequest to publish manuscripts).
92. For abequest to employ a marching band to parade to the grave of the deceased each
year on the anniversary of his death and other holidays, see Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq.
347, 350 (Ch. 1883).
93. Of course, tangibles uniquely identified with- or depicting - a testator serve to keep
alive her memory. See, e.g., Grigson v. Harding, 144 A. 2d 870, 872, 878 (Me. 1958) (bequest
to care for building that was to "be preserved as a family memorial"); In re Gassiot, 70 L.J. Ch.
(n.s.) 242,243 (1901) (bequest ofportraitto company on conditionthat it hang in "aconspicuous
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Yet bequests for this last sort of personal purpose could have an addi-
tional psychological basis, more closely analogous to the one that motivates
a bequest to a person: They may reflect atestator's emotional ties to her prop-
erty. Whereas some objectionable folk are said to treat people like objects,
psychological studies show that the reverse phenomenon also occurs (hence
weakening the aspersion): Some individuals treat their objects like people.
We all internalize at least some of our possessions within our self-concept -
that is, we tend to view items of our property as extensions of ourselves.94
The same is true of members of our family ("my better half"), and just as we
wish to provide for loved ones after we are gone, so may we strive to ensure,
for similar if not identical reasons, that treasured objects are protected.95
part of their common hall," plus funds to maintain it). One bizarre variant of this strategy -
excessive, to be sure-involves directions for the preservation ofthe testator's own remains. The
renowned legal rationalist, Jeremy Bentham-who surely stood in no dangerofbeing forgotten-
nonetheless took pains to include in his will a bequest of this sort. To this day, his skeleton, fully
clothed and peering out at the world through a wax mask, greets visitors of University College
in London. See THOMAS, supra note 85, at 73. And along with memory-enhancement, the items
selected by a testator for preservation might also serve to highlight her identity. Once again, the
process could be either direct or stereotypic, for the sorts of objects that we purport to treasure
can signal our status. See HelgaDittmar, MaterialPossessions as Stereotypes: Material lmages
ofDifferent Socio-Economic Groups, 15 J. ECON. PSYCH. 561 (1994).
94. See DITTMAR, supra note 76, at 41-64; Russell W. Belk, Possessions and the
Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139 (1988). For a philosophical discussion, see
MARGARETJANERADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35-71 (1993). For an anecdotal illustra-
tion, see Obituary: Peter Ludwig, EcONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1996, at 75 (recounting life of childless
art collector who was wont to remark "I am what I own."). Estate planners as well have not
been oblivious to the phenomenon. See JEROME A. MANNING ET AL., MANNING ON ESTATE
PLANNING ch. 15, at 8-9 (5th ed. 1995); THOMAsL. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY, AND LAWYERS
126-28 (1970); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & CAROL ANN MOONEY, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING
OF WILLSANDTRUSTS 18-19 (3d ed. 1991). This psychological fact affects economic behavior
during the lifetime of owners, often rendering them unwilling to sell property at its market
value, a predisposition known as the "endowment effect." See, e.g., Robert Franciosi et al.,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect, 30 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 213 (1996).
95. Psychologists have noted, by analogy, the tendency to dote over property while alive,
see Belk, supra note 94, at 158, and the Germans have a saying (surely facetious but also, like
all sayings, not without a grain of truth) that they "love their cars more than their children." One
of the more flamboyant attorneys of our time, Melvin Belli ("King of Torts") listed his four pet
dogs in the San Francisco telephone directory; his holographic will, dividing $10,000 among
them, referred to these animals as his "children." Julian Guthrie, Bellis' Battle of Wills: Son
and Widow Exchange VerbalAssaults in Nasty Fight Over Estate, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 22,
1996, at Cl; Richard C. Reuben, Strife After Deathfor King of Torts, ABAJ., Jan. 1997, at 37;
Steve Rubenstein, New Fight OverBelli's Scribbled Wills, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 1996, atA13.
For judicial observations of cords of affection between testators and the property they bequeath
funds to care for, see, for example, New England Trust Co. v. Folsom, 167 N.E. 665, 666
(Mass. 1929) (suggesting that testator "thought more of [her cats] than she did of her relatives");
Smith v. Heyward, 105 S.E. 275, 277, 279-80 (S.C. 1920) (remarking that testator's house was
"hallowed by ancient family ties," and that she "was devoted to the place and regarded it with
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Significantly, most bequests for the purpose of caring for property have
covered precisely the sorts of items identified in the psychological literature
as those with which persons form their closest attachments:' homes, collec-
tions, and pet animals. 7
The yearning to bequeath for the care of these items may be doubly
reinforced in those instances where the testator lacks loved ones of the human
variety. Property may then serve as a substitute for companionship, consoling
the testator in lieu of relational gratifications, and may even be conceptualized
by her in anthropomorphic terms.98 And in such a case, the outlet of simply
a peculiar pride and veneration"); Grigson v. Harding, 144 A. 2d 870, 876 (Me. 1958) (regard-
ing testator's "beloved Laboratory"); and cases cited infra note 98. The phenomenon is well
enough known to have infiltrated popular culture: A bequest to pet animals formed the premise
of the animated Disney film, The Aristocats (Walt Disney Co. 1970).
96. See RUSSELL W. BELK, COLLECTINGINA CONSUMERSOCIETY 68-96, 139-58(1995);
MIHALY CsSKSZENTmuiALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS 55-89,
121-45 (1981); ODEAN CUSACK & ELAINE SMITH, PETS AND THE ELDERLY 33-48 (1984);
DITMAR, supra note 76, at 107-08, 112-14; WERNERMUENSTERBERGER, COLLECTING 14-24
(1994); Belk, supra note 94, at 155-56; Russell W. Belk, Collecting as Luxury Consumption:
Effects on Individuals and Households, 16 J. ECON. PSYCH. 477, 479 (1995); N. Laura
Kamptner, Personal Possessions and Their Meanings in OldAge, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
AGING 165, 190-92 (Shirlynn Spacapan & Stuart Oskamp eds., 1989). For a pathological
example, see Ronald Smothers, In a Passion for Antique Clocks, Executive Embezzled $12
Million, N.Y. TIME, Oct. 1, 1997, at Al.
97. Homes: see, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 101 A.2d 789, 793 (Conn. 1953); Thorp v.
Lund, 116 N.E. 946,949-50 (Mass. 1917) (island); Grigson v. Harding, 144 A.2d 870, 871-72
(Me. 1958); Bliven v. Borden, 185 A. 239, 245 (RI. 1936); Kelly v. Nichols, 21 A. 906, 907
(R.I. 1891), aff'd on reh'g, 25 A. 840 (RI. 1892) (home and clock); Smith v. Heyward, 105
S.E. 275, 277 (S.C. 1920); In re Corelli, [1943] 2 All E.R. 519, 520 (Ch.) (home and all its
contents); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 1914 App. Cas. 215, 215-16 (P.C.). Collections: see, e.g.,
Palethorp's Estate, 24 Pa. D. & C. 215, 216 (Orphans' Ct. 1914), aff'd, 94 A. 1060 (Pa.),
appeal dismissed, 94 A. 1066 (Pa. 1915); Medical Soc'y of S.C. v. South CarolinaNat'l Bank,
14 S.E.2d 577, 578 (S.C. 1941). Pet animals: see, e.g., In re Rogers, 412 P.2d 710, 711-12
(Ariz. 1966); Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739, 740 (Ky. 1923); New England Trust Co. v.
Folsom, 167 N.E. 665, 666 (Mass. 1929); In re Johnston's Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221-22
(App. Div. 1950), aftd sub nom. In re Johnston's Will, 98 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1951) (finding
that bequest failed because conservators sold animals prior to testator's death); In re Howells'
Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598, 600-01 (Sur. Ct. 1932), modified, 261 N.Y.S. 859 (Sur. Ct. 1933); In
re Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779,782-84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950); Stewart Estate, 13 Pa. D. &
C.3d 488,489-90 (Orphans' Ct. 1979); Lyon Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 474,475 (Orphans' Ct.
1974); Wrenshall's Estate, 72 Pa. Super. 258, 259 (1919).
98. Courts have observed these phenomena. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 412 P.2d 710, 712
(Ariz. 1966); In re Howells' Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598, 600-01 (Sur. Ct. 1932); see alsoAdvance
Desk L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 9, 1994, at 7 (reporting case of unmarried testator who bequeathed her
entire, substantial estate for care of her pet cat, identified in her will as her "best friend and
companion"); Drew Ward, Pet Owners' Wills Make Provisions for Fido and Fluff to Go to
College, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1996, at BI. This has long been the stuff of fable. See HANS
CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE NIGHTINGALE (Anna Bier ed., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1985)
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bequeathing cherished objects to a family member as trusted caretaker is
simultaneously foreclosed." Indeed, the factual settings recounted in the
published cases suggest that purpose bequests of this particular sort seldom
occur otherwise."0
In short, testators may have powerful motives for making bequests for
purposes, both social and personal."' Those who choose to include such
bequests in their wills often spell them out in exquisite detail." 2 Apparently
wary of judicial resistance, some testators have even interrupted their wills
with pleas to the probate judge to observe their stated wishes. 3 If freedom
oftestation enhances the value of ownership, and with it incentives to produce
and save, then freedom to make bequests for purposes contributes to that value
and adds to those incentives. Notice fmally that our analysis does not suggest
(1894). But social psychologists remain in some disagreement on the point, see DrmAR,
supra note 76, at 51-52, 103-04, and it may happen that one who spurns human relations also
shuns material possessions as a complementary expression of unworldliness. See Obituary:
PaulErdos, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 1996, at 83 (recounting solitary life of mathematician who also
insisted on giving away most of his earnings because, as he put it, "private property is a
nuisance"). For the mirror image of this philosophy, see supra note 94.
99. For a discussion of the phenomenon of beneficiaries playing the role of curators of
family heirlooms that they inherit, see MCCRACKEN, supra note 75, at 44-53.
100. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 412 P.2d 710, 711 (Ariz. 1966); In re Forrester's Estate, 279
P. 721, 722 (Colo. 1929); In re Howells' Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598, 600-01 (Sur. Ct. 1932); In
re Renner's Estate, 57 A.2d 836, 837 (Pa. 1948); Richberg v. Robbins, 228 S.W.2d 1019, 1021
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1950). One popular survey of 10,000 pet owners, yielding approximately 4100
respondents, found that 27% of dog owners and 21% of cat owners provide for the care of their
pets in their wills. "Not surprisingly, it's the older (45+) set... who have done this good deed.
Generally, they are single individuals who have income levels above $30,000 a year." BARRY
SINROD, Do You Do IT WHEN YouR PET's iN THE RooM? at ix, 71 (1993).
101. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 412 P.2d 710, 714 (Ariz. 1966) (remarking testimony that
testator "didn't care how much it cost to take care of her dogs the way she wanted them taken
care of; and this was the reason she had gone down and had the will made up in the first place").
102. See, e.g., In re Stoffel's Estate, 145 A. 70,70-71 (Pa. 1929); Estate of Smith, 181 Pa.
109, 110-11 (1896); Callin Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 376,377-79 (Orphans' Ct. 1961). But cf
WALDEMAR A. NIELS EN, THE GOLDEN DONORS 14-19 (1985) (finding that possessors of large
fortunes can be remarkably vague and careless about purposes of foundations established under
their wills).
103. "I have considered for a number of years the disposition of my estate. All that I
possess has come to me as compensation and reward for services rendered and I have worked
and saved since I was a small boy and I feel that I have a right to make whatever disposition I
may care to make of my property...." Snouffer v. Peoples Trust & Say. Co., 212 N.E.2d 165,
169 (Ind. App. 1965) (bequest to build family mausoleum); "I have regulated the disposition
and appropriation of [my property] ... in a spirit accordant with my own views and feelings...
against which, it is my will and desire that, even the law itself, shall not interfere nor prevail."
Mitford v. Reynolds, 60 Eng. Rep. 812, 813 (V.C. 1848) (emphasis omitted) (bequest for care
of testator's horses); "No part of my estate is to be spent upon human beings .... ." In re
Forrester's Estate, 279 P. 721, 722 (Colo. 1929).
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any reason whythe utility of a purpose bequest from the testator's perspective
should turn systematically on whether the purpose at issue happens to serve
the public interest. Its worth to her may vary depending on the strength of her
ties to the undefined group that benefits or to the property that is cared for, but
those are factors independent of the charitability vel non of the purpose as
perceived by lawmakers.
Whether survivors, in their turn, can be said to profit from a law that
concedes testators power to create bequests for purposes is another matter.
Plainly, the traditional argument that freedom of testation affords owners
room to plan their estates in ways that enhance the overall welfare of surviv-
ing relatives has no bearing here. Bequests for purposes do not benefit the
testator's relatives at all. Indeed, were the interests of the family our para-
mount concern, we might justly bar bequests for purposes, at least in those
instances where close relatives do survive the testator.' In the nineteenth
century some American commentators took that very stance, opposing even
charitable bequests on this basis,' and the development of the British case
law may well reflect this consideration implicitly."r Today, however, the
104. But compare the vision of Andrew Carnegie, who saw bequests to one's children as
poisoned gifts, tending to their demoralization: "I would as soon leave my son a curse as the
almighty dollar." Carnegie, supra note 77, at 4. However this may be, testators of their own
volition tend to eschew bequests for purposes when they are survived by close relatives; in the
ordinary course, bequests to relatives dominate the estate plan. See Driscoll v. Hewlett, 91 N.E.
784, 784 (N.Y. 1910) ("Some explanation may be afforded of the motive for [the testator's
bequest of his entire estate for the care of his grave], in the fact that the testator left neither wife,
child, nor parent, and that his estate at the time of his death was of the value of $6,000."). See
also, e.g., In re Turk's Will, 221 N.Y.S. 225,227-28 (Sur. Ct. 1927); cases cited supra note 97;
supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. On the other hand, on rare occasion, feelings of
antagonism toward close relatives motivate testators to make purpose bequests. See, e.g.,
Gallagher v. Venturini, 3 A.2d 157, 158 (N.J. Ch. 1938).
105. American advocates of this position included Thomas Jefferson and Joseph Story.
See MILLER, supra note 28, at 40-50; Note, supra note 28, at 442-48; see also Estate of Smith,
181 Pa. 109, 114 (1896) (justifying enforcement of purpose bequest because testator had died
childless); Doughten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51, 77 (1875) (criticizing testator for disinheriting
her family in favor of charities). One court went even further, questioning the wisdom of
allowing any freedom of testation, on the theory that the scheme of intestate distribution
provided the best means of family protection. See In re Walker's Estate, 42 P. 815, 818 (Cal.
1895), modified, 42 P. 1082 (Cal. 1896).
106. Most British courts have given effect to bequests for noncharitable purposes only
when they concerned the care of tombs and pets. These typically have involved relatively small
sums and could be viewed loosely as a matter of intrafamily concern. Larger bequests for
noncharitable social purposes, generally avoided by British courts, posed a greater threat to the
family. The case for this interpretation is thoughtfully put in Roger B.M. Cotterrell, Some
Sociological Aspects of the Controversy Around the Legal Validity ofPrivate Purpose Trusts,
in EQUITYAND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 302 (Stephen Goldstein ed., 1992); cf
Eggleston, supra note 25, at 120 (suggesting that noncharitable purpose bequests given effect
under British law "deal with subjects near to the hearts of Englishmen" and so could be
"regarded as deserving of exceptional treatment"); In re Astor's Settlement Trusts, [1952] 1 All
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elective share and related statutes function to secure the minimum level of
family protection that lawmakers deem expedient." 7 Apart from the forced
shares reserved by these statutes, testators are perfectly free to bequeath to
persons outside the family."0 ' Do bequests for purposes procure any less
social gain?
Here, we have several more concerns to address. In the case of a bequest
for a social purpose, the individuals who ultimately get to enjoy the property
will find it tied to a particular use. At first sight, this appears an economic
drawback: When atestator restricts the use of a named beneficiary's bequest,
by comparison, its value to her falls, for she must settle for the prescribed
form of consumption, even though she would prefer to expend the resource
otherwise."° On reflection, however, when a testator bequeaths for a purpose
to an extended group, the value of the bequest is less likely to be compro-
mised. Very probably, there are persons out there who enjoy, say, fox hunting
well enough to expend their own funds for the activity; by virtue of its very
namelessness, a purpose bequest can find its preferred users, satisfying a
desire for consumption that exists somewhere or other."'
E.R 1067, 1074 (Ch.) (observing similarly that these exceptional cases involve purposes
"intimately connected with the deceased," leading courts to seek "means of escape" from the
general rule); Note, 68 L.Q. Rnv. 449, 451 (1952) (asserting that British case law is perverse,
in that bequests for social purposes invalidated by British courts involve "more beneficial
schemes" than bequests for personal purposes which courts have allowed). The British Statute
of Mortmain also was partly inspired by concern for the family, see A.H. Oosterhoff, The Law
ofMortmain: An HistoricalandComparative Review, 27 U.TORONTOL.J. 257,279-84(1977),
as was its American counterparts, see Stephen D. Bomes, The DeadHand: The Last Grasp?,
28 U. FLA. L. REV. 351, 353-57 (1976).
107. On the contours and policies of the elective share, see Susan N. Gary, Marital
Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law Provides a Solution, 49
U. MLII L. REV. 567 (1995). Community property operates as a counterpart to the elective
share in a handful of states. See id at 569. For a comparative discussion of British statutes, see
Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom -A Report on Decedents'Family
Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 277 (1955).
108. Still, traditional norms have never disappeared and today express themselves as
homilies. Hence, "charity begins at home." To the extent that testamentary provisions permit-
ted by law run afoul of such social norms, courts and juries may strive covertly to annul them.
In this manner, social norms at odds with legal rules can seep into adjudicative subculture. For
an analysis of cases suggesting that courts have stretched to defy wills seeking to disinherit the
testator's immediate family, see Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38
ARiz. L. REV. 235 (1996). But even if the law fails, as it well may, to reflect popular concerns
for family protection, a stronger policy against disinheritance of the immediate family would
call for no legal distinction between purpose bequests and ordinary bequests to nonrelatives.
Hence, such a policy would provide no justification for banning purpose bequests exclusively.
109. For a further discussion of bequests for individuals limited to a particular use, see
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 69, at 18-27.
110. The process is manifest when atestator bequeaths to an association devoted to atype
of consumption. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
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This insight helps us to pin down the structural attributes of a bequest for
a social purpose. In essence, it is a bequest to individuals whofit a social
description, such as fox hunters; hence, like outright bequests to persons, it
does not diminish the value of property. Such a bequest is efficient, in the
economic sense. 1' And, note well, that is true whether or not the social pur-
pose in question falls within any set parameters of charitability.
Assuredly, the case differs when a prescribed social purpose is so unor-
thodox that no one eligible to benefit would choose to spend her own funds
for the activity. In that event, the value of the bequest does fall (and could
conceivably amount to nothing). But even here, the consequent economic loss
might prove transient. Testators typically impose use-restrictions onto be-
quests for persons out of a sense of paternalism. They thereby seek to influ-
ence consumption decisions - and eventually consumption preferences - in
what they conceive to be the beneficiaries' own interest."' By the same
token, testators experiencing a sense of fellowship with society-at-large might
seek by a social purpose bequest to encourage unfamiliar or unwelcome forms
of consumption which they believe would benefit the public. In the process,
they could show fellow-citizens what they had been missing and stir demand
for the subsidized good or service. As the new form of consumption came
into vogue, members of society would once again discover in the bequest an
efficient source of funding for something they would (at last) wish to have.
Many social purpose bequests have almost certainly been so inspired' - and
111. Even an individual beneficiary saddled with a use restriction may also be able to
mitigate its effects on her consumption choices by diverting to other uses resources that she
would otherwise have devoted on her own to the prescribed use, or via secondary trading. But
the risk that value will be lost by a use restriction declines as the class of persons eligible to
participate in the bequest expands, reaching its minimum when the eligibility pool is unlimited.
Hence, if anything, there is a stronger economic case to be made for forbidding use-restrictions
upon bequests to individual persons or classes than for forbidding general bequests for social
purposes. See infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
112. See Robert A. Pollack, Tied Transfers and Paternalistic Preferences, 78 AM. ECON.
REv., PAPERS & PROC., May 1988, at 240.
113. George Bernard Shaw provided a bequest underhis will forthe purpose ofdeveloping
a revised British alphabet of 40 letters. See In re Shaw, [1957] 1 All E.R. 745, 749-50 (Ch.),
appeal dismissed per compromise, [1958] 1 All E.R. 245 (C.A.). The will went on to remark
Shaw's hope that this streamlined alphabet would gain eventual endorsement by the Ministry
of Education and be taught in British schools. See id. at 750; see also In re Bushnell, [1975]
1 W.L.R. 1596, 1605 (Ch.) (finding that by funding bequest to advance socialized medicine,
testator "was trying to promote his own theory"). Among the living philanthropists of today,
billionaire George Soros has been making similarly innovative gifts. See Giving It Away,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 1997, at 77. Soros possibly was influenced by Karl Popper, the social
philosopher under whom he studied, who advocated small-scale social experiments as the best
route to social development (and who, in his own way, practiced what he preached, by climbing
out onto more than a few intellectual limbs in his day). See KARL R. POPPER, Piecemeal Social
Engineering, in POPPER SELECrIONS 304, 312-18 (David Miller ed., 1985) (1944).
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though the underlying value in such cases is speculative, the potential welfare
gain from the absorption of a new good or service into the economy is con-
comitantly substantial. Speculative social purpose bequests can thus be
conceptualized as a gratuitous variant of venture capital. 14
Efficiency to one side, we have also the broader welfare of survivors to
consider."5 When a testator bequeaths to named beneficiaries, she can make
114. The sequel to the story of Shaw's "alphabet trust" bequest:
[After] compromise settlement of the appeal, money was made available for the
extensive research which Shaw desired. An alphabet was produced, and the play
of Androcles and the Lion was published in it. The alphabet has been widely
recognized in the United States and elsewhere as of considerable educational value,
and is being increasingly used as an aid to teaching.
GEORGE W. KEETON, MODERN DEvELOPMENTs IN THE LAW OF TRUSTS 299 (1971). Several
legal commentators have perceived the opportunity to conduct social experiments to be among
the greatest virtues of purpose bequests. See J.W. Harris, Trust, Power, andDuty, 87 L.Q. REV.
31, 38-39 (1971); Note, 73 L.Q. REv. 305, 307 (1957); Note, Bernard Shaw's Will and the
Advancement of Education, 2 SOLIC. Q. 348, 348, 354 (1963). For an early discussion, see
JOHN STUART MILL, The Right and Wrong of State Interference with Corporation and Church
Property, in DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 34-36 (1874) (first published in The Jurist, Feb.
1833). But see HOBHOUSE, supra note 80, at 224 (doubting that experimentation mandated by
testators would ever bear fruit):
New and valuable improvements are not so easy to design or to execute. They are
made, not by those who simply hand over their property to trustees fettered by
inflexible rules, but by living people who can give their hearts and souls to them as
well as their property.
Il Some commentators have deemed bequests for experimental purposes sufficiently useful
to merit inclusion in the charitable category. See FISCH ETAL., supra note 28, § 25; LEWIS M.
SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 132-34 (1955); John G. Simon, Charity and
Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 246,
253-54 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); see also Atkinson, supra note 66, at 635-37
(expressing fear that exclusion of eccentric bequests from charitable category will result in its
gradual over-restriction). And, indeed, experimental bequests sometimes are held charitable.
See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 589-91 (4th
ed. 1990) (in the 4th ed. only); 4A SCOTT, supra note 4, § 374.7; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 cmt 1 (1959) (asserting that "experimental tests of ideas" are
charitable if they "may be reasonably thought to promote the social interest of the community").
For a sociological discussion of experimentation, observing shrewdly that "invention is often
the mother of necessity, rather than vice versa," see JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL
239-64 (1997) (quotation at 243). On the economics and economic value of venture capital,
see generally ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INTRAPRENEURSHIP, AND VENTURE CAPITAL (Robert D.
Hisrich ed., 1986).
115. I here avoid reference to the concept of "utility." Given the impediments to inter-
personal comparisons of subjective utility, which would become relevant at this point, together
with other troubling moral consequences of strict adherence to hedonistic concerns, theorists
often formulate distributive policy by recourse to other normative predicates. See DANIEL M.
HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 71-83
(1996). I myself am unconvinced that interpersonal comparisons of utility are infeasible in
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informed judgments about how to allocate her wealth among them in a manner
calculated to provide for their individual needs and hence secure the family's
overall welfare."6 This opportunity is accounted a positive virtue of freedom
of testation, as we have seen. By the same token, society has an interest in
preventing uninformed bequests, because these perforce are indiscriminate;
whence the Rule Against Perpetuities, barring a testator from allocating her
wealth among persons as yet unborn whose relative needs she cannot possibly
divine.117
On first glance, a bequest for a social purpose may appear similarly
arbitrary: Like unborn persons, its nameless beneficiaries are, from the
testator's perspective, total strangers. But amoment's contemplation suggests
otherwise: Though a bequest for a social purpose fails to make use of the
testator's detailed knowledge about individuals, the distribution of resources
that results is not more unreflective on that account. This conclusion follows
from another observation concerning the structural attributes of purpose
bequests. In the case of ordinary bequests to persons, the testator utilizes
her familiarity with individuals to see to their needs. In the case of bequests
for social purposes, theprocess is reversed: The testator identifies the needs
first, and those individuals who happen to display them benefit. Either way,
the needs are satisfied. Although personal knowledge does not guide be-
quests for social purposes, it is no longer necessary to achieve a coherent
result. Whether a testator bequeaths to persons she knows on the basis of
their individual needs or to persons she does not know who share those needs,
the ensuing distribution is thoughtful, so long as the needs favored for sating
are themselves thoughtfully selected - for which we must rely, both in the
case of bequests for persons and for purposes, not on the testator's personal
knowledge, but rather on her social (and moral) experience.' And, once
the context of legal decisions, where we seek a rule-utilitarian outcome involving aggregate
values, but I wish to keep this Article on course, and so I will save the latter discussion for
another day.
116. But see Mark 0. Wilhelm, Bequest Behavior and the Effect of Heirs' Earnings:
Testing the Altruistic Model ofBequests, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 874 (1996) (presenting empirical
evidence which casts doubt on proposition that testators typically take advantage of their
knowledge of beneficiaries to vary bequests).
117. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
118. Appreciation of what needs are important will often evolve as an individual matures.
For a discussion in connection with charitable giving, see Alan Radley & Marie Kennedy,
Charitable Giving by Individuals: A Study ofAttitudes and Practice, 48 HuM. REL. 685, 691-
93 (1995). To the extent that testators are actuated by egoistic motives to make bequests for
social purposes, these bequests may be premised onjudgments concerning notwhatneeds merit
providing but what needs merit association with the testator's memory. Conceivably, the latter
sort ofjudgment could lead a testator in a different direction, though the distribution that results
would still be nonarbitrary, given the equivalent structure of the bequest.
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again, notice that this structural attribute marks bequests for all social
purposes, irrespective of whether they satisfy any given criteria of charita-
bility.
The case differs, however, when a testator bequeaths for a personal
purpose. Here, no transfer of wealth occurs at all. The testator is simply
consuming resources postmortem for her own gratification, and (apart from
a secondary multiplier effect"9) no one benefits other than herself.2 ° The
policy question we then must face is whether that is benefit enough-whether,
so to say, we should suffer the departed to continue to behave just as selfishly
as before.
Considered from the perspective of economic efficiency, no reason exists
to regulate these bequests. In this situation, the testator is continuing to spend
for her own purposes what someone else would otherwise spend for his. The
channeling of the resource to a particular use occasions not the slightest loss
of value, for the testator in this instance is making that choice for herself, and
not for others. For the same reason, bequests for personal purposes are in no
wise arbitrary: Here, the testator is attending to her own needs, and these she
knows best of all.
Lawmakers might nonetheless posit other grounds for restricting bequests
of this sort. As a matter of distributive justice, one could submit that the
welfare of consumption by the living outweighs that of the dead. The point
seems reasonable on the face of it: We all accept intuitively that the gratifica-
tions which money can buy are tied to the state of being, and that the disem-
119. Whenever anyone, living or dead, spends on herself, she contributes to the national
income by employing others, who in turn employ still other others. Economists call this the
multiplier effect. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECoNOMICS 476-78
(14th ed. 1992). For ajudicial recognition, see In re Nottage, [1895] 2 Ch. 649,653-54 (App.)
(observing that "[a]ny man who spends his income benefits the community by putting money
in circulation").
120. One might argue that when atestator makes abequest to provide for a pet animal, the
animal itself derives utility from the transaction. Professor Sweet analogized bequests of this
sort to "pensions... given to old servants." Charles Sweet, The Monstrous Regiment of the
Rule Against Perpetuities, 18 JURID. REV. 132, 137 (1906-07). Whether it is meaningful (and
moral) to consider the interests of inhuman beings is a question best left to the philosophers, and
that is precisely where I intend to leave it. For discussions (and there are many), see, for
example, BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE 203-12 (1989); GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS,
PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995); ROBERTNOZICK, SOCRATIC PUZZLES 305-10 (1997); PETER
SINGER, ANmIAL LIBERATION (2d ed. 1990); STEPHEN H. WEBB, ON GOD AND DOGS (1998).
In addition, when a testator makes a bequest of funds for the care of an item of property that she
bequeaths to someone else, the new owner benefits from the enhanced value of that new
property (even if the new owner would not have expended so much of her own resources for its
care). For a case in which a custodian of a decedent's pet dog spent bequeathed funds on a
washing machine and a station wagon, ostensibly for the "care" of the animal, see In re Rogers,
412 P.2d 710 (Ariz. 1966).
56 WASH. & LEEL . REV. 33 (1999)
bodied are dispossessed in the natural order ofthings" Obviously, a testator
gains no satisfaction whatsoever from postmortem consumption at the time
when the funds are spent, having grown oblivious to events on this earth."
Still, the matter is a mite more complicated than that: As one astute court
observed, a testator while alive can derive a benefit from the "mental picture"
of consumption following her death."z Psychological research suggests that
the anticipation of consumption - known technically as savoring - can com-
prise a significant component of the satisfaction that consumption affords.124
And we have already remarked the substantial motives for posthumous
spending."1s To the extent a testator savors postmortem consumption, the
potential redistribution flowing from its prohibition would in fact affect the
welfare of two living persons - and hence becomes, at the very least, norma-
tively problematic.
And here, the final justification for granting freedom of testation -
namely, the practical difficulty of denying it - also comes into play. For any
attempt by lawmakers to curtail a person's right to spend money on herself
posthumously - an attempt, if you will, to coerce generosity at death - is
unlikely even to produce the intended result. In all probability, it would
simply provoke the self-indulgent testator to consume more of her property
while she remains alive.126 Examined in that light, the choice at hand is not
121. Philosophers of property have long argued for the limitation of dead hand control,
often by reference to natural law. See RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTI-I, AND SOCIETY
34-37 (1982); J.E. PENNER, THEIDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 98-100 (1997). At least one court
has put the case in explicitly distributive terms: Extravagant bequests to care for burial plots
"impoverish the living to decorate the graves of the forgotten dead." Palethorp's Estate, 24 Pa.
D. & C. 215, 221 (Orphans' Ct. 1914), affd, 94 A. 1060 (Pa.), appeal dismissed, 94 A.1066
(Pa. 1915). Still, the issue cannot be portrayed in tones of black and white. Faced with a
bequest for the purpose of caring for personal property after death, one court lauded the
testator's (ineffective) estate plan as "perfectly natural and to be considered with the respect due
to a commendable sentiment." Smith v. Heyward, 105 S.E. 275, 279 (S.C. 1920); see
Lounsbury v. Trustees of Square Lake Burial Ass'n, 129 N.W. 36, 37 (Mich. 1910) (resolving
validity of bequests to build cemetery vault and to care for graves: "We marvel that an heir will
contest such a provision, but he has a right to do so.").
122. Or, put more reverently, there are no further benefits to be had from mere consump-
tion once the testator has risen to an eternal perspective on this and other matters.
123. Grigson v. Harding, 144 A.2d 870, 876 (Me. 1958) (bequest to care for building).
124. See George Loewenstein, The Fall and Rise of Psychological Explanations in the
Economics oflntertemporal Choice, in CHOICEOvERTIME 3 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster
eds., 1992); Jon Elster & George Loewenstein, Utility from Memory and Anticipation, in
CHOICE OvER TIME, supra, at 213. By comparison, the literal act of consuming is often a
fleeting experience.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 90-100.
126. In fact, atestator probably could accomplish most objectives of postmortem consump-
tion by contracting inter vivos for posthumous services. See Gilman v. McArdle, 2 N.E. 464
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interpersonal, but intertemporal: The testator is simply deciding when to
consume her personal resources, and no comparison between her interests and
others' is even relevant.
Assuming that is so, our only remaining inquiry involves the public
policy of interference with choice over time. Could we somehow conclude
that the state is justified in regulating the temporal consumption choices of
one who is minded to spend after death? The point is worth laboring for a
moment or two, for the possibility of such regulation is by no means beyond
the pale. Theorists have long justified legal intervention to prevent individu-
als from undersaving over time, by analogy. The inalienability of pension
rights under ERISA and the Social Security Act is widely recognized as a
concrete application of this policy." One rationale offered for interference
with individual choice in this context is that otherwise individuals could spend
themselves into destitution and shift the cost of their support onto the rest of
society, via the welfare apparatus.12 The other commonly cited (though more
controversial) rationale is apaternalistic one: Many consumers making current
spending decisions are shortsighted in outlook, failing to look ahead to their
future well-being, a phenomenon known in the psychological literature as
myopia. Eventually, they come to regret the undersaving that leads to their
impoverishment. Enforced saving forestalls that regret, protecting persons
(N.Y. 1885). The hypothesis that testators would choose to consume inter vivos in lieu of
making bequests for personal purposes depends, however, on the further assumption that
individuals save until death primarily with bequest motives (be they selfish or gratuitous) in
mind, which doubtless is true in many cases. But persons may also save until death as a
precaution against uncertain future needs and longevity - or simply because they already have
everything they want. See R. Glenn Hubbard et al., Precautionary Saving and Social Insur-
ance, 103 J. POL. ECON. 360 (1995); see also Michael Hurd et al., Subjective Survival Curves
and Life Cycle Behavior, in INQUIRES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 259 (David A. Wise ed.,
1998) (presenting empirical evidence that individuals tend to overestimate their longevity and
on that basis over-save for future needs). For such persons, forbidding consumption post-
mortem would probably succeed in inducing gratuity. Judge Posner, by contrast, argues that
individuals who lack any bequest motives will buy annuities assuring that they leave nothing
behind at their deaths. See RICHARDPOSNERECONOMICANALYSISOFLAW § 18.1, at 552(5th
ed. 1998). But individuals might fail to do so in practice for any number of reasons: informa-
tion costs (How many lay persons are knowledgeable about annuities, apart, perhaps, from
pension plans?), transaction costs (Insurance companies routinely assume that annuity buyers
are unusually healthy and hence charge prices premised on adverse selection.), and a consump-
tion preference for high-priced luxuries that cannotbe paid for in installments out of an annuity.
See Michael D. Hurd, Research on the Elderly: Economic Status, Retirement, and Consump-
tion and Saving, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 565, 621-22 (1990) (raising some of these points); see also
LEST'ER C. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY 141 (1975) (arguing that people do not buy
annuities because of perceived loss of economic power that their purchase would entail).
127. See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts andPublic Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 23 n.78 (1995) (citing to discussions).
128. See id at 11-13.
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from their own economic imprudence. In the process, the myopic consumer's
aggregate welfare is enhanced, by smoothing her consumption over time.'
29
In the instant case, however, we face not the old problem of individuals
inclined to save too little, but the novel scenario of ones who would (ostensi-
bly) save too much. 30 By placing a ban on postmortem consumption, we
would carry out a policy of enforced spending during life. Under these
reverse conditions, we may conclude that neither justification for the legal
regulation of intertemporal choice stands up to analysis. An individual who
scrimps in order to splurge after death does not add to society's burdens. Her
self-imposed privations fail to qualify her for welfare benefits. Nor does she
ever come to regret her decision: For a saver (unlike a spender) remains in
control of her economic fate, and if she pursues this course to the end, then
she must continue to derive present satisfaction from doing so.
To summarize: There appears no sound argument premised on the tradi-
tional rationales of freedom of testation to preclude individuals from making
bequests for purposes, either of the social or personal variety, and irrespective
of whether they meet a defined threshold of charitability. Freedom to make
these bequests can enhance the value of property in the testator's hands
without compromising either the efficiency of the use of resources, or the
thoughtfulness of its distribution. Professor Dukeminier has nonetheless
questioned the public policy of robust enforcement of bequests for nonchari-
table purposes on the ground that they provide no larger, social benefits.
Given their "marginal public utility," bequests of this sort merit our indul-
gence only "grudgingly. '131 To be sure, bequests for purposes found to be
charitable offer greater advantage than those which do not: Here, the utility
is double-barrelled, aiding the body politic along with unnamed individuals.
But the fact that bequests for some purposes fail to provide any perceived
public utility is no reason to scorn them; these still deliver private utility every
129. See id. at 15-32. For a recent discussion, see RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD
AGE 262-64 (1995).
130. Professor Elster takes notice of the closely analogous problem of the miser and the
still more closely analogous "mixed case" of the miser who saves "in order to become a
spendthrift," but he declines to pursue their theoretical implications. See JoNELSTER ULYSSES
AND THE SIRENs 67 (rev. ed. 1984); see also Richard A. Posner,:Are We One Self or Multiple
Selves? Implications for Law andPublic Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 26,34 (1997) (identify-
ing problem of "asceticism").
131. Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648,
1704 (1985). Accordingly, Professor Dukeminier would sharply limit the duration of
noncharitable purpose bequests. See infra note 196. See also, by negative inference, Professor
Lynn: "The gift to charity is permissible because it encourages the use of private funds for
purposes commonly achieved by the expenditure ofpublic funds." RobertJ. Lynn, Perpetuities:
The Duration of Charitable Trusts and Foundations, 13 UCLA L. REv. 1074, 1083 (1966)
(emphasis added).
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bit as substantial as an ordinary, single-barrelled bequest to a person.'32 The
inclusion of bequests for purposes, whether deemed charitable or not, within
the scope oftestamentary liberty is justifiable on that basis alone. As a matter
of public policy, then, we may pronounce the American cases permitting these
bequests to be right, and the British cases prohibiting a good many of them to
be wrong.
3. Exceptional Cases
That said, it remains for us to consider whether this principle can be
announced without qualification. Should the hoary distinction between valid
and superstitious uses live on in some form and, if so, how should the latter
today be defined? Born ignominiously of royal avarice, the original doctrine
of superstitious uses operated to confiscate endowments for false religious
practices and, needless to say, has no modem American (or, for that matter,
British) application.' Nonetheless, the doctrine's broader postulate that
bequests for purposes are void if they fall foul of public policy survives in the
Restatement and under modem case law. Without exception, commentators
have added their imprimatur.'
The economic case for such a limitation is straightforward so long as the
category is closely confined. Where the bequest in question is a perverse
reflection of the traditional bequest for a social purpose -to wit, a bequest for
an antisocial purpose, one that would cause injury to others or to society in
132. This is the point that needs to be fully appreciated. Professor Dukeminier offers the
example of a bequest "for the benefit of the Yale Whiffenpoofs," a noncharitable singing group,
as a disposition "of marginal social utility." See Dukeminier, supra note 131, at 1702. Who
benefits from a bequest to the Whiffenpoofs? Persons who take pleasure in the art of a
cappella - and who would gladly spend their own money (if they had it) to sing and to listen
to singing. Though a bequest such as this provides little "social" utility, it does provide private
utility, just like an ordinary bequest to persons, that is scarcely "marginal." See also In re
Hummeltenberg, [1923] 1 Ch. 237,240 (noting counsel's argument that bequest for training of
mediums is "beneficial to a section of the public - namely, that section which proposes or
intends to engage in the calling of a medium"); H.A.J. Ford, Dispositions for Purposes, in
ESSAYS IN EQuITY 159, 160 (P.D. Finn ed., 1985) (observing that social purpose bequests can
have "positive value" even if not charitable, and that there is virtue in having "a wide variety of
purposes" endowed); L.H. Leigh, Trusts of Imperfect Obligation, 18 MOD. L. REV. 120, 130
(1955) (remarking that bequests for noncharitable sects can help to "provide many of the
necessary amenities those communities require").
133. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
134. See RONALD H. MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF PERPETUITIES 169-70 (1979);
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 53, § 3.11, at 154, § 8.4, at 319; MORRIS & LEACH, supra note
25, at 3 19, 321; 7 POWELL, supra note 53, 588, at 46-7-8; Atkinson, supra note 72, at 1131-32;
Gareth H. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROP-
ERTY 119, 126 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); Scott, Control, supra note 50, at 632-33,
646-47, 658; Sweet, supra note 120, at 142 & n.a; cf. POSNER, supra note 126, § 18.6, at 559.
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general,13 -the resulting social costs weigh against the benefit to the testator
in making the bequest. Because no one can bargain with a decedent to revise
a socially harmful estate plan, it would remain in effect even Where the cost
to others (and the sums they would be willing to pay to avoid it) exceeded its
value to her; this market failure justifies legal intervention to restore effi-
ciency."' Though the cases are few, courts have in'variably invalidated
bequests for purposes that they identify as injurious to members of the com-
munity,'37 expressly on the basis of assumptions about the relative scale of the
associated costs and benefits.'38
The Restators do not stop there, however. Also void, they say, are
bequests for purposes that a court deems "capricious." The proffered exam-
ples include bequests ostensibly for social purposes that, while not affirma-
tively detrimental to others, are so outlandish that they offer no prospect of
benefitting anyone, and bequests for personal purposes involving either the
135. Bequests for injurious purposes, though quite rare, could stem from a negative form
of interdependent utility function, whereby the testator's happiness is inversely correlated to that
of another or a group of others - a phenomenon that Professor Sen calls "antipathy." See
AMARTYA K. SEN, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic
Theory, in CHOICE, WELFAREANDMEASUREMENT 84,92 (1982) (essay firstpublished in 1977).
For an example of a bequest for an antisocial purpose prompted by antipathy, see THOMAS,
supra note 85, at 33-34 (quoting estate plan of an Englishman who loathed the Irish).
136. Cf Hirsch & Wang, supra note 69, at 18-27 (discussing use restrictions generally).
137. See Thrupp v. Collett, 53 Eng. Rep. 844, 845 (M.R. 1858) (endowment to pay
criminalfines: "Looking atthis bequest in a plain commonsense view, it is obviously calculated
to encourage offences prohibited by the Legislature"); Meksras Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371,
373 (Orphans' Ct. 1974) (holding void testamentary instruction to bury jewelry because of its
tendency to incite grave robbery and desecration of burial grounds) (further discussed infra note
163); Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217, 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding void testamentary instruction to destroy testator's house because it would have dam-
aged neighboring property values) (further discussed infra note 141); Will of Pace, 400
N.Y.S.2d 488, 492-93 (Sur. Ct. 1977) (similar facts and reasoning); see also In re Hummelten-
berg, [1923] 1 Ch. 237, 242 (raising possibility that bequest for training of mediums was
"illegal, or at all events against public policy").
138. Where, for example, a testator bequeathed a fund to provide support for the minor
children of persons imprisoned for "crime[s] ... of a political nature," the court found that
"[a]ny risk that a parent might be induced to commit a crime he otherwise would not commit
because of the possibility that his child mightbecome abeneficiary. .. is far outweighed by the
interests of the innocent children involved and society's interest in them." In re Estate of
Robbins, 371 P.2d 573, 573-75 (Cal. 1962) (Traynor, J.); see also Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 524 S.W.2d 210,217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) ("No benefits are presentto balance againstthis
injury .... "). By analogy, under the law of conditional bequests to persons, potentially harmful
conditions have been held valid where they have only a "slight tendency" to cause harm -
hence, life estates are valid despite the fact that they create a minute incentive to criminal acts
by impatient remaindermen. See Scott, Control, supra note 50, at 633; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1 (1983) (giving effect to bequests
conditioned on divorce where testator's primary motive is not to occasion divorce).
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disuse or destruction of property, or assignments of "unreasonably large"
sums for personal purposes that are otherwise "normal" and benign. 39 Most
(though not all) of the cases are in accord.
140
In that they impose no cost on others, bequests for capricious pur-
poses - unlike antisocial purposes - cannot be condemned on efficiency
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TRUSTS §§ 124 cmt. g & illustrations 5 & 6,374 cmt. m
(1959); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. Conceivably, the last principle might
also be applied, by analogy, to a bequest for a social purpose where the amount bequeathed is
so great that the particular need addressed is fully "saturated," and part of the funding becomes
superfluous. The Restators fail to contemplate this scenario, however. See John G. Simon,
AmericanPhilanthropyandtheBuckTrust, 21 U.S.F.L.REV. 641,659-61 (1987) (raising issue
in context of cy pres doctrine). At the same time, the Restators are careful not to decree
bequests for personal purposes capricious per se. A purpose bequest "is not capricious merely
because no living person benefits from its performance." So long as the purpose satisfies "a
natural desire which normal people have with respect to the disposition of their property," it is
to be ratified. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. g (1959).
140. Setting "capriciousness" as the general standard: see, e.g., In re Byrne's Estate, 100
A.2d 157, 160 (N.H. 1953) (dicta); Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 491 (Sur. Ct. 1977);
Devereux's Estate, 48 Pa. D. & C. 491,497 (Orphans' Ct. 1943), appeal quashed, 46 A.2d 168
(Pa. 1946); Lindsay's Ex'r v. Forsyth, 1940 Sess. Cas. 568, 572, 575-77 (Scot.). But see infra
note 182. Bequests for useless publications: see Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Clyde, 121 A.2d
625, 629 (Conn. 1956); Wilber v. Asbury Park Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 59 A.2d 570, 578-79
(N.J. 1948), aff'dsub nom. Wilber v. Owens, 65 A.2d 843 (1949); cf. Hanson Estate, 8 Pa. D.
& C.2d 620, 623 (Orphans' Ct. 1956) (finding that where testator provided bequest to publish
useless writings with royalties paid to charitable foundation, bequest should go to foundation
directly; intimating in dicta that, had testator been "motivated solely by vanity" in providing for
useless publication, court might have upheld bequest as originally set out). Bequests for other
useless purposes: see M'Caig v. University of Glasgow, 1907 Sess. Cas. 231, 239-48 (Scot.)
(construction of statues); M'Caig's Trustees v. Kirk-Session of United Free Church, 1915 Sess.
Cas. 426,434-38 (Scot.) (same). Destruction of moneys: see In re Scott's Will, 93 N.W. 109,
109 (Minn. 1903); Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 493 (dicta); Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d
121, 134 (Orphans' Ct. 1964) (dicta); M'Caig v. University of Glasgow, 1907 Sess. Cas. 23 1,
242 (Scot.) (dicta). Destruction of property: see Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 210; Will of Pace,
400 N.Y.S.2d at 488; Ford v. Ford's Ex'r, 16 S.W. 451, 452-53 (Ky. 1891) (dicta). But see
National City Bank v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 369 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1976)
(holding valid instruction to destroy house) (discussed infra note 165); Notes on People, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1977, at C2 (citing to unreported case holding valid instruction to bury
automobile). Disuse ofproperty: see Brown v. Burdett, 21 Ch. D. 667,673 (V.C. 1882) (house
to be closed up for twenty years); Egerton v. Brownlow, 10 Eng. Rep. 359, 417 (H.L.C. 1853)
(dicta). Excessive bequests for benign purposes: seelnreBackes' Will, 30N.Y.S. 394,395-96
(Sur. Ct. 1894) (dicta); In re Turk's Will, 221 N.Y.S. 225,239 (Sur. Ct. 1927), appeal denied,
226 N.Y.S. 111, 112 (App. Div. 1927) (dicta). But see infra note 182. Courts in Pennsylvania,
applying a state statute permitting bequests in perpetuity for grave care, have claimed authority
to reduce to reasonable sums lavish bequests for such care: see Devereux's Estate, 48 Pa. D.
& C. at 496-97; In re Dreisbach's Estate, 121 A.2d 74, 79 (Pa. 1956); In re Leber's Estate, 186
A. 225, 226 (Pa. 1936); Palethorp's Estate, 24 Pa. D. & C. 215, 221,224 (Orphans' Ct. 1914),
aff'd, 94 A. 1060, 1066 (Pa.), appeal dismissed, 94 A. 1066 (Pa. 1915); cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. g (1959) (failing to acknowledge this power).
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grounds.14 ' Nor are they arbitrary, in the traditional sense of action taken in
the dark: Once again, the testator knows full well what she wants for herself
and frames her estate plan in order to acquire it. The case for legal intolerance
of these bequests must be put otherwise, and it is far from an easy one. To the
brief extent they have addressed the issue, courts and commentators have
pressed two, related points: first, the testator's subjectively small interest in
accomplishing capricious purposes and, second, society's objective disap-
proval of frivolous (even though harmless) forms of consumption.
The argument premised on subjective minuteness of interest follows from
the general observation that the process of testation is "an exercise in power
without responsibility."'42 Living persons face the economic and social
141. Several courts have put forward the view that testamentary provisions for the razing
of homes implicate collateral costs, in that their destruction depresses the value of neighboring
properties. See Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 213, 217 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975); Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 493 (Sur. Ct. 1977); see also Colonial Trust Co. v.
Brown, 135 A. 555, 564 (Conn. 1926) (finding that bequest of urban property restricting size
of buildings constructed thereon would harm neighboring properties and pose threat to proper
growth of city). Similarly, courts have sometimes invalidated bequests for excessively grandi-
ose purposes on the ground that they would create eyesores, again harmful to the living. See
Murr v. Youse, 80 N.E.2d 788, 797-98 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1946) (bequest to fund "gaudy"
cemetery statuary held offensive to interests of other users of cemetery); Aitken's Trustees v.
Aitken, 1927 Sess. Cas. 374,383 (Scot.) (bequest to fund an extravagant equestrian statue held
offensive to interests of local townspeople); see also M'Caig's Trustees v. Kirk-Session of
United Free Church, 1915 Sess. Cas. 426, 434 (Scot.) (hinting at this theme). Once again, we
could then reasonably premise legal regulation on the inability of the affected parties to bargain
with the testator. But the hypothesis of collateral costs, at least in the context of destructive
bequests, is of doubtful plausibility: Whereas it is a commonplace among realtors that expen-
sive homes raise the value of less expensive adjoining ones by increasing the attractiveness of
a street or a neighborhood, there is another side to the economic coin - open spaces in a
neighborhood are also attractive, and, as an elementary exercise in supply and demand, the
fewer homes available in a neighborhood, the higher the price of those left standing. For a
recognition of the speculativeness of alleged collateral costs in this context, see Eyerman, 524
S.W.2d at 219 (Clemens, J., dissenting). One court has asserted that the government has an
interest in preventing the destruction of a home, in that this act will diminish the tax revenues
flowing from the property. Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 493. In other words, government
allegedly has a proprietary interest in the property singled out for destruction. But government
stakes its proprietary claim to the property of the deceased via estate and inheritance taxes.
These must be paid over initially, whatever is subsequently done with the property, and can be
premised on the value of the estate prior to destruction. See infra note 157. But cf Ahmanson
Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1981) (suggesting in dicta that for
purposes of federal estate taxation gross estate is diminished to extent that testator prescribes
its destruction). The hypothesis of collateral costs loses all color ofreason when personalty and
intangible assets lie at issue. The destruction of securities is nothing more than a gift to the
issuer, and the destruction of moneys, a gift to the govemment!
142. M. Meston, The Power of the Will, 1982 JURID. REV. 172, 173. I have elsewhere
explored this point in other analytical contexts. See Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the
Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 638-39 (1989); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 69, at 13;
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repercussions of their actions; dead persons do not. One consequence is that
a testator can, if she is so inclined, wash her hands of her dependents, without
suffering the opprobrium that a living person would bear for such behavior.
Death spares the testator from interpersonal costs. And that is not all: Be-
cause it is the end of personal expenses as well as pain, death can also spare
the testator from opportunity costs.
Indeed, it bears noting that in this respect the economic panorama faced
by the superannuated resembles that of the super-rich: Absent interdependent
utilities, they too lack opportunity costs and can give themselves up to similar
whims. 43 Thus could Cleopatra amuse herself (and awe her Roman guests)
by dissolving priceless pearls in wine, because she knew she possessed more
treasure than she could ever spend.1" However much the dead possess, it too
is more than they can spend; hence they too can squander it with abandon.
This last point appears the gist of the oft-repeated assertion that bequests
for capricious purposes need to be curtailed because, unlike lifetime consump-
tion, they are uninhibited by the restraint of self-interest. 45 With money to
see also Scott, Control, supra note 50, at 657-58. The fundamental insight traces to Lord
Hobhouse, if not earlier:
While a man is alive, you have a tolerably sure guarantee that he will not... expose
himself to privations, to blame, to ridicule..., or even undergo the exertions
which any original or eccentric course involves .... But when a man's deeds are
to have no operation till he is dead, what security have we... that he will feel the
weight of responsibility; that his passions will be chastened by conscience, or his
fancies corrected by sober reason and reflection?
HOBHOUSE, supra note 80, at 94; see id. at 221.
143. For an observation that possessors of large fortunes literally lack sufficient time
usefully to consume all of their wealth, see THUROW, supra note 126, at 134-36. Of course,
most testators- like most wealthy folk-do have interdependent utilities with others and hence
face opportunity costs. The more alienated one is from familial attachments, the more likely one
becomes to pursue capricious testamentary ends. For an early recognition, see GEORG HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 178-79 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1821).
144. For a modem version of Cleopatra's conspicuous destruction, see MATTHEW
JOSEPHSON, THEROBBER BARONS 338 (1934) (remarking practice among America's economic
titans during Gilded Age of smoking cigarettes rolled in hundred-dollar bills).
145. See Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (Sur. Ct. 1977) ("Although a person may
wish to deal capriciously with his property, while he is alive, his self-interest will usually
prevent him from doing so. After his death there is no such restraint."); M'Calg's Trustees v.
Kirk-Session of United Free Church, 1915 Sess. Cas. 426, 434 (Scot.) ("A man may, of course,
do with his money what he pleases while he is alive, but he is generally restrained from wasteful
expenditure by a desire to enjoy his property, or to accumulate it, during his lifetime."); Eyer-
man v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). The Restators and
other commentators endorsing rules against capricious bequests have also emphasized this
point. See MCGOVERN ETAL., supra note 53, § 3.11, at 154; MORRIS &LEACH, supra note 25,
at 319; RESTATBENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. g (1959), JA SCOTT, supra note 4,
§ 62.14; Atkinson, supra note 72, at 1131-32; Scott, Control, supra note 50, at 658.
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bum, the testator can afford to take a devil-may-care attitude, giving vent to
"whim," "folly," or "extravagance." '146 This occurrence does not implicate a
market imperfection, strictly speaking. Opportunity costs are wholly intra-
personal; their avoidance by the testator shifts no costs onto others.147 But the
testator is violating what appears a social norm that property should only be
consumed in ways that accord its owner genuine satisfaction. In this vein,
courts have sometimes passed judgment on capricious bequests by asking (as
a thought-experiment) whether the living testator - when still faced with
budget constraints - would have been prepared to make the same expenditure
out-of-pocket as she is out-of-probate.'48 But even in instances where that is
true, some courts have also condemned such bequests on a normatively
objective basis: 49 namely, that "senseless destruction serving no apparent
good purpose" is intolerable.'
146. In re Turk's Will, 221 N.Y.S. 225,236 (Sur. Ct. 1927), appeal denied, 226N.Y.S.
111 (1927); M'Caig's Trustees, 1915 Sess. Cas. at 434, 438; see also, e.g., Wilber v. Asbury
Park Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 59 A.2d 570, 578 (N.J. 1948), aff'd sub nom. Wilber v. Owens,
65 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1949); Will ofPace, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 491; MacKintosh's Judicial Factor v.
Lord Advocate, 1935 Sess. Cas. 406, 413 (Scot.). At least one court has gone so far as to
submit that a destructive bequest is worthless to a testator. A provision to destroy the testator's
home "is without benefit to the dead woman. No reason, good or bad, is suggested by the will
or record for the eccentric condition." Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 214.
147. Conceivably, it could be argued that extravagant personal consumption, at least when
visible to others, implicates external costs in the form of anger and social censure and hence
involves a true market imperfection when ordered upon death. Cf POSNER, supra note 126,
§ 18.6, at 559.
148. "In the present case thetestator's wishes are capricious in thatthey are not something
which the testator would have done while alive." Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 493. "For
many years [the testators] had apparently contemplated the erection of similar statues, but they
could not bring themselves to part with the money during their own lifetimes." M'Caig's
Trustees, 1915 Sess. Cas. at 434.
149. Presumably, the implicitbasis for the social norm condemning frivolous consumption
is distributive welfare, along with moral values. That norm has been embedded in the American
grain from the very beginning, but of course it also has ancient roots. See EDMUND S. MORGAN,
The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, in THE CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN REV-
OLUTION 88, 92-98, 108-09, 118-19, 129-30 (1976); JOHN SEKORA, LUXURY 23-62 (1977) (on
disapproval of extravagance in classical thought); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 52, 64-65 (1969); see also infra note 168; see generally
CHRISTOPHER J. BERRY, THE IDEA OF LUXURY (1994).
150. Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 217. Such arguments have been sounded both when
personal purposes are abnormal and when the sums assigned to normal personal purposes are
abnormally large. As one court mused, "[e]ven an animal hater probably would not complain
if the bequest to benefit a dog was, figuratively, only a bone. But when the bequest is substan-
tial and, figuratively, a whole quarter of beef, then even those who otherwise profess to like
dogs often complain about the provisions of such a will." In re Hill's Will, 255 N.Y.S.2d 898,
899 (Sur. Ct. 1965) (Keane, J.). One economic case occasionally made on behalf of wasteful
bequests for personal purposes is that they at least provide employment to survivors-a phenom-
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The inference that testators are blas6 about bequests for seemingly
capricious purposes is a dubious one. Certainly, the flow of the argument
leaves behind some nagging questions: If they care so little about them, then
why do testators go to the trouble and expense of executing these bequests in
the first place? Doing so entails immediate transaction costs. And why do
testators under these conditions not choose instead to consume property while
they are alive, when they can squeeze more benefit out of it? Returning to our
last analogy, when an individual of ordinary means can anticipate becoming
super-rich, she behaves rationally by spending more now, while money still
matters to her.5 Why would the rational testator wait till it doesn't? One
begins to suspect that courts have misjudged the situation. And, in fact,
analysis suggests that there may be more benefit here than meets the judicial
eye.
Bequests for seemingly wasteful purposes still yield satisfaction to the
extent that they facilitate identity-editing, as previously discussed. 2 A
testator might intend a perverse estate plan as a memorial to her personality.
Hence, a bequest to fund the publication of offensive writings makes psycho-
logical, if not economic, sense when the testator "considered himselfa contro-
versialist."'5 And a manifestly capricious bequest might appeal to a testator
for that reason alone - assuming she wanted to be remembered as an eccen-
tric 1m
Extravagant consumption at death might also emerge out of a testator's
desire to draw attention to herself. By leaving behind funds for a fabulous
monument, she might imagine that she stands abetter chance of being remem-
enon known technically as the multiplier effect, see supra note 119. This argument has been
rejected on the ground that an alternative disposition would also result in employment. See
M'Caig's Trustees v. Kirk-Session of United Free Church, 1915 Sess. Cas. 426, 434 (Scot.).
By analogy, this same rationale has sometimes been voiced to justify wasteful consumption by
the wealthy and has been refuted by economists in precisely the same way! See RICHARDT.ELY
&RALPH H. HESS, OUTLiNES OF ECONOMICS 143-44(6th ed. 1937) (1893); JOSEPHSON, supra
note 144, at 339-40; 2 WILLIAM [WILHELM] RosCHER, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
§ 219 (John J. Lalor trans. 1882) (1854); HARTLEY WIHERS, POVERTY AND WASTE 160-65
(1919); John Kenneth Galbraith, The Uses and Excuses for Affluence, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
1981, Magazine at 38, 38.
151. This is true of some heirs, who spend (or forbear to save) in reasonable anticipation
of their inheritances, and it is also true of some college athletes, who can reasonably anticipate
lucrative professional sports contracts. In the inheritance context, see MARVINB. SUSSMANET
AL., THE FAMiLY AND INHERrrANCE 159, 170-71 (1970).
152. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
153. Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Clyde, 121 A.2d 625, 627 (Conn. 1956).
154. For one testator who said as much, and for the estate plan that followed from that
desire, see ROBERT S. MENCHIN, THE LAST CAPRICE 27-30 (1963); see also In re Estate of
Robbins, 371 P.2d 573, 574 n.1 (Cal. 1962) (quoting will that hinted at this desire).
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bered.'55 Alternatively, an outsized bequest for a personal purpose could
reflect a testator's strong attachment to the object in question. Princely sums
left for the care of pets, for example, almost certainly follow from emotional
bonds comparable to the ones that tie together human beings. 5 6 In such
instances, testators again derive real satisfaction from their bequests.
Estate plans calling for the destruction of property must stem from
different motivations. Testators probably make provisions of this sort not out
of indifference toward the world they have lost; rather, they may wish to
destroy property postmortem in order to preserve their privacy. Testamentary
instructions to bum diaries or other personal papers, however valuable given
the celebrity of the testator, find their purchase in this way.'57 Alternatively,
some testators' sense of ownership could cause them to resist the appropria-
155. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text. An early president of Yale College,
Ezra Stiles, had planned to bequeath funds for a fifty-foot monument to himself, "somewhat in
Resemblance of the Ancyran Marble of Augustus Caesar." See EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE
GENTLE PuRITAN 164 (1962). Eventually he thought better of it. See id at 163-65. Conceiv-
ably, through this sort of conspicuous consumption at death, a testator seeks more precisely to
be remembered as a person of means. Whether the latter strategy holds the promise of success
is another matter. The rich are able to draw social distinctions by their wasteful opulence
precisely because they, and they alone, can afford it. This exclusivity is lessened in connection
with the dead, and so any effort on their part to inspire awe (forget envy!) through testamentary
ostentation is more problematic. See MacKintosh's Judicial Factor v. Lord Advocate, 1935
Sess. Cas. 406, 411 (Scot.) (assessing grandiose burial project: "It is no doubt impossible to
look at her plan for the realisation of such a project without a smile."); M'Caig's Trustees v.
Kirk-Session of United Free Church, 1915 Sess. Cas. 426, 438 (Scot.), quoted supra note 90.
156. In one recent instance, an unmarried testator left her entire estate of $500,000 for the
support (including an apartment and full-time caretaker) of her pet cat, "Tinker," identified in
the will as her "best friend and companion." Kitty's Life Is the Cat's Meow After He Inherits
$500,000, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1994, at 7. As an acquaintance reported, "This cat was [the
testator's] life." Id.; see Barbara W. Schwartz, Estate Planning for Animals, 113 TA. & EST.
376 (1974); Wills ofthe Month, 108 TR.&EST. 321 (1969); Wills ofthe Month, 113 TR.&EST.
384 (1974). Such bonds could even extend to other forms of inanimate property. In finding
"extravagant and unreasonable" atestator's bequest of her entire estate for the care of her grave,
the Surrogate's Court of New York paid no regard to the circumstance that the testator had lived
her entire adult life in a house on the premises of the cemetery in question, and that she seldom
ventured outside it. See In re Turk's Will, 221 N.Y.S. 225, 227-28, 235 (Sur. Ct. 1927); cf
MacKintosh's Judicial Factor, 1935 Sess. Cas. at 411 (Scot.) (holding reasonable, in light of
testator's circumstances, grandiose burial project).
157. Thus, for example, the will of the late Jacqueline Susann, author of "Valley of the
Dolls," called upon her executor to destroy her diary "so that its contents would never become
public and embarrass those mentioned within it." Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1979, at
Al. The executor complied, although the IRS subsequently valued the diary at $3.8 million as
a literary property and billed the estate accordingly. See id. A famous request of this sort was
made by Franz Kafka, though in his case a more complex psychology (or psychosis) appears to
have been at work. See FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 326-35 (Modem Library ed. 1956) (1925).
For still another example from classical times, see BROOKS OTIs, VIRGIL 1 (1964) (recounting
Virgil's instructions for burning his epic poem, The Aeneid, upon his death).
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tion of that which is uniquely theirs. Psychologists have found that persons
sometimes identify strongly with items of their property, as we have seen.1
58
This depth of attachment may prompt testators to take steps designed to
ensure that their property is cared for after they are gone 159 - or perhaps to
take steps leading in another direction. One observed manifestation of an
owner's connection to her property is the anxiety induced by its involuntary
loss, especially by theft. Studies reveal that the experience can be acutely
traumatic. " Yet, death too involves an involuntary taking! The thought that
cherished property will fall into someone else's hands - at least in the absence
of loved ones whose hands the testator can look upon metaphysically as her
own - may strike her as a personal violation. 6' Faced with the prospect of
imminent dispossession, some owners have been known to destroy their
property before they will part with it." The same impulse could move some
testators: Faced with the robbery of their lives, destruction of prized posses-
sions may offer real utility.63 Accordingly, those courts that have tested the
capriciousness of a purpose bequest by asking whether the testator during her
158. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
160. See DITrMAR, supra note 76, at 46-47 (surveying psychological literature); Belk,
supra note 94, at 142-44.
161. Whence perhaps the occasional qualification of a bequest of a home to the surviving
spouse "so long as she does not re-marry." JANET FINCH ET AL., WILLS, INHERITANCE, AND
FAmmiEs 106-08 (1996).
162. For example, some Japanese-Americans facing internment during World War II pre-
ferred to ruin their property rather than relinquish itto profiteers. SeeAUDRPEGIRDNER&ANNE
LOFrIs, THE GREAT BETRAYAL 112-13 (1969).
163. Provisions for the destruction of property, once again, have usually involved the types
of items with which testators are most likely to form emotional attachments: homes and, in at
least one instance, pet animals. See supra note 140; Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 133-
34 (Orphans' Ct. 1964). Ratherthan destroy property per se, somemodernmtestators-following
ancient practice - have endeavored literally to take cherished property with them. For one who
sought to be buried with herjewelry, see Meksras Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371,371 (Orphans'
Ct. 1974). The court in Meksras held this provision void on the ground that it would tend to
incite grave-robbery, see id at 373, but in another unreported Texas case, the court gave effect
to a testator's instruction that she be buried seated in her Ferrari sports car; this instruction
(involving, implicitly, no threat of grave-robbery) the court deemed "unusual, but not illegal."
Notes on People, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13, 1977, at C2. The Texas scenario has lately been
reenacted in an offbeattelevision commercial for Infiniti automobiles, parodying drivers' strong
attachment to the company's products; in the commercial, it is unclear whether survivors are
mourning the burial of the car or its occupant. Some testators may employ yet another strategy
to do away with property following their deaths: They may leave instructions that it be broken
apart, so that it will no longer possess, in the testator's view, its original character - hence, the
contents of a home could be liquidated, thereby converting it into a (mere) house. For a related
discussion, see Janet Finch & Lynn Hayes, Inheritance, Death and the Concept of the Home,
28 SOCIOLOGY 417, 428-31 (1994).
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lifetime would have dealt with the property in the same manner may well have
missed the point.'" In this case, death itself is the event that triggers the
benefit of the prescribed use, be it the preservation of a testator's privacy or
her material integrity. At least one court has seemingly bowed to this logic,
upholding a testamentary instruction to raze a home on (more or less) this
basis.' 65
In short, a testator's motives for "capricious" purpose bequests may well
prove substantial after all - no less so than those underlying other ones of the
"normal" variety. What seems a resentable waste of resources to survivors
could mean much to the testator psychologically and cannot blithely be
dismissed as inconsequential to her. In those instances where testators seek
out professional counsel, purpose bequests are especially unlikely to follow
from frivolity. Part of the estate planner's fiduciary responsibility is to sort
out the testator's wishes, averting those that (upon consultation) she comes to
recognize as improper or ill-advised. 66 Without counsel, the risk of careless
will-making rises - as more than a few heirs have had occasion to learn. Still,
the very unorthodoxy of this sort of bequest suggests that its author will have
given the matter at least a modicum of thought. If defiance of convention
requires efforts of concentration, then few testators will hatch an unnatural
scheme of testation unless it actually suits their nature. 67
164. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
165. SeeNational City Bank v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 369 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ohio Prob.
Ct. 1976), in which testimony showed that the testator had been troubled by the evolution of
her neighborhood from a residential to a commercial district, had a "great affection" for her
home, and wanted to ensure that it was not used for commercial purposes following her death.
See id The court concluded that "[w]hile her purpose and motive may have been impelled by
sentiment, it did not thereby become a capricious or irrational act... [and] is not... contrary
to public policy.... ." Id at 818. Yet even in that case, the house was not destroyed but instead
granted by the court with restrictive covenants to a historical society. See id. at 819; cf Will
of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 493 (Sur. Ct. 1977) (refusing to give effect to testator's provision
for demolition of his home, where his "intent was apparently to memorialize the property by
having it remain vacant"). For an argument that personal endowments in homes should be taken
into account in the law of takings and residential rent control, by analogy, see RADIN, supra
note 94, at 72-97, 146-65; cf William A. Fischel, The Offer/AskDisparity and Just Compensa-
tion for Takings: A Constitutional Choice Perspective, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 187 (1995).
166. See Rosser v. Prem, 449 A.2d 461, 463 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (concerning
bequest for publication of book of dubious literary merits about which attorney-scrivener
"testified that had he seen a copy of the book before drawing up the will he would have tried
to discourage [the testator]"). On the fiduciary responsibilities of the attorney-scrivener in this
respect, see JOHNR. PRICEPRICEONCONTEMPORARYESTATEPLANNING § 1.9 (1992 & Supp.
1996). For anecdotal examples of attorneys playing this role in connection with bequests for
charitable purposes, see ODENDAHL, supra note 80, at 214-17.
167. See, e.g.,Inre Baeuchle's Will, 82N.Y.S.2d 371 (Sur. Ct. 1948), affd, 94N.Y.S.2d
582, 583 (App. Div.) ("The former wills of this testatrix show that the disposition [to build an
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All of this is not to say that bequests for capricious purposes must
necessarily be countenanced. Courts can fall back on objective criteria of
wastefulness as a litmus test of legal acceptability. The assertion that expen-
ditures deemed wasteful are contrary to social welfare is normative and hence
incontestable. Still, we can take lawmakers to task when they implement
a norm inconsistently. In this regard, notice that no comparable rules regu-
late consumption by the super-rich: Sumptuary laws have long since departed
the scene, and billionaires are free to deploy their inexhaustible resources in
any manner that they please, however frivolous."' Whereas excise taxes on
a few luxury items survive,'69 having apparently been premised on the as-
sumption that these goods satisfy comparatively insignificant wants, 70 most
such taxes disappeared decades ago, on the contrary subjective theory (still
echoed by critics of the few remaining excise taxes) that "what constitutes a
luxury.. to one person, is not a luxury... to another person."17' If con-
elaborate mausoleum] made in the will here involved had been contemplated by her for a
considerable period of time."), affd mem., 93 N.E.2d 491 (N.Y. 1950).
168. The issue is so uncontroversial as to be ignored by latter-day political economists.
Montesquieu defended sumptuary laws if crafted to ensure that the citizenry had "more of what
it needs." CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS pt. 1, ch. 5 (Anne
M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748). On the other hand, Adam Smith opposed such
laws as unnecessary, see 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 367 (Edwin Carman ed., 1976) (1776), whereas the late nineteenth-
century economist Alfred Marshall deemed them futile, see 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES
OF ECONOMICS 136 (C.W. Guillebaud ed., 9th [variorum] ed. 1961) (1890). The German
political economist Wilhelm Roscher agreed with both of these assessments. See 2 ROSCHER,
supra note 150, §§ 234-36. For a general history of sumptuary legislation in Great Britain
(which often served the very different purpose of reinforcing class divisions), see FRANCES E.
BALDWIN, SUMPTUARY LEGISLATION AND PERSONAL REGULATION IN ENGLAND (1926).
169. The one surviving excise tax on luxuries covers automobiles. See I.R.C. § 4001 &
note to ch. 31, subchapter A (West Supp. 1998). (A previous version of this tax had also
covered boats, aircraft, jewelry and furs.) In addition, the Internal Revenue Code currently
limits the deductibility of certain forms of luxury consumption as business expenses. See id.
at §§ 162(a)(2), 274(m)(1), 280F.
170. See F.R. Nagle, Can the US. Afford the Luxury Tax?, 52 TAX NOTES 878, 880
(1991). Though opposed to sumptuary laws, see supra note 168, Adam Smith favored taxes on
luxuries that contributed merely to "the indolence and vanity of the rich." 2 SMri, supra note
168, at 246; see 2 id at 368, 401.
171. ELY & HESS, supra note 150, at 144-45. For modem criticisms of luxury taxes, see
BERRY, supra note 149, at 215-17; Nagle, supra note 170; Norman B. Ture, SocialPolicy and
Excise Taxes, 40 TAXNOTES 737 (1988). But cf Bagwell & Bernheim, supra note 75, at 352,
368-69 (arguing that luxury taxes constitute ideal sources of revenue, given that, at least in the
presence ofVeblen effects, they are nondistortionary); Yew-Kwang Ng, Diamonds Are a Gov-
ernment's Best Friend: Burden-Free Taxes on Goods Valuedfor Their Values, 77 AM. ECON.
REV. 186(1987) (same). Foran early anticipationofthis analysis, seeJoHNRAETHESOCIOLOG-
ICAL THEORY OF CAPITAL 294-96 (1905) (originally published in 1834 under the title Statement
ofSome New Principles on the Subject ofPolitical Economy); see generally id at 286-96.
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 33 (1999)
sumer sovereignty reigns among the idle rich, then why treat differently the
idle dead?
Still more to the point, freedom of testation is not otherwise cabined in
by judicial evaluations of an estate plan's normality." By tradition, courts
have conducted their inquiry at a different level, filtering out abnormal wills
by evaluating not the testator's sense, but rather her sensibility. In order
to have the capacity to execute a will, a testator must possess a "sound
mind" - that is, she must enjoy "sufficient mental ability to know... the
natural objects of her bounty, to comprehend the kind and character of [her]
property,"'74 and then in her testamentary deliberations "to form a rational
judgment concerning them."'75 This rule functions indirectly to avoid capri-
cious estate plans, by requiring that testators at least be able to appreciate
what others would regard as just or natural. 76 It does not, however, require
testators invariably to abide by conventional attitudes. Once a court has
satisfied itself that a testator's mind is sound, "nothing can prevent him from
making... a will ... as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice,
frivolity [or] revenge can dictate." 77 It follows that "a disposition of property,
172. If, however, lawmakers deemed sumptuary laws inexpedient only because they are
difficult to police, see supra note 168, then an exception for testamentary spending could be
warranted: Postmortem extravagance is far easier to curtail, because the testator's directives
appear in a will (being a public document) and hence can be discovered and challenged by
interested parties-unlike the potentially secretbehavior ofalive plutocrat minded to misspend.
173. Bequeststo individual beneficiaries conditioned on actions that are merely capricious,
not affirmatively harmful, may also be held void, however. See Cast v. National Bank of
Commerce Trust & Say. Ass'n, 183 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Neb. 1971); IA ScoTr, supra note 4,
§ 62.14; ef Olin L. Browder, Jr., Illegal Conditions and Limitations: Miscellaneous Provi-
sions, 1 OKLA. L.REv. 237,250-51 & n.64 (1948) (questioning this principle without analysis).
174. Estate of Wrigley, 433 N.E.2d 995, 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (emphasis omitted).
175. In re Estate of Congdon, 309 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. 1981) (quoting In re Estate
of Healy, 68 N.W.2d 401,403 (Minn. 1955)); see MCGOVERNETAL., supra note 53, § 7.2, at
272-77. The rule has ancient common law origins. For a sixteenth-century discussion, see
HENRY SWINBURNE, A BRIEFE TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLES 34-42 (photo.
reprint 1978) (1590).
176. "[lit would be socially undesirable to give [testamentary] power to one who is so
deficient or unbalanced mentally that he does not appreciate the significance of the disposition.
It is better to distribute the property according to intestate laws than according to the caprice of
an unsound mind." THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 233 (2d ed.
1953).
177. Schneider v. Vosburgh, 106 N.W. 1129, 1130 (Mich. 1906). The point has been
endlessly recapitulated: "A will may be contrary to the principles ofjustice and humanity,- its
provisions may be shockingly unnatural... ; nevertheless, if it appears to have been made by
a person ... of a sound mind, the courts are bound to uphold it." Middleditch v. Williams, 17
A. 826, 827 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1889). And again: "'The tests are mental capacity and free
agency. When these exist the testator has the right... "to make an unreasonable, unjust,
injudicious will....""' Maurath v. Sickles, 586 S.W.2d 723, 732 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting
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though ever so capricious or unreasonable, will not be avoided on that ground
alone."
178
To be sure, the substance of an estate plan is admissible in a suit contest-
ing testamentary capacity; in practice, the outcome can turn on circumstantial
evidence of the plan's perceived reasonability.179 And so it happens that in a
good many cases, contestants have challenged wills containing personal
purpose bequests under the sound-mind doctrine, often successfully."' In
some cases, however, those challenges either are waived or fail.' For
lawmakers to posit an additional rule voiding purpose bequests that a court
Maddox v. Maddox, 21 S.W. 499,502 (Mo. 1893), quoting inturn Boylan v. Meeker, 28 N.J.L.
276, 277 (1860)). And again:
[lIt is one of our most fundamental legal principles that an individual has the right
to dispose of his own property by gift or will as he sees fit; indeed this right is so
much protected that atestator's direction will be enforced even though contrary to
the general views of society... and however arbitrary, unwise, intolerant, discrimi-
natory, or ignoble his exercise of that right may be. He is entitled to his
idiosyncracies and even to his prejudices.
In re Estate of Girard, 127 A.2d 287, 290-91 (Pa. 1956), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Pennsylvania v. Board of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
178. Calhoun v. Calhoun, 290 S.E.2d 415,418 (S.C. 1982) (citing Farr v. Thompson, 25
S.C.L. (Chev.) 15 (1839)).
179. Even some courts trumpeting the testator's freedom to make an injudicious will have
hinted that this black-letter rule is not entirely unvarnished:
I do not mean to be understood as saying that the contents of the will may not often
be very important evidence, as the product of [the testator's] mind, to show the state
of that mind; the character of the stream near its source is often the best evidence
of the condition of the fountain.
Boylan v. Meeker, 28 N.J.L. 276, 277 (1860). Commentators too have remarked judicial
resistance to unnatural wills. See McGovERN ETAL., supra note 53, § 7.6, at 292-94 & n.16;
3 PAGE, supra note 53, § 29.40, at 491; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law ofthe Living, the Law
of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340,358-59; Leslie, supra
note 108.
180. See, e.g., New England Trust Co. v. Folsom, 167 N.E. 665, 665-66 (Mass. 1929); In
re Hill's Will, 255 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (Sur. Ct. 1965) (remarking this strategy); Harry
Hibschman, Whimsies of Will-Makers, 66 U.S. L. Rv. 362, 365-66 (1932):
181. See, e.g., Wilber v. Asbury Park Nat'l Bank& Trust Co., 59 A.2d 570, 584 (N.J. Ch.
1948) (finding that testator who bequeathed funds for publication of useless writings "was
eccentric, egotistical, pompous, and had an exaggerated idea of his own importance," but
possessed capacity), af'd sub nom. Wilber v. Owens, 65 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1949); In re Turk's
Will, 221 N.Y.S. 225,228,235 (Sur. Ct. 1927) (ruling that testator who bequeathed her entire
estate for care of her grave was "eccentric and quarrelsome," but "[h]er oddity... was not
shown to amountto insanity generally"); In re Baeuchle's Will, 82N.Y.S.2d 371,373 (Sur. Ct.
1948), aff'd, 94N.Y.S.2d 582 (App. Div.), affdmem., 93 N.E.2d 491 (N.Y. 1950); M'Caig v.
University of Glasgow, 1907 Sess. Cas. 231, 239 (Scot.) (concluding that testator who be-
queathed her estate for construction of statues depicting family members suffered from "a moral
disease, though quite consistent with sanity").
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deems capricious contradicts the sound-mind doctrine."8 2 And such a rule can
also be said to contradict the public policy underlying that doctrine: One of
the reasons lawmakers grant freedom oftestation is to avail themselves of the
testator's inside information into what will benefit her family (including, in
this case, herself?), thereby circumventing costly judicial inquiries into these
matters," provided she possesses the mental wherewithal to put that informa-
182. In framing the modem prohibition against superstitious uses, neither courts, nor
Restators, nor commentators have sought to reconcile their injunction against eccentricity with
the sound-mind doctrine. In fact, hardly any reference appears to the doctrine at all. Its
comparative significance has gone unaddressed for the reason that it has been overlooked. The
sole American exception is a little-remarked case, Snouffer v. Peoples Trust & Say. Co., 212
N.E.2d 165 (Ind. App. 1965), where the court's recognition of the sound-mind doctrine led it
to reject a challenge to a bequest of the remainder interest in the testator's residuary estate for
the purpose of constructing a family mausoleum as being "capricious and wasteful." Said the
court (contrary to Restatement doctrine):
[W]e do not have the authority, nor the duty, to... determine... the wisdom,
efficiency, or economic value of testator's expressed desires .... The fact that a
testator may make an unreasonable or unnatural disposition of his property is a
proper matter to consider where his soundness of mind is in question but of itself
it furnishes insufficient basis for a court to reject a will. In this matter there was no
attack on... the testator's mental capacity.
Id. at 171-72. Several other (mainly older) cases, all involving allegedly excessive bequests for
the construction and care of monuments and tombs, also took the position that bequests for
purposes were valid so long as they were not affirmatively harmful to society, without explicit
reference to the sound-mind doctrine. See Clark v. Portland Burying Ground Ass'n, 200 A.2d
468, 470 (Conn. 1964) (dicta); Morrow v. Durant, 118 N.W. 781,784 (Iowa 1908) ("Whether
it shall be regarded as selfish or not must depend upon the point of view. If it be so conceded,
it determines nothing."); Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq. 347, 352-53 (1883) ("Mhis court
manifestly cannot deal with the provision as a violation of good taste, neither can it deal with
it on the ground that it is a wasteful expenditure. As to that, too, the testator was the sole
judge.... It stands on the same footing as an expensive funeral."); In re Baeuchle's Will, 82
N.Y.S.2d 371, 377 (Sur. Ct. 1948) ("It does not seem thatthe folly orwisdom of [thetestator's]
directions are the concern either of her kin or the court."), affid, 94 N.Y.S.2d 582 (App. Div.),
aff'd mem., 93 N.E.2d 491 (N.Y. 1950); In re Getman's Will, 291 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397, 401
(App. Div. 1968) ("[S]uch a gift is valid.. . even though in the minds of some persons it seems
to be an improvident disposition."); Emans v. Hickman, 19 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 425, 427 (1877)
(dicta); In re Boardman's Will, 20 N.Y.S. 60,61 (Sur. Ct. 1891) (dicta); Bainbridge's Appeal,
97 Pa. 482, 486 (1881) ("We will not consider the wisdom or the folly of this disposition.");
Kalbach's Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C. 195, 198 (Orphans' Ct. 1927) ("[O]ur own views of the
propriety of such a disposition would not dare interfere with... compliance."); Estate of Smith,
181 Pa. 109, 114-15 (1896); In re Close's Estate, 103 A. 822, 823 (Pa. 1918); Mellick v.
President and Guardians of the Asylum, 37 Eng. Rep. 818, 820 (M.R. 1821); see also Meksras
Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371,372 (Orphans' Ct. 1974) (dicta). One Scottish judge, however,
saw no incompatibility between the capricious purpose rule and the sound-mind doctrine:
"[Tihe principle seems (if I may state it in a popular way) to be that, just as a mad person cannot
make any will, so a saneperson cannot make a mad will." MacKintosh's Judicial Factor v. Lord
Advocate, 1935 Sess. Cas. 406, 410-11 (Scot.).
183. See supra text following note 69.
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tion to good use. A testator in possession of a sound mind is assumed to have
a sound reason for the estate plan she chooses, even if that reason fails to
appear to an outsider peering in; and this assumption spares us adjudicative
expenses that we would just as soon avoid.
Several nondiscretionary limits on testamentary freedom do stand along-
side the sound-mind doctrine, of course. Were lawmakers to substitute for a
capriciousness standard specific tests for avoiding wasteful bequests - a rule
barring destruction of property at death, for instance - they could block the
stream of litigation unleashed by the vaguer existing rule."' Still, were
lawmakers to undertake systematically to develop objective rules prohibiting
purpose bequests that violate social norms, consistency demands that, with
equal thoroughness, they distill testamentary prohibitions out of the mass of
capricious bequests to persons, hitherto ratified despite that characteriza-
tion. 6 To date, no such effort has ever been contemplated.
Again to summarize: The doctrine of superstitious uses should continue,
though (arguendo) in a more lenient form. Courts should overturn bequests
for purposes when they tend to the injury of society. Otherwise, capable
184. "That the will to others not having the means of knowing what the testator knows, not
occupying his stand-point, not having lived his life, not having his secret affections and hates,
may seem unreasonable, injudicious, and even unjust, is no reason why it should be declared
the product of a diseased mind." Boylan v. Meeker, 28 N.J.L. 276, 277 (1860).
185. The Restators themselves confess that "lilt is impossible to draw a clear line between
purposes which are capricious and those which are not." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 124 cmt. g (1959); see id. § 374 cmt. m. In one Scottish case raising the question whether a
bequest of £1000 to provide flowers for a grave was capricious, one judge opined that the
purpose itself, as an act of self-piety, was capricious, two otherjudges opined that the purpose
was reasonable but the sum was capricious, and a fourth judge opined that both the purpose and
the sum were reasonable. See Lindsay's Ex'r v. Forsyth, 1940 Sess. Cas. 568 (Scot.). Apart
from the costs of litigation encouraged by such a vague legal standard, some might take alarm
at the judicial latitude that it creates - though what some see as arbitrary authority, others will
look upon as laudable flexibility. At the other edge of the spectrum, similar qualms have been
expressed by some scholars - and shrugged off by others - with regard to the haziness of the
prevailing definition of a "charitable purpose." Cf, e.g., Norman Bentwich, The Wilderness of
Legal Charity, 49 L.Q. REV. 520, 526-27 (1933); Mary Kay Lundwall, Inconsistency and
Uncertainty in the Charitable Purposes Doctrine, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1341, 1384 & passim
(1995); Robert 3. Lynn, The Questionable Testamentary Gift to Charity: A SuggestedApproach
to Judicial Decisions, 30 U. CH. L. REV. 450,468 (1963).
186. Bequests to persons never violate the norm against wasting property, but they can
violate other norms, seemingly of comparable weight. Thus, for example, bequests to persons
to be chosen by lot violate the norm against random division of property, whereas nonnominal
bequests to persons who lack familial or social ties to the testator and about whose needs she
has no knowledge violate the norm against arbitrary division of property. For examples of such
estate plans, see MENCHIN, supra note 154, at 26 (mandating that beneficiary be chosen by
toss ofdice); Man Left $50,000 to Favorite Paperboy, SANDIEG UNION-TRIB., June 28, 1998,
at A9.
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testators may reasonably be granted leave to craft the estate plans they reckon
best calculated to their needs and circumstances, whether those plans have to
do with persons or purposes.
B. Subsidiary Issues
Having concluded that bequests for purposes should in general be re-
spected under our law, we proceed to the details of the rules that govern them.
We face two issues here, which we shall examine seriatim. We begin with
matters of duration - that is, the testator's power to prolong a bequest for a
purpose for a space of time. We then turn to matters of process - that is, the
legal apparatus the testator can employ to see that her purpose is carried out.
1. Duration
As under the common law, the Restatement distinguishes the maximum
longevity of a purpose bequest depending upon how it is categorized. Be-
quests for charitable purposes can continue indefinitely, whereas those for
noncharitable purposes are restricted to the period of the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 7 Is this legal dichotomy a sound one?
First, to place the issue in context:"' All else being equal, lawmakers
have reason to permit testators to extend their dead hand control over prop-
erty. This power increases the value of wealth to its owner, and so enhances
her incentive to create it. Dead hand control can also indirectly benefit
society when it is exercised to conserve the corpus of a bequest. Conservation
of wealth serves the public interest by adding to the stock of investment
capital available to society at any given time; that contributes, in turn, to
economic growth.
Nonetheless, lawmakers have restricted the right of testators to bequeath
among persons in perpetuity because this projection of testamentary power
can simultaneously impair social interests. Bequests to persons as yet unborn
are formulated in ignorance; to the extent that they mandate how a future
beneficiary must use her inheritance, they may ill-suit her needs and prefer-
ences, yielding inefficiency. But even unrestricted allocations of property
among the unborn, whose relative wants the testator cannot today anticipate,
result in arbitrary distributions; these too are contrary to the overall welfare
of subsequent generations. The Rule Against Perpetuities is precisely crafted
with these concerns in mind. By restricting testamentary power to "lives in
being," that is, to persons whom the testator knows, plus "twenty-one years,"
187. See supra note 51; SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 29, §§ 1392,1394.
188. The two paragraphs following are distilled from Hirsch & Wang, supra note 69, at
14-27, 36-38.
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that is, the guardianship-period of the next generation, lawmakers ensure that
distributive decisions are made only by an informed party. If the testator is
uninformed, then she must relinquish that task to some later, living hand.
Bequests for purposes are structured differently, however, and hence call
for a different analysis. Let us begin by considering bequests for social
purposes in general. As pointed out earlier,'89 one of the interesting features
of a bequest for a social purpose is that its restrictions on the use of property
are less confining than they first appear. Because the takers are nameless, the
subsidy that the bequest provides will find its way to those who prefer the
form of consumption dictated. Thus, the beneficiaries of a bequest to subsi-
dize fox hunting are those persons who happen to enjoy the sport and who
would themselves choose to consume resources in this manner. Economi-
cally, then, a bequest for a social purpose should prove efficient. And it
should also prove thoughtful, in that the benefit it creates follows from the
testator'sjudgments, based on her life-experiences, concerning what forms of
consumption merit subsidization.
Knowledge of beneficiaries is what makes bequests for persons judi-
cious; but it evaporates abruptly after a single generation. Knowledge of
society and its culture is what makes bequests for social purposes judicious;
and this too is bound to erode as time wears on. In due course, a bequest for
a social purpose may grow archaic, betraying a sort of moral eccentricity.
And once too few persons would choose to use their own resources for the
purpose subsidized by the bequest, it will become economically inefficient as
well."
But just when these liabilities will set in cannot be predicted with any
accuracy; no bright line marks the temporal horizon of a testator's cultural
(unlike her familial) knowledge. Some aspects of human culture evolve at a
snail's pace - a bequest for the general relief of poverty is as efficient and
morally apt today as it was a millennium ago. Other (especially technology-
189. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
190. For some examples in connection with charitable bequests, see SMIES, supra note 114,
at 121-23. For early discussions, see HOBHOUSE, supra note 80, at 7-12, 222-23 (observing that
a testator "may have understood the wants of his own time as well as we understand those of our
time, but he certainly did not understand the wants of our time so well"), and John Stuart Mill,
who put his case rhetorically:
[S]hall we say it is supposed by ... the Judges of the land, that a man cannot know
what partition of his property among his descendants, thirty years hence, will be for
the interest of the descendants themselves; but that he may know... how children
may be best educated five hundred years hence; how the necessities of the poor may
then be best provided for... and by what body of men it will be desirable that the
people should be taught religion, to the end of time?
MILL, supra note 114, at 4-7, 13.
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 33 (1999)
driven) aspects can change at a moment's notice.191 One thing is clear: The
traditional Rule Against Perpetuities has no policy relevance whatsoever in
this arena." To peg the duration of an ordinary bequest for persons to "lives
in being" makes sense, given that the enduring thoughtfulness of the estate
plan depends on the enduring existence of beneficiaries known to the testator.
But cultural obsolescence is not tied to particular individuals' longevity;
accordingly, lifespans do not afford a useful measure of the thoughtfulness of
bequests for social purposes. That lawmakers nonetheless have determined
the validity of bequests for noncharitable purposes by reference to the Rule
Against Perpetuities illustrates the (alas, all too common) common-law
phenomenon of history outshining policy - here, resulting in the extended
application of a legal rule for no other reason than that it was glaringly evident
in an adjoining segment of the legal landscape."
Given the unpredictability of obsolescence, the ideal rule appears to be
a variable one - allowing a court to terminate a bequest for a social purpose
once it is found inefficient (or, arguendo, merely anachronistic194). The
Restators assumed that the social benefits of bequests for charitable purposes
constituted the justification for their prolongation, and they defined charita-
bility in precisely these terms. 95 Yet, so long as they retain their currency,
191. The upshot is that today one can become culturally disoriented even within one's own
lifetime. See generally ALviN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970).
192. But compare Professor Scott: "[Tihe principle involved [in limiting the duration of
trusts for noncharitable purposes] rests on the same public policy which underlies th[e] Rule
[Against Perpetuities] and the period is the same as that of the Rule." AUSTiN WAKEMAN
SCOTT, SELECT CASES AND OTERAUTHORTES ONTHELAW OF TRUSTS 281 n.2 (Ist ed. 1919)
(in the 1st ed. only).
193. For a further discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 6.
194. See infra note 203.
195. A bequest is charitable if it "promot[es] ... purposes which are of a character
sufficiently beneficial to the community to justify permitting property to be devoted forever to
their accomplishment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374(1959). Other commenta-
tors have offered similar assessments:
The gift to charity is permissible because it encourages the use of private funds for
purposes commonly achieved by the expenditure of public funds.... Perpetual life
of the charitable gift is justifiable on precisely the same basis- quasi-public funds
are being devoted, or ultimately will be devoted, to a public purpose, and therefore
the indefinite life of the charitable gift is an irrelevant consideration.
Lynn, supra note 131, at 1083; see BOGERT &BOGERT, supra note 53, § 351, at 514-15; SIMES,
supra note 114, at 116; cf RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 398 cmt. (1944) (asserting that
lawmakers have removed temporal restrictions on charitable bequests as inducement for
testators to grant them). But see Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit
Sector, 41 ViLL. L. REv. 433, 477, 494-95 (1996) (noting proposals to limit duration of
charitable bequests); Allan D. Vestal, Critical Evaluation of the Charitable Trust as a Giving
Device, 1957 WASH. U. L.Q. 195, 212-14 (same); cf POSNER, supra note 126, § 18.5.
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bequests for any social purpose will remain as efficient and coherent as a
bequest for a person; it is their structural attributes, designating beneficiaries
by stereotype and hence transcending personal familiarity, that renders them
durably productive of private benefits, irrespective of any secondary public
benefits they may generate. Absent the degradation of cultural knowledge,
one finds no reason to discontinue them." And, note well, that degradation
is a malady to which bequests for charitable and noncharitable social purposes
are in equal measure susceptible.
By tradition, however, only bequests for charitable purposes have been
permitted to continue indefinitely, until they become impossible or impractical
to effectuate. And, again within this limited category, lawmakers have gone
further, allowing courts, if and when that day comes, to vary from - and hence
to update - the purpose specified. This authority may be explicit, as in the
case of bequests for indefinite charitable purposes. 97 But it may also be
implicit. Under the so-called cy pres doctrine, a court can infer the testator's
readiness to vary from the strict terms of a charitable bequest when it becomes
obsolete and then can modify it to continue for a similar purpose no longer
hampered by inefficiency. 98
196. The issue has aroused little scholarly commentary. Several British critics have urged
that bequests for social purposes that are found to confer some substantial benefit to the public,
whether strictly charitable or not, should be allowed to continue in perpetuity. See Geoffrey
Cross, Some Recent Developments in the Law of Charity, 72 L.Q. REV. 187, 205-06 (1956);
Nigel P. Gravells, Public Purpose Trusts, 40 MOD. L. REv. 397, 406-10, 418-19 (1977); see
also Trevor C.W. Farrow, The Limits of Charity: Redefining the Boundaries of Charitable
Trust Law, 13 EsT. & TA. J. 306 (1994) (Canadian proposal). But others, both British and
American, have sought to limit the life-span ofa noncharitable purpose bequest, some advocat-
ing a period shorter than is allowed presently under the common law. See MAUDSLEY, supra
note 134, at 178 (advocating twenty-one year limit, without analysis); 2 ScoTr, supra note 4,
§ 124.1, at 248 (stating, without analysis, that "[t]here is a clear policy against tying up property
in this way for an indefinite period"); Dukeminier, supra note 131, at 1702, 1704 (suggesting
twenty-one year limit on assumption that noncharitable purpose bequests are of "marginal
public utility"); William F. Fratcher, The MissouriPerpetuitiesAct, 45 Mo. L. REv. 240,251-52
(1980) (suggesting same, without analysis); William F. Fratcher, Bequests for Purposes, 56
IOWAL. REV. 773,801 (1971) (focusing on intent side of equation and concluding that testator
ought to be able "to ensure the continuation, for at least a few years after his death, of an
undertaking in which he is interested") [hereinafter Fratcher, Bequests]; Palmer, supra note 21,
at 286-87 (favoring existing common law limit). For an early discussion, see George L. Clark,
Unenforcible Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 10 MIcH. L. REV. 31, 37-38 (1911).
197. Most of the great charitable foundations have taken this form. See Atkinson, supra
note 72, at 1150.
198. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 & cmt. m (1959). Though in theory
the doctrine contemplates that a court will restrict its modification "as nearly as possible" to
the testator's original purpose (cypres comme possible), the Restators recognized that courts
have come to adopt a more liberal approach, altering stated purposes more broadly within
the parameters of a testator's "general charitable intention." See id § 399 & cmts. b & d;
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Not only have lawmakers unnecessarily limited bequests for nonchari-
table social purposes in their duration; they have also rendered them unneces-
sarily inflexible. Astonishingly, in many jurisdictions, an avowedly discre-
tionary bequest for noncharitable purposes is void per se, even as bequests for
defined noncharitable purposes are valid. " No cogent justification has ever
been offered for this result."° Furthermore, if a bequest for a defined
noncharitable purpose becomes impossible or impractical to effectuate before
it would terminate naturally, it simply fails; it cannot be modified to continue,
because (we are told) the cy pres doctrine applies only to charitable gifts.
Again, courts have failed to justify this doctrinal limitation - it is simply
repeated, mantra-like, as a truism." 1 Yet, lawmakers rationalize the cy pres
cf RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 399 & cmt. c (1935). Hence, the doctrine has outgrown
its name. But, in any event, a court must find that the testator had a general charitable inten-
tion- in other words, that she would have wished that the purpose be modified rather than fail-
for the doctrine to be invoked. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 & cmts. a & c
(1959).
199. According to Professor Scott, this is the majority rule. See 2 SCOTT, supra note 4,
§ 123, at 224-25, 236-39. In fact, the cases seem fairly evenly divided. See supra note 62.
Modem statutes in several states also give effect to bequests for indefinite noncharitable
purposes. See Hirsch, supra note 6.
200. The rationale sometimes voiced is that public policy will not abide the "delegation"
of a benefactor's testamentary power by virtue of the creation of a discretionary power. See
Adye v. Smith, 44 Conn. 60, 67 (1876); Bristol v. Bristol, 5 A. 687, 691 (Conn. 1885); Tilden
v. Green, 28 N.E. 880, 888 (N.Y. 1891). The argument has often appeared in more modem
British opinions. See D.M. Gordon, Delegation of Will-Making Power, 69 L.Q. REV. 334
(1953). But see In re Beatty's Will Trusts, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1503, 1509 (Ch.) (rejecting no-
delegation principle in connection with bequests for persons). Quite inexplicably, these courts
have gone out of their way to condemn what they ought to commend - control by a living
hand - and what, indeed, they have abided for centuries under the law of charitable bequests,
as well as the law of powers of appointment. The inconsistency between the delegation
rationale and powers doctrine has been recognized by a number of scholars. See 2 SCOTT, supra
note 4, § 123, at 232; Gordon, supra, at 334-35, 342, 345 (arguing, however, against right of
delegation); Palmer, supra note 21, at 260; Scott, Control, supra note 50, at 540-41; Scott,
Trusts, supra note 50, at 566-67, 571; Glanville L. Williams, The Three Certainties, 4 MOD. L.
REv. 20, 21 (1940). The Restators explicitly rejected the delegation rationale. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 123 cmt. d (1959).
201. See In re Gonzalez, 621 A.2d 94, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992); Grebenstein v.
St. John's Evangelical Luth. Church, 66 A.2d 461,462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949); Martin
v. North Hill Christian Church, 412 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979); Callin Estate, 25
Pa. D. & C.2d 376, 381 (Orphans' Ct. 1961); In re Essig's Estate, 74 A.2d 787, 789 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1950); In re Stephan's Estate, 195 A. 653, 657 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937); Edwards v. DeSimone,
252 A.2d 327, 332 (R.I. 1969); Kelly v. Nichols, 21 A. 906, 908 (R.I. 1891); Foshee v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 617 S.W.2d 675,768-79 (Tex. 1981); BOGERT&BOGERT, supra note 53,
§ 431, at 99-100; FISCH, supra note 2, at 129-30; FISCHETAL., supra note 28, § 573, at433-34;
4A Scorr, supra note 4, § 399, at 479; cf Security Trust Co. v. Willett, 97 A.2d 112, 113 (Del.
Ch. 1953) (suggesting, without ruling, that cy pres might be applied to cemetery trust, which
"is in some respects akin to a charitable trust").
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doctrine as an intent-effectuating rule of construction." - Rules of construc-
tion are supposed to operate whenever a testator would wish them to, not
(merely) when she happens to be of a socially magnanimous frame of mind.
Certainly, no other rule of construction found within the law of wills is held
out to the testator as a reward for tailoring her estate plan in a manner law-
makers would prefer. In this respect, the confinement of the cy pres doctrine
to charitable bequests is not only bad policy - it is anomalous policy
besides. 3
202. See, e.g., Rohlffv. German Old People's Home, 10 N.W.2d 686, 691 (Neb. 1943);
City of Keene v. Eastman, 72 A. 213,214 (N.H. 1909); 4A SCOTT, supra note 4, § 399, at 476.
203. A scholarly consensus appearsto be forming in support ofthe view that the traditional
cy pres doctrine is insufficiently intrusive to avoid obsolescence of charitable bequests and that
it ought to be new-modelled, either to permit revision of a purpose in the face of undesirability,
rather than literal uselessness, or to render any purpose subject to revision at the trustee's
discretion after a set number of years has passed. Since the Rule Against Perpetuities already
restricts future interests in persons when they are arbitrary, even though they involve no literal
inefficiency, such an extension of the cy pres doctrine applicable to purposes appears to me to
be thematic. For discussions, see 4A SCOTT, supra note 4, § 399.4, at 534-40; SIMES, supra
note 114, at 132-40; Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., Cy Pres: A Proposal for Change, 47 B.U. L.
REv. 153, 166, 200 (1967); Alex M. Johnson, Jr. & Ross D. Taylor, Revolutionizing Judicial
Interpretation ofCharitable Trusts: ApplyingRelational Contracts andDynamic Interpretation
to Cy Pres and the America's Cup Litigation, 74 IowA L. REv. 545, 566-86 (1989); Peter
Luxton, Cy-Pr~s and the Ghost of Things that Might Have Been, 1983 CONv. & PROP. LAW.
107, 115-18(1983). For an early proposal, seeAustin W. Scott, Education andthe DeadHand,
34 HARv.L.REv. 1, 16-19 (1920), and still earlier, seeMILL, supra note 114, at 1, 19-20,27-33
&passim. The neplus ultra of these schemes is Professor Atkinson's suggestion that trustees
be allowed to deviate at their discretion from any charitable purpose immediately upon creation
of the trust. In effect, then, only charitable trusts for indefinite purposes would be permissible.
See Atkinson, supra note 72, at 1143-44, 1155-56. Again, for an early proposal along these
lines, see HOBHOUSE, supra note 80, at 120-22, 229-30, 235-37. Such an approach pays
insufficient regard to the strong intent a testator may have to accomplish some fixed purpose,
see supra notes 72-89, 101-03 and accompanying text, and could prompt the testator ex ante
to refrain from making charitable bequests, cf Atkinson, supra note 72, at 1121-34; HOBHOUSE,
supra note 80, at 122-23,224-27; MCGOVERNETAL., supra note 53, § 8.6, at 334; MILL, supra
note 114, at4, 29; 4A SCoTr, supra note 4, § 399.4, at 536-37. Other critics proposing to allow
trustees similar discretion would nonetheless adhere strictly to the testator's wishes in the first
few years after her death, the period of time during which - given its immediacy for her - she
has the greatest interest in ensuring that her intent is effectuated. See MILL, supra note 114, at
4, 13, 19, 27, 29; SIMES, supra note 114, at 139; Luxton, supra, at 118; see also Scott, supra,
at 17 (anticipating and dissenting from Atkinson's proposal). A too-liberal cy pres power could
prove counterproductive even from the perspective of society's welfare. If the testator's social
purpose is of the patemalistic-cum-experimental variety, see supra note 113 and accompanying
text, wielders of a broader cy pres power might terminate the experiment prematurely; in order
to succeed, a paternalistic testator - like any other paternalist - must stand in a position to
impose her will at least for a trial period. But whatever approach is thought best, the point to
be emphasized here is that the problem of purpose-obsolescence arises in connection with
bequests for social purposes of all sorts, and so the solution chosen, be it orthodox cy pres or
some reformed variant of the doctrine, ought to apply across the board, not merely to charitable
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When we turn to bequests for personal purposes, the problem ofanachro-
nism fails to arise at all - the only person who derives benefits from the
bequest is the testator herself, and all of these she gleans initially, from the
psychological anticipation of postmortem consumption. Here, changing
circumstances, whether familial or culture, are inconsequential: From the
unique perspective of this beneficiary, the world is frozen in time, and unfold-
ing events affect neither the efficiency nor the coherence of the bequest.
Challenges to the extended validity of bequests for personal purposes can
only be framed in terms of comparative welfare. We have already observed
that bequests for personal purposes can concern a testator greatly.2°4 One
may, however, posit that most of the testator's concern is focused on the years
immediately following her death, when the social world she inhabited and
cared about still exists.0 5 Just as individuals tend to discount the value of
future consumption during life,2as so may this tendency extend to any spend-
ing that might follow death - and if the marginal value of consumption
diminishes overtime, then eventually, at some limit, the comparative welfare
of persons who would consume here and now becomes too conspicuous to
ignore.
The assumption that temporal discounting persists postmortem may,
however, oversimplify testamentary psychology. Quite possibly, a discontinu-
ity looms here: Granting that the marginal utility of consumption drops as a
consequence of anno domini, the prospect of perpetual consumption can
nonetheless hold a special allure for the testator, because immortality (after
a fashion) is greater than the sum of its temporal parts.2' 7 Hence, the opportu-
nity to engage in eternal postmortem consumption can still afford testators
substantial satisfaction, meeting a psychological need that could well be uni-
versal, however rarely testators choose this particular outlet for its realization.
And here again, we also face the difficulty that lawmakers cannot coerce
testators to be generous.0 8 Confronted with a temporal barrier to bequests for
protracted personal purposes, the selfish testator will choose simply to con-
bequests. Once that is the case, the argument that bequests for noncharitable purposes have to
be limited temporally in order to avoid obsolescence loses its analytic force.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 90-100.
205. See Mellick v. President and Guardians ofthe Asylum, 37 Eng. Rep. 818, 820 (M.R.
182 1) (questioning whether testator would wish to expend funds for monument to his memory
if its construction were delayed to a time when he was already forgotten).
206. In fact, cognitive studies suggest that lifetime discounting is often irrationally great
in light of the interest rate in the economy, a phenomenon known as myopia. See supra note
129 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. For an earlier speculation along these
lines, see Friedman, supra note 88, at 548.
208. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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sume her wealth with greater dispatch, either during her lifetime or within
whatever postmortem window of opportunity lawmakers allow her. Thus, if
denied the right to set aside in perpetuity a fund for the care of her grave-site,
for example, a testator could simply devote that same fund to the construction
of a sturdier, more enduring mausoleum initially.' ° If the choice at hand is
(once again) not interpersonal, but intertemporal - in this case, a choice
between consumption concentrated immediately after, or spread out after,
death - then society's interests are better served by encouraging the testator
to prolong the process. That way the corpus is conserved and remains a
source of investment capital.
On this logic, bequests for personal purposes should be valid per se, even
in perpetuity, so long as they remain possible to effectuate.21° Once they are
not, the cy pres doctrine again appears applicable as an intent-effectuating rule
of construction, as pertinent here as in the case of any other bequest.
And so we may conclude that bequests for purposes of all sorts - charita-
ble and noncharitable, social and personal - could sensibly be merged into a
single durational formula, namely, the one presently applied to charitable
bequests.
2. Process
When we turn to the process whereby bequests for purposes can be
effected, we encounter a second line of cleavage dividing bequests for charita-
ble and noncharitable purposes. Bequests for charitable purposes can take the
trust form, as the testator intended; these are specifically enforceable in equity
by the state attorney general. 1 Bequests for noncharitable purposes, how-
ever, are relegated to the honorary trust form, leaving the honorary trustee at
liberty to perform or to terminate the interest and distribute the corpus to
residuary legatees or heirs whenever she pleases." 2
What sense is there in this dichotomy? American courts and commenta-
tors have typically regarded the honorary trust as apis aller: Lacking benefi-
209. Cf John A. Andrews, Gifts to Purposes and Institions, 29 CONV. & PROP. LAW.
(n.s.) 165, 168-69, 174 (1965) (arguing that removal of existing durational restraints would
"serve[ ] only to etemalise the results of the testators' posthumous vanity").
210. This result is reached under modem statutes in well over half the states, permitting
the creation of perpetual trusts for a specific personal purpose, the care of graves. For a fairly
up-to-date tally, see 4A SCOTT, supra note 4, at 236 n.13; see also Hirsch, supra note 6; infra
note 283. Once again, note well that tax policy forms a distinct question: If they so chose,
lawmakers could subject perpetual purpose trusts to continuing, periodic estate taxation.
211. See supra note 43. Bequests can also be made directly to charitable corporations, but
these serve as quasi-trustees, and the attorney general again has supervisory authority. See 4A
SCOTT, supra note 4, §348.1.
212. See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
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ciaries with equitable standing to enforce the bequest, an honorary trust
"give[s] effect to [the testator's intent] so far as is possible." '213 As in Great
Britain, the American approach takes the beneficiary principle for granted;214
it simply adds a remedial corollary, reforming an "intended trust"2 5 for a
noncharitable purpose into a power - the interest that remains once the
element of equitable enforceability is removed.216
At one level, this result is commendable: Surely, as Professor Scott -
and Ames before him - reasoned, the testator will prefer to create a power
when the alternative under the beneficiary principle is outright failure of the
bequest for impossibility.2 7 But at another level, this way of thinking is still
too rigid, for the beneficiary principle is itself empty of substance.
213. LyonEstate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d474,478 (Orphans'Ct. 1974); see, e.g., J.H.C. MORRIS
& W. BARTONLEACH, THERULEAGArNSTPERPETUrrIES 307 (Isted. 1956) (inthe 1st ed. only)
("But if the whole of the testator's intention cannot be effectuated, that is no reason for prevent-
ing the fulfillment of so much of his intention as can be carried out.").
214. In fact, the beneficiary principle is enshrined in the Restatement: "A trust is not
created unless there is a beneficiary ... ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 (1959);
see also id. §§ 112 cmts. g & h, 124 cmt c. But even so, the Restatement does not apply the
principle comprehensively. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt c (1959).
216. Curiously, the Restators fail to address directly the case where a testator initially
intends to create apower for a purpose, but the effectiveness of this device has to be implicit:
A law permitting testators to create a power only by intending a trust would be worthy of Lewis
Carroll. It seems the Restators of Trust felt that any discussion of intended powers for purposes
lay beyond their doctrinal jurisdiction. See Austin W. Scott, The Restatement of the Law of
Trusts, 31 COLuM. L. REv. 1266, 1267 (1931). But unfortunately, the Restators of Property,
in whose province powers lay, failed to leap into the breach. The Restatement of Property
includes only "persons" within its definition of the objects of a power of appointment See
RESTATEMENTOFPROPERTY § 319(3) (1944); RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFPROPERTY § 11.2(3)
(1983). On powers for purposes, see also supra notes 25 and 38.
217. See 2 SCOTT, supra note 4, § 124, at 242-44; Ames, supranote 55, at 395-96, quoted
supra in text accompanying note 57. Honorary trust doctrine was thus a harbinger (along with
dependent relative revocation) of the modem trend toward judicial intervention to correct
flawed estate plans. For the traditional anticurative position, see ATKINSON, supra note 176,
at 277; 1 PAGE, supra note 53, § 13.6. For an early case expressly invalidating a trust for a
noncharitable purpose on this traditional basis, though characterizing the outcome as "a matter
of regret," see McHugh v. McCole, 72 N.W. 631, 636 (Wis. 1897). For the modem curative
perspective, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 12.1, 12.2
(Tentative DraftNo. 1, 1995) (advocating reform of wills that include mistakes of law); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 34.7 (1983) (advocating correction of mistakes of
execution); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1993) (advocating correction of mistakes
of formalization); id. § 2-903 (advocating correction of mistaken violations of Rule Against
Perpetuities). But see infra note 222 (noting arbitrary limitations on remedial doctrine). Most
of the debate concerning honorary trust doctrine has revolved around this issue - and hence
implicitly accepts the beneficiary principle as a given. See GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 166 (1st ed. 1951) (fully elaborated in the Ist ed. only); ALBERT M.
BEQUESTS FOR PURPOSES
Students of a historical bent will notice that the latter-day honorary trust
has an atavistic flavor. Wanting a legal obligor, the honorary trustee incurs
merely a moral responsibility, "one binding the conscience of the [honorary]
trustee. 2 11 Once upon a time, this conception underlay the whole category of
trust, which also lacked a legal mechanism of enforcement; barring that,
courts could only say that "the feoffee is obligated in conscience to perform
it.""19 Under pressure for relief, Chancery, as the court of conscience, began
to enforce trusts during the medieval period.' Soon enough, responsibilities
hitherto conscientious had become compulsory. The same was true of trusts
for charitable purposes, as we have seen." To deny the effectiveness of an
intended trust for a noncharitable purpose by reciting the formalistic benefi-
ciary principle - a trust is not a trust unless its trustee owes obligations - is
simply to beg the question of what (if any) obligations we ought to create.
Beggars can be choosers, however. If lawmakers discover reasons to enforce
trusts for noncharitable purposes, then, rest assured, ways and means can once
again be found.' The Restators decided to reform the intended trust; they
might instead have reformed the law, to make the intended trust possible.
KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS
§ 660, at 759 (1920); MORRIS &LEACH, supra note 213, at 306-11; Gray, supra note 57, at 512-
15; Leigh, supra note 132, at 133-34; Scott, Control, supra note 50, at 540-42; L.A. Sheridan,
Purpose Trusts andPowers, 4 U.W. AusTL. L. REv. 235, 240-44 (1958); Sheridan, supra note
25, at 220, 231-32; Charles Sweet, Restraints on Alienation (pt. 2), 33 L.Q. REV. 342, 360-62
(1917); Note, Private Trustsfor Indefinite Beneficiaries, 45 YALE L.J. 1515, 1518-19 (1936).
218. In re Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 781 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
219. DeVine, supra note 6, at318-19 (quoting Re Lord Dacre ofthe South (dec'd) (1535),
Spelman's Reports, vol. 1, 93 Seld. Soc. 228 (1977)). "During this period, then, uses were mere
honorary obligations." I SCOTT, supra note 4, § 1.3, at 13.
220. See 1 SCOTT, supra note 4, § 1.4, at 14-15; DeVine, supra note 7, at 338-50.
221. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
222. At still another level, the Restatement can be criticized for administering its curative
medicine arbitrarily. An instructive comparison can be drawn between the problem of an
intended trust for a purpose and an intended trust including limitations as to use, where the sole
beneficiary is also named as the sole trustee. In such a case, the trustee once again owes
enforceable duties to no one and so, under current law, the trust cannot be carried out as
planned. The evident remedial solution in the second case is for the court to name a substitute
trustee. Yet, under the Restatement the limitation as to use simply fails for impossibility, and
the trust beneficiary receives the corpus free oftrust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 99(5) & cmt. e, § 115(5) (1959); 2 SCOTT, supra note 4, § 99. If unenforceable trusts for
purposes are worthy of reform, then one would suppose that unenforceable trusts for persons
merit the same consideration. Indeed, this principle could be extended in other ways: Should
not a bequest outright to an animal also be reformed into an honorary trust for its care? Under
current law, a bequest outright to an animal, not being suijuris, fails for impossibility. See 1
THOMAS JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 116 (Raymond Jennings ed., 8th ed. 1951) (1st ed.
1841-43); In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353, 363-64 (Cal. 1968); see also Richberg v.
Robbins, 228 S.W.2d 1019,1020-21 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (holding that where testator left his
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Surely, none of this comes as a revelation. Though the Restatement of
Trusts is shrouded in formalism,' its architect framed the issue rather differ-
ently in his parallel treatise. "It is arguable that since the court has control
over the administration of the trust it can act on its own initiative in directing
the carrying out of the purpose of the testator," Professor Scott allowed; "The
question in its final analysis is one of policy rather than technique. " 2 4 Having
peeled away the fornalistic husk of the issue, Scott seemed poised to probe
the kernels beneath. But, anticlimactically, all he had to add was a curt
intuition, corresponding with his prior adherence to the beneficiary principle:
"It is submitted that it is not in accordance with public policy that a decedent
should be permitted to control the disposition of property to this extent."'
However lofty his stature in the field, Scott's pronouncement on this occasion
was bereft of analysis; we must remain chary of unsubstantiated claims, even
by our leading lights. 6 My own conclusion - which I do hope briefly to
substantiate- is that Scott's submission was unsound: Bequests for purposes
ought not to be categorically differentiated in respect of their enforceability.
Our starting point is the principle of intent-effectuation. All else being
equal, lawmakers should give testators the estate plans they want, 7 and we
may safely assume that a testator who leaves a "trust" for a purpose wishes to
make it enforceable, if possible. It would not do, then, to defend the prevail-
ing process distinction simply by averring that society has no stake in the
enforcement of a noncharitable purpose bequest.228 The testator has a stake
in the enforcement of every one of her bequests and hence, by extension, so
entire estate to his dog but also specified periodic sums "to be... spent for the dog's care," the
question of whether testator intended outright bequest or honorary trust was ambiguous and
required construction); cf RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 119 cmt. c (1959) (suggesting
that bequest outright to unincorporated association will be reformed into trust for benefit of
association). The Restatement also fails expressly to allow a court to reform a purpose bequest
by reducing to a reasonable sum the amount allocated for the purpose. Under the Restatement,
an outsized bequest for a purpose is simply void as against public policy. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. g (1959). For cases, see supra note 140.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
224. 2 ScoTr, supra note 4, § 124, at 246; see id. at 247 (pointing out that courts could
indirectly enforce honorary trusts by replacing any trustees who withdrew their services).
225. Id. at 246; ef 2 id. § 122, at 222 n.33 (taking opposite view with respect to trusts for
indefinite classes of persons).
226. One is reminded of Justice Scalia's sprightly rebuke of his brethren for having
indulged in "policy intuitions of a legislative character." Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,422
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. See supra text following note 69.
228. This is the traditional justification for confining at least the Attorney General's
standing to enforce bequests for purposes to the charitable category. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text; infra note 265.
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does society. Rather, we have to turn the question around: Is there any reason
in public policy not to give enforceable effect to an honorary trust?
In practice, the distinction between the two alternatives may amount to
little. When we get down to cases, honorary trustees probably can be counted
on to carry out their duties as a matter of course. 9 Still, examples of balky
trustees do turn up in the reports? 0° Perhaps Scott's concern was that some
living person should remain on hand to appraise both the immediate and
continued viability of the designated purpose and to bring the trust to a close
prematurely when that is appropriate. Otherwise, the trust could give rise to
inefficiency? 1 But this responsibility (which, in any event, is pertinent only
to bequests for defined social purposes, not indefinite or personal onesp2)
is better left to courts, which can exercise judgment more professionally
and impartially. 3  Courts already perform this function in connection
with charitable trusts under the cy pres doctrine and could do so comprehen-
sively if invested with expanded cy pres authority, as earlier proposed. 4
Once that reform is in place, the trustee's power to terminate an honorary
trust accomplishes nothing constructive, 5 even as it raises the testator's
229. Maitland thought it well enough to provide mere precatory instructions to trusted
friends for the performance of purposes. See MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 62-63; see also
Fratcher, Bequests, supra note 196, at 785-86. Furthermore, if the testator names professional
trustees, they have a reputational incentive to carry out honorary trusts.
230. See Kingsley v. Montrose Cemetery Co., 26 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Il1. App. Ct. 1940);
Epstein Estate, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 239, 240 (Orphans' Ct. 1969); Braig Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C.2d
469, 471-73 (Orphans' Ct. 1965).
231. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
232. See supra text following note 203.
233. If an honorary trustee receives compensation for her services, she has a mercenary
incentive to keep the trust going, whereas if she receives no compensation, she has the opposite
incentive. See infra text accompanying notes 241-42. Though the problem of obsolescence
pertains only to bequests for social purposes, an initial "capriciousness" standard may be applied
to bequests for personal purposes as well; but this has always been assessed by courts, not
trustees. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text. Courts also perform this function in
connection with use-restricted trusts for persons in a few states. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note
69, at 51 n.205.
235. Compare Professor Atkinson, who would rather move in the-opposite direction,
shifting cy pres power over charitable trusts from courts to trustees. See Atkinson, supra note
72, at 1115-16. Under Atkinson's proposal, then, charitable trusts would take on some of the
existing attributes of honorary trusts. See iaJ at 1142-44. In defense of this position, Atkinson
asserts that "the absence of an objective definition of charitable efficiency" (i.e., the relative
social welfare of alternative charitable purposes) governing the application of cy pres results in
judicial judgments imposed "arbitrarily" -whereas, "trustees would not need such a definition
to guide their actions. They could make their own judgments as to efficiency based on the
donors' wishes; on universal, societal standards; or on their own standards." IR at 1143. But
how can Atkinson then conclude that "this approach would avert the primary problem of
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"error costs. 36
Indeed, it could do worse than that. The concern sometimes voiced by
courts and commentators about honorary trust process is that it is insuffi-
ciently supervised; without beneficiaries who have standing to safeguard the
bequest, an honorary trustee may yield to temptation and misappropriate the
funds.237 This appears a false alarm: The fact that the trustee cannot be
enjoined to carry out an honorary trust shifts standing to residuary legatees or
heirs to petition for a resulting trust in the event of refusal or malfeasance.238
These alternative beneficiaries have precisely the same mercenary incentive
to monitor an honorary trustee's activities in pursuit of nonperformance as
would direct beneficiaries of a like-sized enforceable trust in pursuit of
performance. 2 9 So long as honorary trustees have a duty to account, their
judicial control"? Id. Is not the prospect ofjudgments by unfettered trustees equally, if not
more, problematic? Indeed, in the context of noncharitable trusts, we have no assurance that
the trustee will even be a professional, following professional standards of conduct. Atkinson's
proposal seems premised on the empirical assumption that most charitable trustees fall into that
category. See id. at 1127-28, 1141-42, 1145.
236. That is to say, the risk that she will misread the honorary trustee's willingness to carry
out the purpose as prescribed.
237. "[lt is not possible to contemplate with equanimity the creation of large funds
devoted to non-charitable purposes which no court and no department of State can control, or,
in the case of maladministration, reform." In re Astor's Settlement Trusts, [1952] 1 All E.R.
1067, 1071, 1074 (Ch.); see also BOGERT&BOGERT, supra note 53, § 166, at 165; L. McKay,
Trusts for Purposes -Another View, 37 CONv. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 420, 423, 430-32, 435
(1973). But ef P.A. Lovell, Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts - Further Reflections, 34 CoNy.
&PRoP. LAW. (n.s.) 77,87-88 (1970) (asserting issue's insignificance: "The trustee must in fact
be trusted," as in practice she is with respect to charitable trusts).
238. But compare the case where the honorary trustee selected to carry out a purpose is the
alternative beneficiary. Here, no one else can challenge nonperformance of the purpose, and
the case is structurally analogous to an ordinary trust for a person, where the named trustee and
beneficiary are one and the same (and hence, once again, where no one can challenge nonperfor-
mance of the terms of the trust). Under trust law, the second construct fails and becomes an
absolute bequest to the beneficiary. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 99(5) & cmt.
e, 115(5) (1959). By analogy, the first construct should also fail under honorary trust law and
become an absolute bequest to the alternative beneficiary. See In re Renner's Estate, 57 A.2d
836, 838 (Pa. 1948) (construing bequest "in trust" for purpose, with residuary legatee named
as trustee, as outright gift to her with precatory instructions, in implicit recognition of structural
flaw in estate plan). Quaere, however, whether both of these constructs should be cured by
allowing the court to name a substitute trustee. See supra note 222.
239. See MoRRis & LEACH, supra note 213, at 309 ("Mhis... provides a means of
indirect enforcement which is almost as satisfactory as direct enforcement."); Harris, supra note
114, at 36-38. But see BOGERT& BOGERT, supra note 53, § 166, at 165 ("Mhe carrying out
of the terms of the gift is not apt to be insured by intervention by the successors of the testator,
since it is unlikely that they will have the inclination or ability to watch the trustee over a period
of years and go to the trouble and expense of seeking to secure the property."); McKay, supra
note 237, at 432, 435 ("[T]he courts. .. should not accept any beneficial interest as being
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monitors' information costs will also remain symmetrical.24°
But the real hazard built into the honorary trust vehicle is that it invites
collusion between the honorary trustee and alternative beneficiaries. Quite
apart from the social expediency of the testator's purpose, atrustee may refuse
to carry out an honorary trust at the behest of grasping heirs. She can then
divvy up the spoils with them under the table. Within the law of powers, this
act, thwarting testamentary intent, constitutes a fraud on the power and hence
is void.24 But one still requires a human object of the power to police the
other parties' activities. When the objects are purposes, nothing falls in the
way of conspiracies of this sort, and the fraud may proceed in broad day-
light.
42
sufficient... If the settlor has failed to confer upon some person an interest of such a character
as to guarantee (as far as that is possible) that he will come to court to compel performance then
the basic principle underlying the human beneficiary rule is breached."). One British court
distinguished the case in which atestator creates contingent interests in alternative beneficiaries
from one in which the alternative beneficiaries are already determined; in the former case, "I
agree at once that, if the persons to take in remainder are unascertainable, the court is deprived
of any means of controlling such a trust," but in the latter case, where "the persons taking the
ultimate residue are ascertained, I do not feel the force of this objection. They are entitled to
the estate except in so far as it has been devoted to the indicated purposes.... and they can
come to the court and sue.., the trustee for a breach of trust, and thus, though not themselves
interested in the purposes, enable the court indirectly to control them." In re Shaw, [1957] 1
All E.R. 745, 758 (Ch.), appeal dismissed per compromise, [1958] 1 All E.R. 245 (C.A.); see
In re Astor's Settlement Trusts, [1952] 1 All E.R. 1067, 1071-74 (Ch.); see also E.O. Walford,
Gifts to Non-Charitable Bodies, 24 CONV. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 278, 282 (1960) (asserting
incorrectly that if testator devotes her entire estate to a purpose, and hence names no residuary
legatee, then there are no alternative beneficiaries at all; but in such case, testator's heirs
constitute her alternative beneficiaries). When alternative beneficiaries of an honorary trust
hold only contingent interests, it is conceivable that their individual stakes in the corpus are so
attenuated that they could succumb collectively to "rational apathy" and fail to monitor the trust.
(On this phenomenon in other contexts, see MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LoGIc OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION 9-16, 21-36, 163-65 & n.102 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (1965)). But this is no less
true of contingent beneficiaries of an ordinary trust, which does not fail on that account. See
2 SCorr, supra note 4, § 129, at 399.
240. Under current law, it must be said, the duty to account is unclear, see infra notes 247,
250 and accompanying text, though at least one court has assumed that the duty exists: The
report would be filed with the court, "and notice of the filing of such reporf will be given to the
testatrix's next of kin. Thus the performance of the trust duties will be adequately supervised."
Feinberg v. Feinberg, 131 A.2d 658, 661 (Del. Ch. 1957); see In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552, 561-
62 (1889) (finding duty to account but also ruling that bequest for purpose constituted trust);
cf Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision ofPrivate Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295,
319 (1988) (suggesting that monitoring costs are higher for purpose trusts than for personal
trusts).
241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PRoPERTY § 20.2 (1983).
242. This outcome violates an acknowledged public policy. See In re Stoffel's Estate, 145
A. 70, 71 (Pa. 1929) (invalidating family settlement agreement that would have overridden
bequest to build monument); Callin Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 376, 381 (Orphans' Ct. 1961)
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A secondary difficulty with the honorary trust device as presently imple-
mented is its haziness as a legal category. The Restators insist that an honor-
ary trust "is not a trust, as that term is used in the Restatement of this Sub-
ject.""4 3 Rather, "it is more accurate to state that the trustee has a power than
it is to state that he holds upon trust."' Accurate, or more accurate? As
presently conceived, honorary trusts are neither fish nor fowl, inhabiting "an
obscure no-man's land between the 'trust' and the 'power'."' 45 As a conse-
quence, one cannot say with any assurance what subsidiary rules apply to
them.
24 6
The questions that ensue are legion. Must honorary trustees fulfill (any
of) the litany of fiduciary duties that regulate trust administration, but not
powers?4 Likewise, do the limitations on investment and responsibilities of
financial prudence pertinent to trusts (but not powers) apply to honorary
trusts?2A8 The Restatement seems to suggest not,249 though no cases on point
(stating dictum that "the court will not permit the parties beneficially interested in the estate to
arrange among themselves to defeat" bequest for monument). Compare the law of trusts, under
which courts have held trustees liable to beneficiaries even if they distribute to them outright
property subject to trust restrictions. Thus, for example, a trustee who would collude with the
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to accelerate distributions in violation of the distribution
restrictions imposed by the testator might still face a subsequent suit by the beneficiary for later
distributions due under the trust instrument. Accordingly, collusion between trustee and
beneficiary is deterred. See 4 SCOTT, supra note 4, § 342.1.
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124cmt. c(1959).
244. Id
245. Leigh, supra note 132, at 133; see also Palmer, supra note 21, at 285 n.198 (stating
that honorary trusts "are both trusts and powers"); Note, 73 L.Q. REv. 305, 306 (1957) ("combi-
nation of trust and power").
246. Compare Professor Bogert's somewhat cryptic assertion that "[tihe proposal for
honorary trusts is an attempt to alter one of the basic ideas [i.e., compellability] of the trust.
Such an alteration would mar the trust as an institution and confuse courts and lawyers as to its
characteristics." BOGERT, supra note 217, § 166, at 112; see also A.K.R. Kiralfy, Note, 13
CONY. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 379, 379 (1949) ("[T]he law of trusts has become the involuntary
receptacle of the anomalies of other branches of law. These anomalies stand in the way of any
systematic law of trusts."). On the other hand, Professor Leigh sees no conceptual obstacle to
the notion of an unenforceable trust. See Leigh, supra note 132, at 134-36.
247. These include the duty of loyalty, the duty not to delegate trust responsibilities
(except, under the latest Restatement, as a prudent person would do so), the duty to segregate
and earmark the corpus, and the duty to account. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§§ 169-85 (1959); RESTATEMENT (TH[RD)OF TRUSTS §§ 170-71, 181 (1992). Unless clothed
in a trust, a power does not impose fiduciary duties on the donee of the power. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.1 cmt. a (1983). Still, the doctrine of fraud upon powers
would seem a rough counterpart to the (singular) duty of loyalty. Compare id. § 20.2 with
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1992).
248. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 227-29 (1992).
249. "Since, however, the transferee has only a power and not a duty to apply the property,
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have ever appeared." Whereas state statutes ensure that a testator can in-
clude in her will a bequest to fund a preexisting trust (known as a "pourover"
bequest), can she fund a preexisting honorary trust in the same manner?"1
And what if the honorary trustee is not named, or predeceases the testator, or
dies before the honorary trust terminates? Powers are deemed personal to
their donees and expire automatically upon their deaths (or failures to be
named), whereas under the law of trusts the court appoints a trustee if none is
named, or if one dies before the trust terminates naturally. 2 Which rule
applies to honorary trusts? 3 (This question is doubly significant, for it also
and since in the Restatement of this Subject the term 'trust' connotes the existence of duties
which will be enforced in the courts, it is more accurate to state that the trustee has a
power .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. c (1959). Does the reference to
"duties" include fiduciary duties of administration and investment as well as essential duties of
performance and expenditure?
250. In only one reported case has a party been challenged and sanctioned for his actions
in carrying out a noncharitable purpose designated in a will. In that case, however, the relevant
party - who had claimed exorbitant charges for care of a dog - was still serving as executor to
the estate, and hence was subject to fiduciary duties and court supervision in that capacity. See
In re Rogers, 412 P.2d 710 (Ariz. 1966). In at least one other case, it was asserted that the
honorary trustee would make an accounting to the court. See Feinberg v. Feinberg, 131 A.2d
658, 661 (Del. Ch. 1957).
251. A pourover bequest at common law is probably effective under the doctrine of
incorporation by reference (although this may result, inefficiently, in a duplicate of the original
vehicle rather than consolidation into the original vehicle) and, if the bequest funds an amend-
able vehicle, under the doctrine of acts of independent significance. But statutory law govern-
ing pourover bequests into trusts in most states goes further: (1) surely permitting consolidation
into the "receptacle" trust, (2) giving effect to pourover bequests even when the receptacle trust
is empty (hence when amendments to it have no independent significance), and (3) in some
states, giving effect to pourover bequests even when the receptacle trust is executed after the
will (and hence could not be incorporated by reference into the will). See JESSE DUKEMINIER
& STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 364-67 (5th ed. 1995); IA SCOTT,
supra note 4, § 54.3.
252. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFPROPERTY § 11.2 cmt. b (1983) with RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 33 & cmt. a, 101 & cmt. a (1959). In some states, antilapse
statutes apply to donees of special powers of appointment, but these nowhere apply to trusts.
See Susan F. French, Application of Antilapse Statutes to Appointments Made by Will, 53
WASH. L. REv. 405, 421-28 (1978).
253. The matter has arisen only rarely in the published reports. In one case where a will
failed to name the trustee of an honorary trust to provide flowers for a grave, the cemetery
company housing the grave was appointed trustee upon undescribed "adjudication." When the
cemetery company declined to accept the honorary trust, the court without analysis proceeded
to appoint one of the executors as honorary trustee. See Epstein Estate, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 239,
239-40 (Orphans' Ct. 1967); see also Richberg v. Robbins, 228 S.W.2d 1019, 1020-21 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1950) (asserting in dicta that bequest, if construed as trust for care of animal rather
than as outright gift to animal, would be valid, despite failure of bequest in question to name
trustee). In another case where a bequest to build a cemetery monument failed specifically to
entrust anyone with that responsibility, the court read the bequest as "a direction to her execu-
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bears on the validity of bequests for purposes under rules limiting their
duration.') All of this, and more, 5 the Restatement leaves up in the air.
tor." In re Koppikus' Estate, 81 P. 732, 732-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1905). In another case, a
bequest to provide for the care of an animal that neglected to name a trustee was expressly
found valid on the traditional trust principle that "equity never allows a trust to fail for want of
a trustee." But the court interpreted the bequest at issue as creating an enforceable (not
honorary) trust under a state statute decreeing bequests for a noncharitable "humane" purpose
as "valid." See Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739, 739-41 (Ky. 1923). In another case, where a
trust for a cemetery monument also came under a state statute rendering it charitable and hence
enforceable, and the will named apredeceasing trustee, the court distinguished between specific
instructions to spend all funds and discretionary instructions whereby some funds might be left
over for alternative beneficiaries: A substitute trustee would be named in the first case but not
in the second, on the theory that alternative beneficiaries have no property interest in the first
case but do in the second. Had the trust not come under the statute, and hence been unenforce-
able, the court presumably would have ruled that alternative beneficiaries again had a residual
property interest in the event ofnonperformance by the trustee; hence, by analogy, no substitute
trustee would have been named. See In re Voorhis' Estate, 27 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822-23 (Sur. Ct.
1941). Finally, dicta in one further case asserted, without analysis, that if an honorary trustee
survived the testator but died before completing an honorary trust, no successor trustee would
be named. See In re Howard's Estate, 25 N.Y.S. 1111, 1112 (Sur. Ct. 1893); see also 2 SCOTT,
supra note 4, § 124, at 246-47 (favoring appointment of successors upon deaths of honorary
trustees); SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 29, § 1394, at 251-52 (assuming that successors will be
named); cf In re Will of Ryan, 60 I.L.T.R. 57,59-60 (Ir. H. Ct. 1925) (asserting that substitute
should be named for predeceasing trustee, but whether successor should be named for one who
dies before completing honorary trust turns on inference of testamentary intent).
254. As Professor Simes pointed out, ifhonorary trustees are deemed to be impressed with
a power personal to themselves, then no honorary trust can endure past their lives; hence, the
branch of perpetuities doctrine requiring a bequest for a noncharitable purpose to terminate
within a life in being plus twenty-one years is always satisfied, unless (as is, however, often the
case) the testator selects a corporate fiduciary as honorary trustee. See SIMES & SMITH, supra
note 29, § 1394, at 251-52. But the published cases have never turned on whether the will
names a human or corporate trustee, and bequests for noncharitable purposes not limited in
duration have almost always failed, even where human trustees are to serve. See, e.g., Barton
v. Parrott, 495 N.E.2d 973, 974, 976 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1984), aff'd, No. 85-CA-22, 1986 WL
6993 (Ohio Ct. App. June 11, 1986); Kelly v. Nichols, 21 A. 906, 907 (R.I. 1891). But cf In
re Gibbons, [1917] 1 Ir. R. 448, 452 (Ch.) (construing bequest for purpose as limited to lives
of trustees, and hence not subject to Rule Against Perpetuities, though not because bequest was
deemed equivalent to a special power). Accordingly, either courts have assumed implicitly that
successor honorary trustees can be appointed, or the issue -never discussed in connection with
durational validity in a published case - has not been raised by the parties and so has not come
to courts' attention for analysis.
255. Do state laws regulating trustees' compensation cover trustees of honorary trusts?
Absent express provision in the will, can an honorary trustee demand fees, as an ordinary trustee
can, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 (1959), whereas the donee of a power of
appointment cannot? Assuming an honorary trust involves discretionary judgments by the
honorary trustee, is there any redress for abuses of discretion, as there is with respect to an
ordinary discretionarytrust? See id § 187. Under theRestatement, an honorary trust terminates
if the trustee "refuses to apply [the corpus] to the designated purpose." Id. § 124 cmt. b. What
constitutes such a refusal? Does an abuse of discretion suffice? Do trust principal-and-income
rules, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 240-41 (1992), apply to honorary trusts?
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In a word, honorary trust doctrine needs a fountainhead. 6 This could be
either the law of powers, the law of trusts, or some precisely delineated
admixture of the two. Were lawmakers prepared to give full effect to intended
trusts for noncharitable purposes, the subsidiary-rule problem would of course
disappear in the same stroke. But even if lawmakers insisted on treating
honorary trusts as powers for purposes of performance, they still could treat
them as trusts for purposes of administration. 7 Because purpose bequests
often involve long-term responsibilities of care or expenditure, principles of
trust administration appear apropos. 8 In those jurisdictions where the
probate court exercises continuing administrative supervision over testamen-
tary trusts, 9 the beneficiary principle would present no obstacle, real or
imagined, for the trustee accounts to the court in the ordinary course. And
even in jurisdictions where the court does not (by tradition) receive an ac-
counting - hence, where the honorary trustee would, in the absence of benefi-
ciaries and barring law reform, have no one to account to - the thematic
remedial solution is to require an accounting to the alternative beneficiaries,
on pain of termination were the trustee to violate a fiduciary duty. This
solution more closely approaches the testator's intent of a full-fledged trust
than does absolving the honorary trustee from any fiduciary duties at all. Nor
does the absence of beneficiaries bear on the testator's right to create an
honorary trust with successor trustees, for courts have traditionally intervened
to make these appointments.2" In short, the analogy of an honorary trust to
a power of appointment need not extend beyond the province of enforce-
ability, even if lawmakers continue to make obeisance to the beneficiary
principle.261
256. The same structural difficulty arises in all borderlands between legal categories. See
Hirsch, supra note 142, at 588-91.
257. In an article advocating abolition of the beneficiary principle, Professor Palmer took
this position. Most curiously, he did not take the final step and advocate rendering honorary
trusts enforceable, though that step would not appear alien to his thinking. See Palmer, supra
note 21, at 282-89.
258. Honorary trusts are treated like trusts forfederal estate tax purposes. See 3AA. JAMES
CASNER, EsTATE PLANNING § 12.10.2, at 196 n.8 (5th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1998); see also In re
Shanahan's Estate, 112 N.E.2d 665, 666-67 (Ohio 1953) (discussing state inheritance tax
treatment of honorary trusts).
259. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
260. See 2 Scorr, supra note 4, § 108.2.
261. Notice also that the beneficiary principle should not interfere with the testator's right
to pourover testamentary assets into an honorary trust, a process which would again in the
ordinary course occur under the auspices of the probate court. Given that gifts for purposes are
simply another form of donative transfer, one surely finds no reason in substantive policy to
deny a testator the right to make pourover provisions for them. The opportunity to do so opens
to a testator wishing to make gifts for purposes the same efficiencies of asset consolidation
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As matters stand, testators have it in their power to wedge bequests for
noncharitable social purposes into the enforceable trust category, if they are
careful to limit the pool of potential beneficiaries. When a testator restricts
a purpose bequest to a sufficiently small group - say, the employees of a
specified company - the bequest can be deemed a class gift and so can take
the trust form, enforceable by whoever is, or becomes, a member of the
class.262 Similarly, a testator might bestow her largesse on a limited class of
enthusiasts, by bequeathing to an association devoted to a social purpose she
wishes to promote. This bequest too can take the trust form, enforceable by
whoever is, or becomes, a member of the association.263 In the first case, the
risk that a purpose restriction will cause inefficiency rises by virtue of the fact
that the purpose must find its appeal among a smaller audience; yet, per-
versely, here the purpose is strictly enforceable! In the second case, the risk
is constant, assuming new members canjoin the association. But why should
the issue of enforceability turn on the depth of the beneficiary pool? Although
added deepness may disrupt traditional mechanisms of trust enforcement, no
policy reason for distinguishing enforceability on this basis presents itself-
nor has one ever been presented by lawmakers or commentators.
Were lawmakers disposed to render intended trusts for noncharitable
purposes effective as such, the question of how to go about enforcing them
available to those who would make ordinary bequests. On the estate planning virtues of pour-
overs, see, for example, W.S. McClanahan, The Pour-Over Device Comes ofAge, 39 S. CAL.
L. REV. 163, 164-65 (1966). Furthermore, by treating gratuitous transfers for persons, charita-
ble purposes, and noncharitable purposes symmetrically in an administrative sense, the law
would allow testators to consolidate an estate plan combining one sort of transfer with another
into a single, omnibus trust vehicle, possibly generating economies of scale.
262. See In re Denley's Trust Deed, [1969] 1 Ch. 373, 374, 382-87. On class gifts, see
generally RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 120 (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 120
(1959); 2 SCOTT, supra note 4, § 120. The extent to which a testator must circumscribe the
eligibility pool of a purpose trust for it to crystalize into a trust for a class is not clarified by
the Restatement or the case law. In Great Britain, the contrast is even starker: A trust for
a noncharitable purpose is either enforceable or void, depending on whether it can fit into
the category of a class gift; but again, the line of demarcation separating the two categories is
fizzy. InDenley's TrustDeed, a purpose trust restricted to a company's employees was deemed
a class gift; cf R. v. District Auditor, exparte West Yorkshire Metro. County Council, 1986 R.
& V.R. 24 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.) (holding that inhabitants of a county, as recipients ofnoncharitable
purpose trust, constituted a group "far too large" to comprise a class); In re Lipinski's Will
Trusts, [1976] 1 Ch. 235, 248-50 (holding that members of association could enforce purpose
trust, and adding in dicta that the Jewish community of Hull would have comprised too large
a group); Keewatin Tribal Council, Inc. v. City of Thompson, 61 Man. Rep. 2d 241, 251-52
(Q.B. 1989) (holding that individual members of Indian bands could enforce noncharitable
purpose trust to provide housing for students from those bands while attending school in city
of Thompson).
263. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 119 & cmt. f (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 119 & cmt. g (1959); 2 Scorr, supra note 4, § 119.
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has still to be confronted. Here, alternative beneficiaries no longer have a
constructive role to play, for they hold no interest in the execution, as opposed
to the termination, of a purpose bequest.2" Nevertheless, several other
candidates present themselves. The simplest solution as a technical matter -
though unsatisfactory as a practical matter-would be to absorb noncharitable
purpose trusts into the administrative sphere of charitable trusts, leaving to
state attorneys general the duty of enforcing them. 65 Because the task of
monitoring noncharitable purpose trusts corresponds to that of charitable
trusts, structural consolidation appears warranted.2 The difficulty, however,
is that attorneys general already have their hands full with other matters; they
have little time to spare riding herd over trustees. Even now, it is a notorious
fact that attorneys general look into the accounts of charitable trusts only
when word leaks back to them of irregularities, usually as a result of media
publicity.267 Such a turn is unlikely in the case of noncharitable purpose
264. Several courts have nonetheless posited this possibility, apparently on the assumption
that the testator's heirs feel a moral obligation to see her wishes carried out. See Snouffer v.
Peoples Trust & Say. Co., 212 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ind. App. 1965) (treating bequest for mauso-
leum as aspect of burial rights, rather than as trust); In re Sill's Estate, 84 N.Y.S. 213, 215 (Sur.
Ct. 1903) ("It seems to me that some person must have the right ... to see that the trust is
properly carried out. In this case who could it be if not the next of kin of the testatrix?");
Sherman v. Baker, 40 A. 11, 12 (R.I. 1898) ("[lit is hard to see why it should not be enforced
as a trust. The answer that there is no one in interest to have a standing in court is met by the
rejoinder that an heir at law of the testator has a sufficient interest to see that the will is carried
out."). A few courts have also granted heirs standing to enforce trusts for charitable purposes,
although most courts, following the Restatement, do not. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 391 & cmt. e (1959); 4A SCOTT, supra note 4, § 391, at 375-78.
265. For a British proposal along these lines, though limited to noncharitable trusts
conferring "an appreciable benefit on a sufficient section ofthe public," see Gravells, supra note
196, at 415-16. Under current law, state attorneys general claim jurisdiction only over charita-
ble trusts. In the case of a noncharitable trust, "[t]here is no community benefit which permits
the time and effort ofa public official to be devoted to its enforcement." Green v. Connally, 330
F. Supp. 1150, 1157-58 (D.D.C. 1971).
266. If cost is a consideration, noncharitable trusts could be made subject to a periodic
administrative fee for the attorney general's efforts. See, by analogy, I.R.C. § 4940 (West 1989)
(imposing periodic excise tax on private foundations); Williams Home, Inc. v. United States,
540 F. Supp. 310,312 (W.D. Va. 1982) (reciting legislative history indicating that purpose of
excise tax is to impose costs of supervision of foundations on those foundations).
267. See DUKEMENIER & JOHANSON, supra note 251, at 675; 4A SCOTT, supra note 4,
§ 391, at 361; Brody, supra note 195, at 481-82. For an example of the abuses that can result,
see Brody, supra note 195, at454-56; cf Rob Atkinson, UnsettledStanding: Who (Else) Should
Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 683-85 (1998). In many
jurisdictions, charitable trustees do not even have to account to the attorney general, adding
considerably to information costs. The Commissioners have promulgated legislation designed
to cure this difficulty. See UNIF. SuPERviSION OF TRUSTEES FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES ACT,
7B U.L.A. 727 (1954). A few states have also reorganized the offices of their attorneys general
to better accommodatethetask ofmonitoring charitabletrusts. See, e.g., Wallace Howland, The
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trusts, especially trusts for personal purposes like the care of graves or pets,
of small interest to anyone who is alive.
A different, and probably more effective, option, achieving consolidation
of a different sort, would be to lodge jurisdiction over noncharitable trusts in
the probate court, sua sponte.26s Probate courts are well suited to this task:
They serve already in a supervisory (and not merely adjudicative) capacity,
auditing the accounts of personal representatives of estates and, in some
jurisdictions, of trustees of all testamentary trusts. 269 To give effect to pur-
pose bequests as testamentary trusts under this same judicial mandate would
extend a preexisting responsibility, one that probate courts have discharged
effectively."' At least one modem court has taken this position, in spite of the
Restatement.2Y ' But if courts found this added responsibility burdensome,
History of the Supervision of Charitable Trusts and Corporations in California, 13 UCLA L.
REV. 1029, 1030-32 (1966). This is the exception, however. Judge Posner has suggested that,
in the absence of effective oversight by the attorney general, lawmakers limit the duration of
bequests for charitable purposes. Professional trustees and foundations will then have strong
market incentives to self-regulate, given the periodic need for new fund-raising. See POSNER,
supra note 126, § 18.5. One cannot assume, however, that this approach would much affect the
behavior of trustees of noncharitable trusts, many of whom probably are not "repeat players"
with reputational capital to protect-though for one unlikely counter-example, see Ward, supra
note 98 (noting Purdue University's entry into honorary trust business).
268. This solution would not, however, suffice for a revocable inter vivos honorary trust
(or, if you will, an "honorary living trust"), which would escape the jurisdiction of the probate
court. That this vehicle is valid we can surmise from the fact that the Restatement contemplates
revocable powers, when clothed in trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.1 &
cmt. b & illus. 1-2 (1983). So, whether an honorary trust is itself deemed a trust or merely a
power which can be placed within a revocable trust, honorary trusts may be structured to avoid
probate.
269. See ATKINSON, supra note 176, § 142; BOGERT& BOGERT, supra note 53, § 563; 5A
SCOTT, supra note 4, § 570. But see UNWF. PROBATE CODE § 7-303 & cmt. (amended 1993)
(stipulating no requirement to account to court). In a few jurisdictions, courts also audit the
accounts of all charitable trusts. See 4A ScoTT, supra note 4, § 391, at 363.
270. See ThomasJ. Alexander, Court ControlofTrusts, 33 UMKC L.REv. 1, 17-21 (1965)
(advocating judicial supervision of accounts of ordinary testamentary trusts). But cf 2 SCOTT,
supra note 4, § 124, at 244-46 (asserting that "it would be a departure from the traditional view
of the function of a court to permit it to act on its own motion" in this situation, but acknowl-
edging analogy and admitting possibility). The criticism sometimes made ofjudicial supervi-
sion of testamentary trusts is that, given the trustee's coextensive obligation to account to
beneficiaries, court accounting is redundant, adding unnecessarily to the expense of trust
administration. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-303 cmt. (amended 1993); McGoVERN ET AL.,
supra note 53, § 14.10, at 702-03. Of course, in connection with noncharitable purpose trusts
which lack beneficiaries, court accounting would implicate no redundancy.
271. SeeDevereux'sEstate, 48 Pa. D. & C. 491,500 (Orphans' Ct. 1943), appealquashed,
46 A.2d 168 (Pa. 1946) (deeming noncharitable purpose trusts valid as trusts, with "standing
to compel the trustee to perform... here supplied by the power.., of orphans' courts to
supervise and control the activity of the trustee"); see also Snoufferv. Peoples Trust & Say. Co.,
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they could be granted power to delegate it, appointing an independent auditor
for each purpose trust.272 Professor Scott suggested this solution, by analogy,
in the case of a trust for an unborn person, which (incidentally) the Restate-
ment acknowledges as enforceable, despite the absence of a present benefi-
ciary.2" The executor of the estate could also be charged with the duty, as a
natural (albeit long-term) extension of her fiduciary obligations to the estate.
Executors already oversee the performance of conditions precedent to taking
a bequest and of contractual obligations owed to a decedent, devices which
can also serve as vehicles for effectuating purposes.274
Yet another possibility would be to grant standing to persons who benefit
indirectly from a purpose bequest. Courts have had recourse to this expedient
to give full effect to trusts for purposes in a few instances. Where, for exam-
ple, the testator bequeaths funds for the maintenance of a cherished home-
stead, the surviving owner has been deemed the beneficiary, with standing to
sue the trustee 5 And in the case of trusts for social purposes meeting the
charitable criterion, courts have awarded individuals holding a "special
interest," distinct from the general public, standing to sue to enforce the
purpose.276 Lawmakers could readily generalize and even liberalize this
212 N.E.2d 165, 170-71 (Ind. App. 1965) (finding that bequest- expressly held not to consti-
tute trust-to build family mausoleum is valid: "The court having probatejurisdiction officially
oversees performance of all conditions in the will."). For opinions taking this position prior to
the promulgation of the Restatement, see supra notes 39-40.
272. Were such an approach taken, the auditor - like other court appointed guardians -
should serve as an officer of the court, subject to personal liability if she fails faithfully to
perform her duties. Like a guardian, the auditor might also be required to post a bond guaran-
teeing performance of those duties. See RICHARD V. MACKAY, THE LAW OF GUARDIANSHIPS
at v, 56-57 (3d ed. 1980).
273. TheRestatement itselffailsto set out an enforcement mechanism fortrusts ofthis sort.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 cmts. c & d (1959); 2 SCOTT, supra note 4,
§ 112.1 (adding that recognition of enforceable trust in this connection presents "no great
difficulty"); see generally William F. Fratcher, Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only.4scertainable
Beneficiary, 47 MICH. L. REv. 907 (1949).
274. See Snouffer, 212 N.E.2d at 170 (suggesting that executor serves to enforce bequest
for purpose of constructing mausoleum when considered an aspect of burial rights); ATKINSON,
supra note 176, §§ 117, 120. On the use of contracts and conditions to effectuate purposes, see
Hirsch, supra note 6.
275. See Stanton v. Stanton, 101 A.2d 789, 793-94 (Conn. 1953) (involving bequest for
upkeep of homestead, to be maintained "as a memorial" to testator's parents, where their
descendants were to have beneficial use of the property); Bliven v. Borden, 185 A. 239, 245
(RI. 1936) (oddly suggesting that issue turns on whether testator intends by bequest for upkeep
of property to benefit its owner or not); In re Cassel, 1926 Ch. 358,370; Kennedy v. Kennedy,
1914 App. Cas. 215, 220 (P.C.) (finding trust invalid on other grounds).
276. See Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918, 923-24 (Mass. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 694 (1998); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 & cmt. c (1959); 4A SCOTT,
supra note 4, § 391, at 366-70. This was also the solution adopted by the ancient court
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principle. Because indirect beneficiaries hold a financial stake in a purpose
trust, whether charitable or not, we might expect them to be its most vigilant
monitors. The attorney general and other representatives lack this personal
incentive. The problem is that in the case of trusts for social purposes, the
group of indirect beneficiaries may be so large or uncertain that no single,
potential beneficiary has a sufficient motive to undertake the cost of monitor-
ing on her own;2" whereas, if the trust is for a personal purpose, the indirect
beneficiaries (though few in number) may have interests so insubstantial as
to deter monitoring no less decisively.278 This form of enforcement must
hence be judged inadequate in and of itself, though it could serve to supple-
ment those already described.279
The most radical - and possibly best - solution would be to establish
a state board to oversee all purpose trusts. Such has often been proposed
in connection with charitable trusts to ease harried attorneys general out of
the business of trust-enforcement.28 ° Rather than a charity board, law-
makers might just as well create a generalpurpose trust board, again collect-
ing all of these kindred entities, facing identical challenges of nonbeneficial
enforcement, into the same regime of accountability. By combining adminis-
trative centralization (an advantage over court or executor supervision) with
structural consolidation, lawmakers might achieve significant economies
of scale.28'
of chancery, prior to the enactment of the statutes of charitable uses. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
277. This is the problem of rational apathy, discussed in a different context supra note 23 9.
Information costs (i.e., those necessary to ensure that the persons who benefit from a purpose
bequest are aware of its existence) pose an additional obstacle.
278. Cemetery companies and successive owners of animals, for example, may care
relatively little whether trusts for the care of graves and pets are properly implemented. Cf
SHERIDAN, supra note 27, at 152-53.
279. Notice, by analogy, thatpersons with a "special interest" in enforcing a charitable trust
receive standing to sue that is concurrent to that of the attorney general. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
280. See Brody, supra note 195, at 481-82; Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the
Charitable Dollar: An UnfulfilledState Responsibility, 73 HARV.L. REV. 433,449-60, 476-83
(1960). Such a system exists under reforms begun over a century ago in Great Britain. See 4A
ScoTT, supra note 4, § 391, at 361-62.
281. Similar benefits could be gained by reorganizing the attorney general's office to
accommodate the responsibility of trust monitoring. For a discussion in connection with
charitable trusts, arguing that an independent agency can serve as a more effective monitor than
courts or an attorney general (who inevitably responds to political pressures), see Karst, supra
note 280, at 476-83; cf Brody, supra note 195, at 497-500 (criticizing state charity board
alternative). Once again, if cost is a factor, noncharitable purpose trusts could be charged
administrative fees for state monitoring services. See supra note 266.
BEQUESTS FOR PURPOSES
We may notice lastly that in many states lawmakers have already ad-
dressed themselves to one fragment of this problem. Their response belies by
way of concrete demonstration suppositions we have challenged in the ab-
stract and also reveals that no novel legal processes need be contrived in order
to render noncharitable purpose trusts enforceable; lawmakers could accom-
plish this end simply by broadening the sweep of rules already extant.
In most jurisdictions today, bequests for the upkeep of a cemetery lot,
though noncharitable at common law,2" 2 and despite the absence of a living
beneficiary, are by statute permissible in trust form.2"3 In a number of these
states, legislators have circumvented the beneficiary principle by decreeing
cemetery trusts to be charitable,2" a path that, if widened, would lead to
categorical consolidation." 5 But in other states, legislators have not hesitated
to charge the beneficiary principle head on. They have done so by bestowing
282. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 cmt. h (1959); see also, e.g., In re
Waldron, 109N.Y.S. 681,684-88 (Sur. Ct. 1907); Todd v. St. Mary's Church, 120 A. 577,578
(R.I. 1923); Foshee v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 617 S.W.2d 675, 677 (rex. 1981). Some critics
have nonetheless detected a public interest in these bequests. See Heinlein v. Elyria Say. &
Trust Co., 62N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945); BOGERT&BOGERT, supra note 53, § 377,
at 184.
283. For a fairly up-to-date compilation of the relevant statutes, see 7 POWELL, supra note
53, 589, at 46-15-35; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.6, statutory note
3 (1983); 4A ScoTr, supra note 4, § 374.9, at 236-40. The Restatement of Trusts contains no
such provision: bequests for the care of graves remain honorary trusts. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124, cmt. d (1959). Statutes of the sort described hereinafter are to be
distinguished from others expressly permitting contracts for the care of graves; these are not
specifically enforceable and hence are structurally akin to honorary trusts. See, e.g., NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 452.090 (Michie 1996).
284. SeeALA. CODE § 11-17-13 (1989); CAL.HEALTH&SA=ETYCODE § 8776 (West 1970
& Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.13 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-
1419a (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 12-511 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:19,31:20 (1988
& Supp. 1998) (construed in Webster v. Sughrow, 45 A. 139, 140 (N.H. 1898), and Opinion
ofthe Justices, 133 A.2d 792, 794 (N.H. 1957));N.M. STAT.ANN. §§ 58-17-4,58-17-8 (Michie
1998); N.Y. EST. POWERS&TRUsTs LAW § 8-1.5 (McKinney 1992); S.C. CODEANN. § 27-5-70
(Law. Co-op. 1991); WASH. REv. CODEANN. §§ 68.24.080 (West 1997) ("shall be deemed to
be... for the benefit of[ ] the general public").
285. The decision by a state to re-label purpose trusts as charitable has no federal tax
consequences. See Child v. United States, 540 F.2d 579, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1976); First Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 532 F. Supp. 251,253 (D. Neb. 1981); supra note 66. It could have state
tax consequences, though once again the legal status of a purpose trust respecting its tax
treatment is severable from its status respecting other substantive rules: Thus in one state,
lawmakers have made trusts for cemetery lots enforceable and tax deductible without deeming
them charitable; accordingly, although exempt from state inheritance taxes, they do not fall
within the jurisdiction of the attorney general. See 760 ILL. COMe. STAT. ANN. 95/2, 10016,
100/12 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); 4A ScoTr, supra note 4, § 374.9, at 23940.
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standing on courts,2 6 or state authorities, 287 or individual persons288 to compel
the execution of a cemetery trust.28 9 These breaches of the forensic palisade
erected so long ago by Sir William Grant confirm its flimsiness as a conceptual
(let alone functional) impedimentto purpose-trust enforcement and could open
the way to its complete demolition.29
286. See ARK. CODEANN. § 20-17-904(c) (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1995) (annual accounting
to chancery court); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 26-202, 26-208 (West 1994) (semi-annual
accounting to district court).
287. See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/12 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (annual accounting
to office of comptroller).
288. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 214.130 (West 1996) (deeming trust enforceable by "[a]ny
court having equity jurisdiction within the county ... upon the application of any person
whatever"); MIss. CODEANN. § 41-43-3 (1993) (stating that "on petition of any person having,
or feeling, any interest therein," chancellor can remove trustee for maladministering trust).
289. Still other safeguards have been introduced here and there. In one state, amaladminis-
tering trustee is subject to fining. Half the fine goes to the prosecutor of the complaint, thereby
giving private persons a mercenary incentive to monitor. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1222 (West 1981). In several states, th6 trustee must post a special bond with the court or other
public authority, conditioned on the faithful performance of trust duties. See HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 441-37(c) (1993); 760 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 100/9(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 26-205 (West 1994). In quite a few states, the trustee of an enforceable
cemetery trust is limited to a corporate fiduciary, ecclesiastical society, or cemetery association.
These bodies may face independent bonding requirements and also necessarily have reputational
capital at stake. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. § 32-2194.27 (West 1992); CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY
CODE § 8775 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-299 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, § 3552 (1995); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/2, 100/3 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); IND.
CODEANN. § 23-14-53-1 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 114, § 5
(West 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 214.130 (West 1996); NEB. REv. STAT. § 12-510 (1997); N.Y.
EST. POWERS &TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.5 (McKinney 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.730 (1997); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CoDEANN. §§ 712.001(5), 712.021(a) & (b), 712.030 (West 1992 & Supp.
1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5306 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-32 (Michie 1995); Wis.
STAT.ANN. § 701.11 (2) (West 1981 & Supp. 1998); see also OKLA. STAT.ANN. tit. 11, § 26-202
(West 1994) (trustee appointed by district court). In afew states, the trustee may also be, or can
only be, a municipal authority. See CONN. GEN. STAT.ANN. § 19a-299 (West 1997); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 566.14 (West 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 214.130 (West 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. AN.
§§ 31:19-22a (1988 & Supp. 1998); OHOREV. CODEANN. § 517.15 (West 1993). One must
observe, however, that in some jurisdictions, lawmakers have made bequests for care of a grave
enforceable as noncharitable trusts and allowed anyone to serve as trustee, without establishing
any safeguard whatever for their enforcement. Perhaps in these states the issue is consciously
left for judicial development, though more likely the problem never occurred to the drafters. See
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-110 (West 1990); Mc. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.351 (West 1988
& Supp. 1997); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 307.05 (West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 8A:4-8 (West
1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-49, 36A-146 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 35-5-6 (1997).
290. The Commissioners have recently crafted - though far from flawlessly - an optional
section of the Uniform Probate Code that achieves this result, and several states by statute have
adopted the section or a variation of the section. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 (amended
1993). I have critiqued the Commissioners' efforts and addressed the state statutes in another
essay. See Hirsch, supra note 6.
BEQUESTS FOR PURPOSES
IV. Conclusion
This Article has argued that the traditional fault lines running through the
law of purpose bequests are misplaced. Save for the tiny sphere of bequests
for antisocial purposes, bequests for purposes of all sorts merit facilitation;
what is more, lawmakers may quite reasonably gather them into the same
regime of substantive legal doctrine. The prevailing disjunctions within that
doctrine are unjustified from the standpoint of public policy.
The key to this conclusion lies in the scope of our outlook. Lawmakers
and commentators have to stop thinking about bequests for purposes as
isolated constructs. They ought to look at them by comparison to ordinary
bequests for persons and, more particularly, by the light of public policies that
underlie testation and dead hand control in general. So viewed, the classical
distinctions drawn between purposes which do and do not further the public
interest appear inconsequential: Either way, bequests for purposes can stand
on the same footing as bequests for persons and need not lean upon "the
crutch of charity" '291 for policy support. In this same larger context, the
structural distinction between bequests for social and personal purposes stands
out as more significant, leading us along separate channels of policy inluiry.
But even these ultimately converge analytically; at the end of the day, one
finds no reason to treat purpose bequests differently on this basis either.
Absorbing bequests for purposes into a single legal category would also
generate meta-benefits arguably no less significant than the primary ones.
Unification, after all, serves to simplify the law. Simpler law is easier and less
costly to abide by.292 On top of that, the removal of boundary lines has the
salutary effect of precluding uncertainty and argument over where the lines
fall. Were purpose bequest doctrine unified, litigation over whether a particu-
lar bequest met or failed to meet the criteria of charitability would become a
thing of the past.293
291. In re Endacott, [1959] 3 All E.R. 562, 570 (C.A.).
292. It is also fairer, in the sense that better counselled and more poorly counselled
individuals are placed on a more equal footing. See generally Mary L. Fellows, In Search of
Donative Intent, 73 IowAL.REv. 611,613 (1988) (framing principle of"equal [estate] planning
under law").
293. For a recent example, see Evangelical Luth. Charities Soc'y v. South Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 495 S.E.2d 199 (S.C. 1997). On the traditional fuzziness of this boundary-line,
along with the parallel ill-definition of the line separating noncharitable from superstitious
bequests, which also prompts litigation, see supra note 185. The one area in which the
traditional distinctions are arguably merited, in spite of the litigation that ensues as a conse-
quence of them, is gratuitous transfer taxation - although this matter too is controversial. See
supra note 67. In any event, here a federal statutory definition could readily be implemented,
and the traditional fuzzy line could with relative ease be transformed into abright-line, minimiz-
ing litigation.
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 33 (1999)
But would such a merger simultaneously entail meta-costs? Responding
to British proposals to authorize trusts for noncharitable social purposes,294
effectively rendering the traditional distinctions inconsequential, one com-
mentator warned that charity's "death" as a "meaningful category within
any branch of the law" would "be ultimately destructive," depriving English
law of"moral values that should not bejettisoned."295 A provocative thought,
this: Would the end of charity as an autonomous legal concept weaken the
moral fiber of the community at large? The notion seems farfetched - lay
persons, after all, observe social norms as well as legal norms, and the disap-
pearance of "charity" from Black's Law Dictionary will not dislodge it from
Webster's. But if the charitable impulse of lay persons is unlikely to flag,
what of law-persons? Would the replacement of "charitable" gifts with the
neutral concept of "purpose" gifts tend to dim a thousand other points of light
within our law? Would hard cases continue to make bad decisions in a legal
universe where charity is dead? One would like to believe that lawmakers, for
all their professional immersion, continue to draw inspiration from social
norms, and that the abandonment of doing-good as a doctrinal construct, for
sound policy reasons, would not smother the principle as a doctrinal value, let
alone ajurisprudential ideal. Legal values well up from below-they need not
shine constantly upon lawmakers from some analogical sideline, such as trust
law, in order to leave their mark.
Still, as always in our law, the answers we adduce to pointed questions
merely point us on to further questions. As critics of the law, our lot is to
follow along, gamely and without surcease.
294. See supra note 196.
295. CHESTERMAN, supra note 4, at 406-09; see also id at 227-29.
